2/17 Russia's war against Ukraine seems to many people to be local and not too big on a global scale. But if we compare it with World Wars І and II, then in terms of the level of destruction of artillery, Russia is not inferior to the artillery of the USSR in 1941-1942.
3/17 If you divide it by the length of the front line, then the destruction caused by Russian artillery is comparable to the scale of the destruction of Hitler's army in 1941-1944.
We see one of the most destructive wars right now. And it is difficult to call it a local conflict.
4/17 How long will Russia be able to feed this beast?
According to Novaya Gazeta, Russia had 15 million artillery shells at the beginning of the war.
Also, Russia can produce another 1 million shells per year and restore 0.5 million old Soviet shells novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/…
5/17 According to my calculations, this will be enough for about 11 months.
But from November to April, Russia will certainly experience logistics problems due to bad roads.
Most likely, Russia will not experience an acute shortage of shells until next summer-autumn.
6/ Maybe the artillery will exhaust its resource earlier?
It is difficult to say what wear Russian artillery had at the beginning of the war. But most likely, the existing artillery + restored systems from warehouses will be enough to maintain intensive shelling for 12-24 months.
7/17 Trench warfare
If Ukraine does not have enough weapons, and Russia does not have enough soldiers to conduct large-scale offensive actions, the war may turn into trench warfare in the fall.
In trench warfare, the one with more artillery has the upper hand.
8/17 Long-term war
A war of attrition is not beneficial to Ukraine, nor to the US and its allies. Russia has sufficient reserves to conduct intensive military operations. Sanctions will catch up with Putin much later than the missiles and ammunition will run out.
9/17 How to prevent this?
To prevent a prolonged bloody war, one of these conditions must be present (preferably all 3):
a) Ukraine must have enough armored vehicles to conduct large-scale offensive operations
10/17
b) Ukraine must have enough artillery to conduct an effective counter-battery fight along the entire front line
c) Ukraine should have enough long-range weapons to hit logistics routes (bridges, railways), airbases, and warehouses deep in the rear
11/17 Armor
Ukraine received about 1,000 armored vehicles and 300+ tanks. This is essential, but not enough to form a large-scale strike group.
12/17 Afghanistan received 24,000 HUMVEE and 800 infantry fighting vehicles from the USA. Yes, these are very different wars, both in terms of duration and scale of actions. But I do not think that the goals of democracy in Ukraine are less than the goals in the East...
13/17 In addition, the equipment received by Ukraine is very different. In the short term, this is acceptable. But in a long-term war, you need to make a system of repair and maintenance of this equipment. And this is difficult to do with dozens of different systems.
14/17 Artillery
Ukraine received about 340 artillery systems. And this is also a lot, but it is much less than what Ukraine has already lost in this war. And Ukraine already has many different artillery systems supplied by allies. This is also a problem in the future (if not now)
15/17 The firepower of Ukrainian artillery dropped sharply in May. Now the soldiers often complain that the artillery does not have time in all directions and is often late.
16/17 HIMARS and M270 really play a big role. But they rather restrain the Russian army than destroy it.
Russia is forced to adapt to new conditions. Logistics becomes more difficult, and the consumption of shells is greater.
17/17 Ukraine needs powerful long-range missiles, such as ATAСMS. Which are capable of destroying fortified infrastructure facilities, air bases, and warehouses at a long distance. Then the Russian supply may come to a dead end.
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Battle of Pokrovsk
The battle of Pokrov became the biggest battle of this war. But it also became one of the largest battles in history in terms of the number of armored vehicles lost. 1/
2/ In the battles near Pokrovsk, Ru losses are close to the number of the entire Western Military District of the Ru Fed as of 2022, which was being prepared for war with NATO. And this is about 60% of the forces with which Russia planned to seize Ukraine in three days in 2022
3/ In October 2023, Ru defined the offensive on Pokrovsk as the main axis of its offensive campaign. Obviously, Putin is focused on the goal of completely capturing the Donetsk region as the highest priority goal in the coming years. But this offensive led to colossal losses.
Russia is suffering more and more losses trying to look like the side that is winning.
The dynamics of Russian losses indicates the price of the Russian offensive. 1/6
Russia had to go to a colossal increase in its losses in order to continue to look like the winning side. If in 2022 Russian losses amounted to about 200 soldiers per day (killed and wounded), in 2023 - about 500, then in 2024 Ru reached the mark of 1,0 and 1.5K soldiers per day
Russian losses increased 10 times compared to the first months of the war.
Given that the hostilities are taking place in fairly limited territories, the overall losses of the Russians are unprecedented. 3/6
Resources of war
Can Russia sustain this war for years? Here are some calculations to help estimate this.
Thread 1/
@RALee85 @olliecarroll @ragnarbjartur @konrad_muzyka @McFaul @HelloMrBond @SpencerGuard @JominiW
2/
Let's start with artillery, which looks the most vulnerable
Standard calculations of the resource of artillery barrels show that at the current rate of firing, Ru needs about 2.5-4К barrels per year. If we add to this direct losses in battles, Ru total need is about 4-5K per year
Half a year ago, I joined the procurement reform team of the Ministry of Defense-the Non-Lethal Procurement Agency (DOT)
This is my second "campaign" for reforms in the defense sector after Ukroboronprom in 2019. And here I would like to share some thoughts and my own experience
2/ Soviet architecture and corruption are the worst things Ukraine inherited from the USSR. In Soviet times, corruption was the only way to become a wealthy person. Wealth and commerce were prohibited by law, but the desire of people to live better did not disappear anywhere.
3/ For the first twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian society was aware of the problem of corruption, eventually defining it as the main enemy of democracy and the development of the state.
Struggle for resources
When Ukrainians say that we need more weapons, the West often thinks that it is a sign of ingratitude.
In fact, Ukrainians are grateful, but there is another side - how many weapons your enemy supplies to the front.
This thread will explore this topic 1/
2/ Russia
Many people look down on the Russian army after its defeats in Ukraine in the first year of the war.
But the Russian doctrine is based on the fact that Russia is able to withstand heavy defeats and incredible losses, but not to give up its political goals.
3/ Ru is still a significant power, if not in terms of the quality of weapons, but in terms of their quantity.
Since the beginning of the war, Ru has removed approximately 6,000 howitzers from its storage facilities.
Russia spent $22.8 billion on missile attacks on Ukraine.
This is more than half of all US military aid to Ukraine ($43 billion).
A short thread about missile attacks this winter: 1/7
2/7 Despite the sanctions, Russia has increased its missile production and can now produce about 100 missiles per month.
In October, Russia reduced the intensity of its use of missiles, apparently preparing for winter attacks on UA energy.
3/7 Air Defense Ukraine has become much more effective than a year ago. If until October 2022, Ukrainian air defenses shot down about 30% of missiles, then after the transfer of NASAMS, Iris-T, Patriot, Samp-T, Ukrainian air defenses began to intercept up to 80-90% of missiles.