Trent Telenko Profile picture
Sep 1 • 19 tweets • 8 min read
I am going to use this @wartranslated retweet to set up another casualty logistics🧵 to highlight what is going on during the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson.

Regarding @wartranslated Russian MoD leaked 50k dead number, that seems believable to me.

1/
Strategypage.com is reporting the Russians casualty ratio is about 2 wounded for each soldier killed in combat.

This ratio is based on Ukrainian analysis of Russian Army cell phone, radio, texting & internet traffic.

2/
strategypage.com/htmw/htart/art…
I've talked about casualty ratios & medevac logistics repeatedly since 24 Feb 2022.

This earlier tweet of mine is the heart of the issue as far as medium intensity warfare casualty ratios are concerned.

3/
For that Strategypage.com ratio to be true, all of the 15/100 that need medical trauma care to survive after a wound in the Russian Army simply don't get that care.

What high velocity artillery fragment & gunshot wounds do to a human body requires stopping the
4/
...bleeding (the Platinum 5 Minutes) and replacing the lost blood volume (the Golden hour) with plasma, if that is all that's available, and whole blood ASAP.

Getting viable whole blood to a wounded soldier in that 'Golden Hour' was a major feat of modern military logistics

5/
...which was first addressed in WW2.

The bar chart below uses data from the US Army Green book series and it shows the amount of whole blood made available in the Southern Philippines campaign.

The difference between the March & April 1945 campaigns was a gasoline powered
6/ Image
...ice chip machine add in early April 1945.

It was simply easier to have these gasoline powered ice chip machines in the whole blood supply chain topping off ice in coolers filled with units of blood as they moved to the front.

USN whole blood ice chest in the photo below
7/ Image
I think the Russian casualty ratio is much worse. than 1:2 KIA/WIA.

Ukrainian com-data would not reflect Russian soldiers who died of wounds later in hospitals or the 'missing' who are actually dead.

When I reviewed the post-WW2 Okinawa campaign casualty data, the US Army
8/
... went out of its way to hide that 'died of wounds later' number during WW2.

Overall, in WW2 there were 118,376 US Army Infantry branch immediate battle deaths & another 19,799 infantry battle casualties that died of wounds in hospital, AKA 16.7% of immediate battle deaths
9/ ImageImage
The US Military's Okinawa definitely had a "Golden hour" for most of the 83-day land campaign, either side of the torrential rains of May 1945.

Even then, US infantry wounded were getting plasma at battalion aid stations within 90 odd minutes with medivac flights to Guam.

10/ ImageImageImageImage
I've attached some screen captures from the article "Review of Military Casualties in Modern Conflicts -- The Re-emergence of Casualties from Armored Warfare" including the abstract and a couple of tables.

This makes clear to me that the Russian Army in Ukraine is taking

11/ ImageImageImage
... at least 24 hours to get wounded soldiers to advanced trauma care.

This is why I am still leaning towards a two dead for every three Russian wounded as the more realistic Russian casualty ratio in Ukraine.

12/
Medical care in Russia is horrid, so Russian Army 'died of wounds' is at least that 16.7% the US Army infantry had in WW2.

Additionally, large numbers of Russian "missing soldiers" are actually incinerated to bone dust Russian tank and light armored vehicle crews.

13/ ImageImage
The T-64/T-72/T-80/T-90 tanks and BMP/BMD IFVs ammo carrousel designs are utterly horrid for incinerating their crews' bodies.

14/ Image
Using Strategypage.com's 2 WIA to 1 KIA ratio, purportedly from Ukrainian sigint intercepts, would put Russian losses at ~136,000 casualties (dead and wounded) in Ukraine by 29 Aug 2022.

15/
A 2:3 KIA to WIA ratio, assuming 50K dead per @wartranslated Russian MoD leak, puts total Russian casualties at 125,000.

In the 2014-2015 ATO operations in Donbass, Ukraine has a 1 to 4.5 ratio of KIA to WIA in summer fighting and a 1:2 ratio in the winter fighting
16/
...in the Debaltseve Salient.

That was a function of cold weather increasing deaths from shock and loss of blood plus Russian shelling slowing Ukrainian medivac.

17/ ImageImage
Between much higher ratios of both whole blood & hemostatic dressings available to Ukrainian ground forces.

