#QuasarRAT is another RAT we see from time to time in our IR cases and was also used against NATO facilities in March. [1]
We can hunt for
1⃣ The default port within the FW logs
2⃣Mutexes
3⃣User-Agent
4⃣Persistence mechanisms
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2/ @qualys has published an excellent paper ("Stealthy Quasar Evolving to Lead the RAT Race") about Quasar, where the whole builder and much more are described in detail. [2]
3/ In the client builder (which creates an executable which is used for the infection), the default port is pre-configured to 4782.
4/ On ThreatFox by @abuse_ch, we see that a quarter of the samples kept this default port. [3]
The other samples use a different high port.
5/ We can create a "random" Mutex per client build, though random is not quite right. 🤔
6/ With a regex, we can find these random mutexes and thus efficiently find infected clients on the network:
9/ In networks were TLS is broken up on the proxy, the hard-coded user agent string could be used for hunting or setting up monitoring for this value. [6]
10/ Quasar uses the same persistence mechanisms as AsyncRAT, which we analyzed in a previous tweet [9].
A run-key entry is created when ran with an unprivileged user, or a new scheduled task is created when ran with administrative credentials.
11/ And although @pmelson pointed out in March of this year that the source code for Quasar is still available online on Github, nothing has not changed 🤷♂️. [7], [8]
1/ We recently had an interesting #Azure case where the TA, instead of creating a new Inbox Rule, added email addresses of interest to the list of blocked senders and domains.
The incoming emails will get flagged as spam and moved to the Junk email folder. 📂
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2/ Here is a screenshot from Outlook web access
(the view might differ, as, for example, here on the screenshot from the theitbros [1])
1/ Customer receives an email from a network monitoring device that a host is supposedly infected with a #CoinMiner. The Task Manager on the said system shows the following screenshot 🤕.
A story of an unpatched system, incorrect scoping, and 🍀. 🧵
1/ I used #AutoRuns v14.09 (GUI) in my lab setup but noticed that it failed to find (or display) the malware in the Startup folder, although the file is there (screenshot below).
I checked back and forth, searched manually for the file, and restarted the OS and AutoRuns.
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2/ With #Velociraptor, I ran the hunt Sysinternals.Autoruns, and with the CLI version of AutoRuns, the malware is found in the Startup folder.
3/ The same for the #Velociraptor hunt Sys.StartupItems.
1/ Real-World #PingCastle Finding #13: Allow log on locally
➡️ Domain Users are eligible to log into DC's 🤯🙈
"When you grant an account the Allow logon locally right, you are allowing that account to log on locally to all domain controllers in the domain." [1]
"If you do not restrict this user right to legitimate users who must log on to the console of the computer, unauthorized users could download and run malicious software to elevate their privileges." [1]
3/ I encountered this finding several times in our AD assessments, so you better check your settings in your domain right now (better safe than sorry 🔒).