From near-conclusion to near-collapse, back to near-conclusion, now edging again toward collapse: New @CrisisGroup report on the #Iran nuclear negotiations, which have had more twists than a telenovela and higher stakes than ever.🧵👇 crisisgroup.org/b87-middle-eas…
2| Talks to revive the JCPOA have been a peculiar, even sui generis exercise: 2 central protagonists with no direct engagement, negotiating a return to a deal they've already agreed to, with multiple parties engaged directly or indirectly as participants or mediators.
3| Despite these peculiarities, by early March a deal seemed within reach at #ViennaTalks: Technical text essentially complete, IAEA discussing a roadmap to resolve safeguards issues, planning for a ministerial meeting to seal things up. But then began the unravelling.
4| Russia introduces demands for sweeping sanctions exemptions. The EU puts the physical talks on hold. Progress on the safeguards investigation languishes. The U.S. and Iran exchange proposals back and forth, inconclusively, while shifting to a de facto Plan B.
5| In June, US & Iran meet in Doha for indirect talks. Doesn't go well. A US official said: "There's no proposal on which the Iranians have said yes [since March]. If their system doesn't have a consensus on returning to the deal, specifics don't seem to be the core issue".
6| With the impasse deepening, the EU throws the diplomatic dice in July by introducing a text that the parties discuss over several days in Vienna. It's the first time all sides are physically in the same place in about five months. ft.com/content/e759d2…
7| Since then, however, it's been a step forward, a step back. Recent comments by US, E3 and EU officials, including from the usually optimistic @JosepBorrellF, about positions diverging rather than converging, and looming midterms invert recent predictions of imminence.
8| The points of divergence are by now familiar: Iranian demands over sanx relief and guarantees the Biden administration says it can't provide beyond its time in office, and the fate of the @IAEAOrg safeguards investigation into past activities at undeclared sites.
9| As we note in the report, on guarantees and safeguards, it may well be the case that the circles cannot be squared. Apropos of BoG and E3's weekend statement in particular, there is no way to get around the investigation other than Iran cooperating as it committed in March.
10| In the meantime, even as negotiations stall, Iran's nuclear activity does not.
Latest numbers of @IAEAOrg reflect what ought to be a deeply concerning state of play: Stockpiles growing, limited monitoring, breakout shrinking - though no indication of weaponization.
11| It's possible that a deus ex machina can change these dynamics in days or weeks ahead, but prospects seem increasingly bleak. In which case the default for all sides is an escalatory one we've already started to see: More sanctions pressure met by nuclear counterpressure.
12| And given the challenges in restoring a deal that already existed, the prospects for alternatives to the JCPOA - more-for-more or an interim agreement don't look very auspicious either. More modest single-step measures or humanitarian deal might be easier but not easy.
13| In which case, European or regional intermediaries may need to shift from hoping for the best to planning against the worst by quietly nudging Tehran and Washington in the direction of tacit understandings that keep a lid on nuclear and regional brinksmanship.
14| Notably, Iran's nuclear activity has little room for further expansion before it hits a potential tripwire for a covert or overt action. Steps such as increasing enrichment to 90%, expelling inspectors or making a move toward weaponization could get very ugly very quickly.
15| Other side of that coin is holding off on steps that, rather than increasing pressure on Iran to rejoin existing or unicorn better deal, could prompt a response that does the opposite. UN snapback right now or more sabotage vs nuke facilities carry precisely those risks.
16| We've also been seeing still-potent threat of regional escalation, notably in exchanges b/w Iran-backed groups & US forces in Syria. Ongoing threats against current/former US officials also a serious concern. Can't stress enough how bad it would be for IRI to pursue this.
17| For the cover photo of this report, we borrowed (h/t @PhilippeErrera) the cover page of the draft text as it was being negotiated in February.
"Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", indeed.
And this image may well be the closest we'll come to seeing a final text.
18/18 Neither side may yet willing to call time on #ViennaTalks. But the proverbial window to reviving the JCPOA may not be closing - it may well now be closed. Having lost an opportunity to deliver a win-win, it falls on all sides to limit the lose-lose. crisisgroup.org/b87-middle-eas…
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گزارش جدید گروه بحران از مذاکرات هستهای منتشر شد.
