More evidence that we saw in #Sweden was the collapse of the center right – rather than the surge of the extreme right or an increase in polarization. Chart from pollofpolls.se#val2022#valet2022 /1
The support for the Sweden Democrats (yellow line) rose in 2014–15, when Sweden had a record number of asylum seekers scb.se/hitta-statisti… It's been relatively constant since. In Dec 2015, support for SD was 20%, within the margin of error of the election result (20.5%). /2
By contrast, the Conservative party has seen seen a sharp decline. They reached 34.8% in 2010-12, but has shrunk steadily ever since. Their election performance was a catastrophic 19.1%. In a mere decade, they lost about 4/9 of their voters! /3
SD did have a small uptick in the weeks leading up to the election. That may have been enough to push the right-wing bloc over the finish line. I don't know what caused the uptick, but it's small enough to be a matter of random fluctuation. /4
As @jonas_wikstrom points out, the data give no support for the notion that SD is an unstoppable force. In fact, they've been idling since 2015. /5
There are lots of questions to answer, and a great deal of data to analyze. But some of the narratives that have been floating around since the election can safely be abandoned. /6
The Swedish center right is celebrating as though they won the recent election. But the four traditional right-wing parties lost a cumulative 4.5% of the vote. That's considerably more than the extreme right gained (3%), meaning they must have lost voters to the left & right. /1
It would be incorrect to describe the outcome in terms of political polarization. On the other side of the political spectrum, the center left gained at the expense of the former Communists. It would be more accurate to talk about the collapse of the center right. /2
The center right may still get to form a government, now that they've hitched their wagon to the extreme right. If successful, it'll be a case of the tail wagging the dog – with the smaller, waning party in charge. It may work, but it'll be a challenge. /3
On NATO expansion and availability bias: lessons from behavioral science and 9/11 🧵 /1
Following the 9/11 terrorist attack, the share of Americans who were 'very' or 'somewhat' worried about falling victim to a terrorist attack reached 58%. /2 news.gallup.com/poll/4909/terr…
The probability of dying in a terrorist attack was never zero, but fears were wildly exaggerated. The lifetime chances are more like 1 in 45,000. Americans are *much* more likely to be killed by police, or an animal, than by terrorists. /3 businessinsider.com/death-risk-sta…
We can’t even request a new coffee machine at the University without extensive deliberation over the course of several weeks. But the Gov’t can decide to join Nato in a matter of days, with only perfunctory public discussion 🤷♂️
I tried to get a conversation started, multiple times, during the Trump era. Nobody – not even the proponents – had the slightest interest. I couldn’t get a single friend or acquaintance to engage.
Current Nato countries should know that (a) Sweden does not have a stable, enduring majority in favor of joining the organization, and (b) the decision to apply will be widely seen as illegitimate.
A thread about why philosophers are so widely disliked and disrespected quickly turned into an occasion to bash economics – a discipline about which philosophers know precious little.
Maybe that’s your answer right there.
Philosophers have the most annoying habit of criticizing things they’ve made no serious effort to understand. Doing so generates zero new insight, and it alienates people from whom they could have learned something new.
Philosophers being jackasses certainly make my life as a philosopher of economics (or philosophical economist) a lot harder than it should have to be.
I think the graph illustrates two things, both of which can be true at the same time: (1) Sweden did well in int'l comparison, all things told. (2) The first peak didn't have to be that tall: early, decisive action could have shaved the top off of it.
Relatedly: Sweden, Finland, Denmark all have comparable levels of excess mortality 2020–21. Norway is the sole outlier now.
One of the most long-standing critiques of Swedish corona policy is that it is, represents, or results from, some kind of national chauvinism. The critique gets it backwards, but it's interesting anyway: it's basically the most Swedish objection ever. /1
The line "Sweden has picked the worst possible time to experiment with national chauvinism" appeared at the very beginning of the pandemic, alongside the new term of art "public-health nationalism," e.g. in this piece. (It's been repeated many times.) /2 washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/…
The basic argument is that (a) Swedish policy results from the premiss that Sweden or Swedes are better and/or more informed than others, and (b) that the premiss is false: it isn't any better, and they aren't any better informed, than anybody else. /3