Ayatollah al-Haeri’s resignation from the marja’iya is not only a rare event, it is ill-timed & extremely dangerous.
Al-Haeri knows the consequences of his announcement to #Iraq. Otherwise, he is right to question his own fitness to remain as a marja’. (1)
To be sure, there is no reasonable urgent cause to make such an inflammatory announcement at this critical time. A second-tier marja’ like al-Haeri (84 years old), with no serious impediment to his daily life functions could wait for a calm time to make this move. (2)
Also, history of his peers, and the ones senior to them, show that they remained in their position until they died — many of them more advanced in age & in worse health conditions than him. (3)
It is obvious that his announcement, considering both its timing & phrasing, can be seen as being induced (or coerced) by the leaders of his country of residence, #Iran.
Here is my reasoning: 👇 (4)
Al-Haeri’s inclusion of the following inflammatory points was uncalled for: 1. Directing his emulators to follow Ayatollah Khamenei is not the usual practice of his counterparts, who normally leave the matter to people’s responsible choice. 2. Openly delegitimating al-Sadr. (5)
The first point above shows lack of courtesy to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who is the leading Marja’ in #Iraq.
The second point further alienates al-Haeri’s target audience (the Sadrists), whose attachment to al-Sadr cannot be dissolved by a fatwa. (6)
It is worthy to note that al-Haeri has very limited following outside the Sadrist movement. His loss of the Sadrists has effectively expunged his entire influence henceforth. Therefore, his endorsement of another marja’ and all other final admonitions are obsolete. (7)
For the Sadrists, this is al-Haeri’s second strike; the first was in 2004 when he dissociated himself from Sadrists political actions. His resignation obviously made his last strike. Many of Sadrists already left al-Haeri back then. (8)
Al-Haeri maintained a base among young Sadrists who are not old enough to emulate Ayatollah M. Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr before he was assassinated by Saddam’s regime in Feb. 1999. For them#se youth, al-Haeri is followed in adherence to Sadr’s recommendation before he died. (9)
This brings up the question: who is now the new Sadrist marja’?
Well, it does not matter in the political sense. The Sadrists are not a religious movement in the narrow meaning. They are a political & a social movement whose marching orders from Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr. (10)
That said, for religious matters (worship & daily-life transactions) they can follow any marja’ they see proper, per each individual’s discretion. The resignation of al-Haeri or the termination of his marja’iya for any other reason was not going to alter the Sadrist path. (11)
Indeed, it is commonplace that all Shia mass movements are internally split on their individual emulation, while maintaining a unified discourse on the movement’s affiliation with a certain marja’, if such collective affiliation is announced. (12)
On his part, Sayid Muqtada al-Sadr released his own defiance to al-Haeri, announced his complete withdrawal from public life, sending a message to all concerned that they are on their own in facing the angry masses on the streets. (13)
If the crisis is not defused by the system’s internal devices, expect a statement from the Shia highest authority in Najaf (G Ayatollah Sistani), who is the last resort for Iraq.
One limitation may be carefully considered: Sadrists must hear from Sadr to heed Sistani’s call. (14)
👇Takeaway:
If al-Haeri’s absence from the scene caused such turmoil, this is a minor league level compared with the scenarios outlined in this 2019 paper I coauthored with @barbaraslavin1, which is relevant now and so will be for quite sometime to come.
Good to see @sarahsavant1 translate this text.
During the Abbasid era (particularly 8th - 10th centuries), an exquisite literary genre appeared mainly in #Iraq — a form of Arab-Persian polemics called Shu’oubiya. (1)
Trying to justify their political & military dominance over many non-Arab peoples & territories, some Arab authors & literary figures (as well as some non-Arab sycophants), such as al-Jahiz & ibn Qutaibah, wrote elaborate works in support of claims of Arab “excellence”. (2)
In response, Persian literary figures, who enjoyed numerical superiority & no less literary quality, flooded libraries with books that belittled the Arabs & mocked their claims of “excellence”, while emphasizing their own glorious past. For more juiciness, poets soon joined. (3)
Readout from the meeting between @Pontifex and Grand Ayatollah #Sistani:
“Grand Ayatollah Sistani thanked the Pope for taking the hardship of the trip to Najaf to visit him and wished him & the world’s Catholics happiness, blessings & prosperity.” (1)
Readout from the meeting between @Pontifex and Grand Ayatollah #Sistani:
“G. ayatollah Sistani emphasized the importance of securing a peaceful & secure life for Iraqi Christians and protecting their constitutional rights, explaining the measures he took for this purpose.” (2)
Readout from the meeting between @Pontifex and Grand Ayatollah #Sistani:
“Grand Ayatollah Sistani emphasized the role of religious & spiritual leaders in easing the suffering of oppressed people worldwide & called on great powers to adopt reason & wisdom rather than war.” (3)
Today is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s 90th birthday.
He ascended to the position of “al-Marja’ al-A’la” after his teacher Grand Ayatollah Abol’Qasim al-Khoei passed away in 1992.
Sayid Sistani was born in Mashhad (#Iran). In 1952, he arrived in Najaf (#Iraq). (1)
In Najaf, Sayid Sistani studied for 10 years with two of the most prominent scholars in Najaf, Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei and Grand Ayatollah Husayn al-Hilli. Also attended teachings of G.A. Sayid Mohsin al-Hakim. (2)
In 1961, Sayid Sistani traveled back to his hometown in #Iran.
In that year he received 2 certifications of his “ijtihad” (ability to independently issue Islamic legal rulings). He also received a ertification in “hadīth” scholarship from its master, Agha Buzurg Tehrani. (3)
#Iraq, Today's Statement of Grand Ayatollah #Sistani, from Friday Prayer:
"In times of crisis, the need to unity & setting internal disputes aside intensifies. Disputants must give up, even if partly, their personal & factional interests for the sake of collective good." (1)
#Iraq, Today's Statement of Grand Ayatollah #Sistani, from Friday Prayer:
"Cooperation by competition by disputants, each of whom possesses part of the power, & attempts to imposes their respective views will help exacerbate the crisis & prevent its solution." (2)
"Such competition may cause all parties to lose, & the biggest loss will be suffered by the country & its average people who have no role in internal conflict, who only care for their country's security, stability & sovereignty." (3)
The best solution to #Iraq's problems is to support the Iraqi state to be fully sovereign & independent, and to prevent the influence of its neighbors, whether it is direct influence of by proxies. A weak Iraq cannot be helpful for the region or for the world. (1)
1. strong and functional democratic institutions. 2. credible measures of the rule of law. 3. respect of human rights & international law. 4. elimination of corruption. 5. state control of the use of force.
6. energy independence. 7. strong economic opportunities & employment rates. 8. good governance and high measures of transparency. 9. complete overhaul of the education system.
10: investment in #Iraq's human resources.
#Iraq: Abu Mahdi al-Mihandis, 2nd man in the Popular Mobilization Forces & Gen. Qasim Soleimani, Commabder of Iran’s Quds Force, were killed in a US military operation.
This took the recent US-Iran conflict to another level, putting Iraq in the heart of the fight. (1)
#Iraq’s national leaders hoped to avoid having their country being theater of US-Iran conflict.
Three reactions to watch for in the next few hours:
Iraqi PM Adil Abd al-Mahdi, Muqtada al-Sadr, Sistani’s Friday message in the coming few hours, & of course Iran’s statement. (2)
The Iraqi Govt. will try to contain the consequences of this event, which is perhaps the most consequential event in Iraq after the US invasion of Iraq.
But the main challenge will be the armed groups that aren’t controlled by #Iraq’s Commander-in-Chief. (3)