At a press conference on sidelines of the Quo Vadis seminar in Spain, @JosepBorrellF gave a little insight on #IranDeal negotiations during a press conference a few minutes ago. Translated from Spanish he said that after circulating his proposal on the final text... -1-
"There was an Iranian response that I think was reasonable." That was transmitted to U.S. and the U.S. has not yet responded. "We are awaiting its response and I hope that this response will allow us to complete the negotiations. I hope for that but I can't assure you of it"-2-
"The response was supposed to have come already. A meeting was foreseen in Vienna towards the end of last week. It wasn't possible. It's possible that happens during this week." -3-
Couple of interesting points. @JosepBorrellF is going on record with view of some Euro diplomats that Iran response to EU text was "reasonable." In fact, it goes a tad further than that. Most of the responses I got from Euro sources was that US could work with Iran response.-4-
He's also giving ammo to the Iranian argument now that the U.S. is procrastinating on its response under political, diplomatic pressure. By confirming he'd foreseen a Vienna Joint Commission meeting last week, he's putting pressure on Washington over response timing. -5-
I doubt that was intentional. He might have thought that no-one was paying too much intention to his press conference in Spanish in mid-August. But there we are. But I'm sure Tehran will find his words very useful. -6-
The comments come at Minute 10 here. As far as I can tell, @JosepBorrellF offered these comments on #IranDeal without being asked about it. The event and his previous public Q&A at the seminar focused overwhelmingly on Ukraine. -7-
And here's the text for those who don't speak Spanish and want to run through Google translate. eeas.europa.eu/eeas/quo-vadis… -8-
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
What did Iran most resent about JCPOA? The slow economic benefits it generated because of extreme caution by western banks/firms. What has it pressed for most in current negotiations? Multiple economic guarantees and assurances that it won't happen again - or at least that -1-
it won't be as slow as last time. What are the biggest threats to that? 1/ Republican majority congress and presidency in 2025. 2/ The threat of renewed non-nuclear sanctions vs Iran firms/banks. Needn't be more than a few sanctions targets to chill western economic ties. -2-
Why was Russia's sanctions economic guarantee demands a show-stopper in March? wsj.com/articles/iran-… Because US officials made clear they wouldn't sit by and allow JCPOA to undercut Russia sanctions. wsj.com/articles/u-s-w… -3-
This is such an important point. So I repeat it. We know and have known for a week that Iran didn't include safeguards in its list of issues it was concerned about in its response to EU text on Aug 15. Implying that it could live with the new safeguards language in text.BUT...-1-
that is ABSOLUTELY NOT the same as saying that Iran has dropped its demand that probe must be closed if deal is to be reimplemented. If the US know Iran has dropped this stance, that's significant. But the Iranian negotiating team is denying that on record. -2-
Finally. Yes, it's also important if Iran is no longer insisting on an upfront guarantee that safeguards will be closed before deal resurrected. We all said that last week. But that's still not same as saying we know Iran would complete reimplementation of deal if probe open. -3-
Some really strong comments today from @rafaelmgrossi to @BeckyCNN on the Iran probe and what he wants to see. But also a significant fudge. Grossi says the Agency will not drop the probe unless Iran offers full cooperation. "People say, "are you prepared to drop it?" Well... -1-
"the key to this lies in one simple thing: will Iran cooperate with us? Give us the necessary answers, information, access to people and places so that we can clarify the very things that are still in need for clarification." My emphasis: people and places. -2-
Continues that people say the Agency is political, a view he says is "unacceptable." Continues: "we have an obligation - a legal obligation - which is to clarify many things that Iran has still to clarify." My emphasis "Many Things." -3-
As far as I can see there are around half dozen possibilities tomorrow, which was the unofficial deadline for responding to the EU whether the #IranDeal participants accept the deal/text left on table after latest vienna talks. -1-
1/ I think most likely is that we get no Iranian response Monday at all. They like to make a point of ignoring western set deadlines and have been pretty scornful of idea that EU text from Monday is final and negotiations over. So doubtful we’ll get Iran response tomorrow. -2-
Second most likely is we get an Iranian response which is not framed as final. But says we are ok with bulk of text but we want “assurances” on several issues — including the safeguards IAEA probe. More talks needed, Tehran would say, either with EU or broader -3-
“Several.” The precise definition of what several means is going to be a very important factor in assessing the costs/benefits of a revival #IranDeal - if we get one. At essence, threshold nuclear or not?
“The situation we're in today, as a result of the decision to withdraw from the deal, is, Iran is only a handful of weeks away from having enough fissile material for a bomb.” -2-
“So, again, we have to compare this to the reality we're living today, if we could get a deal that would put Iran back ***several***months away from being able to have enough fissile material for a bomb,” @USEnvoyIran -3-
A little thread on safeguards and @iaeaorg and P5+1. This is more thought exercise than source info. But there’s lots of speculation on this but I think the options are relatively narrow. 1/ the safeguards probe is based on traces of man-made nuke material not suspected past -1-
Nuclear work like PMD. This makes it a core safeguards IAEA concern. 2/ as such, the IAEA has independent authority to investigate and the IAEA board has authority to decide the fate and future of that investigation 3/ undoubtedly the P5+1 are important, powerful board members-2-
They clearly can influence via the IAEA board the fate of the safeguards probe. But via the Board legally. This is not a JCPOA/Joint Commission power. So what does all this mean? What solutions are possible? A/ Iran drops its demand to end probe. Unlikely at this point. B/ -3-