📢New Paper📢
Mask-wearing in times of COVID has become politicized in the US. Can we leverage the salience of social ID to increase compliance w/ mitigation measures?
Our paper, "Taking the Cloth: social norms and elite cues increase support for masks among white Evangelical Americans" tests two strategies for increasing support for wearing face masks in public among one of the least compliant groups: white Evangelical Americans. (2/7)
The first is a cue from an ingroup elite - Reverend Franklin Graham - expressing support for mask-wearing in public.
The second is info about how many other white Evangelicals have worn masks in public - revealing that there has been more compliance than typically thought. (3/7)
Both strategies (Endorsement and Norms) increase expressed support for mask wearing, though the second, the one about other white Evangelicals wearing masks, generates more wide-ranging effects. (4/7)
Interestingly, our endorsement info wasn't really new to most of our respondents; but our peer norm info was. This is consistent with important work by @betsylevyp showing that changing an individual's perception about what is normative in their community can be powerful. (5/7)
I won't pretend to have expertise on Afghanistan, but I have researched migrant and #refugee integration for a few years. A 🧵:
Refugees are an economic boon to their host communities, both because of the economic dynamism of refugees themselves (pnas.org/content/113/27…) and indirectly because of the positive spillovers of cash transfers to refugees (tinyurl.com/5b6da3t9).
In fact, in many cases and against all odds, refugees revitalize struggling small towns, e.g. the case of Somali Bantu refugees in Lewiston, Maine: library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.…
The past few yrs have seen a proliferation of polisci scholarship on dictators' use of nominally-democratic institutions to prolong their tenure... but don't dictators also rely on coercion? This wk, we dove into @SheenaGreitens's "Dictators and their Secret Police." (2016) (1/8)
Dictators face a plethora of threats when they come to power, but one typically dominates in their perception. This dominant subjective threat shapes the kind of security apparatus they design, with important implications for intelligence-gathering and violence. (2/8)
Dictators most concerned with the threat of a coup from rival elites will develop fragmented and socially exclusive security institutions, intentionally fostering competition and overlap between agencies to limit any one rival actor's ability to gain too much power. (3/8)
What explains the success of radical right parties in some European countries and not others? Sound like a trendy topic? Well... it is! @TerriGivens was an early voice in this debate, & this week we read her investigation in "Voting Radial Right In Western Europe" (2005) (1/7)
Givens has to set the stage for her argument given the prominence of the established lit at the time. Sure, unemployment and immigration likely played a role but why the variation in radical right (RR) party success in a region equally affected by such structural changes? (2/7)
Could RR be attracting different types of voters in different countries? Givens actually demonstrates remarkable similarity in RR voter profile across cases, without much change over the 1980s & 1990s: young, male, blue-collar, with lower ed levels (sound familiar?). (3/7)