We can expect that 1:4.5 KIA to WIA ratio has applied throughout the current Russo-Ukrainian War for AFU.

18/
And that casualty ratio is better than that right now in Kherson because Ukraine had time to stockpile medical supplies for this counter-offensive to US/NATO battle medicine standards ahead of time.

19/End

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More from @TrentTelenko

Sep 1
@UAWeapons has a real point here vis-a-vis the TB2.

The idea of "Anti-Access Area Denial" (A2AD) works both ways.

Ukraine is using US GMLRS & HIMARS missiles to push Russian high altitude SAM systems like Buk, S-300 & S-400 over 100km from the #Kherson front lines.
1/
When you do that and punch the relevant numbers into a radar horizon calculator.

It shows Ukraine created a ~1,200 feet of altitude "safe operating zone" below the ability of a long range radar directed SAMs to engage over #Kherson front lines.

translatorscafe.com/unit-converter…

2/ Image
Theoretically this makes a TB2 easy meat for a Russian shoulder fired SAM.

But said Russian shoulder fired SAM has to have a night sight to get TB2's after the sun goes down, or replacement batteries if they do have a night sight.
3/ Image
Read 5 tweets
Aug 30
This is one of the key indicators I have been looking for that Russian Artillery has "hit the wall" in terms lacking logistical capability to go on.

Barrel liners have to be replaced regularly or you destroy the artillery barrels.

(H/T @ChuckPfarrer )

1/7
I've mentioned that in earlier threads here:

2/7
Read 8 tweets
Aug 30
HIMARS, RuAF Logistics & UAF fire support🧵

The two biggest logistical items for a mech force by tonnage are artillery ammo & fuel. The mix depends on the operation. Moving needs fuel. Static operations require more shells.

Ukraine has reduced Russian Army Kherson supplies
1/
...to ~20% for 2 weeks by bridge attacks.

Russian tanks & AFV's don't have an auxiliary power unit - a small fuel efficient engine-generator - to run for recharging their batteries.

This means Russians have to run their engines a few times a day to recharge the batteries.
2/
Any tank or armored fighting vehicle is filled with multiple radios & electronics for the night vision sensors, gun/missile aiming systems and fire control computer.

All of these taken together pull a lot of power and will drain the vehicle's batteries quickly.
3/
Read 23 tweets
Aug 30
This Kherson City video from the @emilkastehelmi Ukraine offensive thread has me going🤨🤔

My take is we are seeing Ukrainian Special Forces & Partisans striking Russian soft/logistical targets to spread fear uncertainty and doubt (FUD) in the Russian Army chain of command.
1/5
Top down command structures tend to be brittle under pressure & take longer to recover from the shock of such attacks than armies with more local initiative at lower command levels, barring a really energetic & skilled top-down flag rank commander.

2/5
Historically, Authoritarian/Totalitarian regimes are low on such generals because they are a political threat to the ruling elite in peacetime.

Prolonged wars allow people like the Soviet Union's General Zhukov to appear in such regimes, but it is a process that takes years.
3/5 Image
Read 5 tweets
Aug 26
In this Antonivka bridge GMLRS strike video, pay attention to the water splashes left, the cadence and repeatability of the strike, as well as the dust/debris between the bridge roadway and the river.

1/
Now watch this US Army program manager video of GMLRS Alternative Warhead missile tests.

The size of the GMLRS blasts and their sounds -- over the rock music background -- match what you are hearing on the @EuromaidanPress Tweet video.

2/
Most GMLRS used on the Antonivka bridge were likely standard blast as opposed to 'Alternative Warhead' fragmentation missiles, but the amount of explosive and the resulting sound/blast/smoke will be very close to the test video when viewed from a distance.
3/
Read 6 tweets
Aug 26
This appears to be an important piece of video evidence as to the ongoing collapse of Russian artillery tactical truck logistics inside Ukraine.
Logistical🧵

These are Russian 122mm artillery shells that are simply being dumped out the side of a civilian vehicle into the dirt
1/
This @HN_Schlottman tweet shows you how a 122mm round is properly packaged, two to a 80-85 kg box with two propellent charges and two fuzes.

2/
This @HN_Schlottman tweet gives you the dimensions & weights for Russian 152mm & 122mm properly packaged shell wooden box containers

3/
Read 7 tweets

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