تلاشهای اخیر برای احیای برجام از مرز توافق تا مرز فروپاشی در نوسان بوده است. الان به نقطهای رسیدهایم که باید پرسید: آیا اصلاً برجام قابل احیاست؟ اگر بله، چگونه؟ و اگر خیر، جایگزین چیست؟ ۱/
مذاکرات احیای برجام به نوبه خود تجربه بسیار منحصربهفردی بوده است: دو طرف اصلی ماجرا، بدون گفتگوی مستقیم و با حضور اعضا و میانجیهای متعدد، بر سر بازگشت به توافقی مذاکره میکنند که آن را چند سال قبل امضا کرده بودند. ۲/
در مقطع کنونی، آنچه مانع توافق شده دو مورد عمده است: ۱. درخواست ایران برای تضمین رفع تحریمها و نبود قابلیت قانونی دولت در آمریکا مبنی بر ایجاد تعهد برای دولت بعدی و ۲. سرنوشت تحقیقات پادمانی آژانس درمورد فعالیتهای قدیمی ایران در مکانهای اعلامنشده (از متن گزارش 👇) ۳/
"It is important to stop and remember that we are not debating between excellent and ideal alternatives, but between alternatives that are currently on the table – which are a situation with an agreement versus a situation without an agreement." 1/ bit.ly/3wXiEiv
2/ "As much as we at @INSSIsrael have analyzed the scenario of a lack of an agreement, we have consistently come to the same result – significant progress by Iran in its nuclear program, which will bring it to a nuclear threshold."
3/ "Economic and operational pressure, which in the view of the regime might endanger its stability, may bring the Supreme Leader to increase his determination to change his nuclear strategy... And to break out to a nuclear weapon."
If Iran is so adamant on closing @IAEAOrg safeguards investigation once and for all, best thing it could do is acknowledge past undeclared activities instead of making up excuses about fabricated/planted evidence and politicized probes. It's easy: Here's a statement. 🧵
2/ "In the late 90s and early 2000s, we were pretty worried about what Saddam was up to with his WMD program. We know the rest of the world was too, because the Americans started a war over it. So yes maybe we did look into a bit of R&D and forgot to disclose it. Busy times".
3/ "Our bad. We put those documents away and had actually totally forgotten about them until they popped on a PowerPoint in 2018. Bit awkward, we admit. But we never did any weapons-related work after that. Even the CIA says we abandoned it nearly 20 years ago."
جنگ روسیه و بحران انرژی در اروپا برای کشورهای دارای ذخائر نفت و گاز فرصتی طلایی ایجاد کرده. ۵ماه است که نه ایران و نه غرب نتوانسته اند از این موقعیت منتفع شوند. این بازی باخت-باخت، با احیای برجام می تواند به بازی برد-برد تبدیل شود.👇
۲/ اروپا برای گرامایش اساساً به گاز احتیاج دارد. ایران به علت نداشتن زیرساختهای لازم (که تحریم در آن نقش بسزا داشته) نمیتواند به اروپا گاز صادر کند. بنابراین استیصال اروپا در زمستان به تقویت اهرم فشار تهران در مذاکرات نمیانجامد. اما فرصت برای ایران کجاست؟
۳/ در حال حاضر اروپا از وابستگی به یک صادرکننده گاز، یعنی روسیه، ضربه میخورد. چنین تجربهای تقویتکننده انگیزه غرب برای سرمایهگذاری در زیرساختهای صادرات گاز در کشورهای مختلف است، تا با افزایش عرضهکنندگان گاز از وابستگی خود به روسیه در آینده بکاهد.
How would Donald Trump, “master”salesman, be pitching the nuclear deal with Iran?
A thought experiment [thread]
2/ "We've just finished restoring what many people call the best nuclear deal ever reached with Iran. It's incredible. I've always said nuclear is very important to me. They can't have a bomb, they just can't. And let me tell you, you're gonna love it".
3/ "I've just been on the phone with the leaders of France, Germany and the UK. They've been telling me what a great job we've done. It's a very popular deal, let me tell you - I'm about to go speak with the head of the UN, by the way. He's also a fan."
The past few years have offered a case study to test the argument made against limiting Iran's nuclear program through diplomacy: That covert operations and sabotage can do the job better and without giving any sanctions relief.
2/ When Natanz was attacked in July 2020, intel assessment from the Trump admin and Israel claimed it would take up to 2 years for Iran to get back to pre-attack capabilities.
2 years later, Iran had 4x as many advanced centrifuges running, at higher levels of enrichment.
3/ After the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, an Israeli official said it "did not brake Iran's progress as was hoped".
No, it did not. It hit the accelerator by upping enrichment to 20%, limiting inspections, and more centrifuges.