@JeremyCliffe First, it's not just centre-right parties moving further to the right (like the US republicans), but also far-right parties becoming more moderate, especially on EU policy. See Meloni, Salvini, Le Pen et al all moving away from calling for their version of either Euro or EU-exit.
@JeremyCliffe Instead, as @APHClarkson, these far-right parties have become 'Europeanised' - they know voters don't want to leave the EU, so instead they want to remake the EU in their image, with hard migration, a 'Europe of nations' w/o rule of law protections.
@JeremyCliffe@APHClarkson 2nd, in this sense, the German AfD is still an outlier - unlike Le Pen, Meloni & Co it has become more radical, moved from Conservative to far-right territory. This is why - despite today's Merz rhetorical disaster - they are further from power than their European peers.
From an EU point of view, this is both good and bad.
Good, because it means that not every national elections is a fight for the survival of the Union. Meloni as Italian PM is no longer seen as the preface to an Italian Euro or even EU exit. This is largely thanks to #Brexit.
However, this also means that the struggle for the values of the EU and where its political power centres are, is real. Does the EU want to be a liberal, open Community based on the rule of law, or one tolerating a growing number of countries with far-right parties in power?
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Today's massive tax cuts in the new UK budget also mark a turning point in the economics of #Brexit which will decide how the success or failure of Brexit will be judged in the future.
First, at the heart of Brexit was always an economic inconsistency. Some Leavers supported it to protect the UK from globalisation, attacking the EU for being a vehicle of liberal policies.
Many of those ended up as first time Tory voters for Boris Johnson, i.e. the ‘red wall’.
They wanted Brexit for a culturally conservative, but economic left-wing policies.
The almost complete absence of any EU discussion in the German #btw2021 election campaign is bordering on the absurd.
This will be a key election for the EU, but also for determining German policies. But you really need a magnifying glass to find any discussion on EU policies.
The 'Wahl-O-Mat', a vote adviser tool, has only a single question on the EU - "Should Germany leave the EU". This is absolutely irrelevant for German policy and resembles on one extreme party. No question on fiscal policy etc. that could provide nuance betw the major parties.
Today the height of absurdity was reached by an accusation that a chancellor Olaf Scholz 'could lead to the break-up of the EU', both trivalizing real threats to the Union and misrepresenting where the discussion on social policy in the EU is or could lead to.
Pre-Weekend thought on #Brexit, Northern Ireland Protocol and what it means for the EU-UK relations.
To me, part of why the UK is escalating again is due to very different lessons learned from the Internal Market Bill and its effect on the trade negotiations last year.
From a Brexiteer perspective, the Internal Market Bill is often regarded as a successful negotiation ploy. It seemingly showed the EU what a risk no deal would also be to the EU, and how serious the UK was about no deal. It thus helped getting more concessions out of the EU. /2
Following this, escalating now on NI is seen as giving the UK negotiation leverage. It forces EU attention on the difficult situation in NI, gives the UK gov the support from ERG+DUP and is expected to help generate pressure on the EU to cave on demands for change of NI protocol.
High time to think about how a possible 'reset' of EU-UK relations can be politically achieved. The EU should be open for this, but I fear the political commitment to make post-#Brexit relations work needs to come from both sides, including the UK government.
5 factors were crucial, incl the dynamic nature of the TCA, still close economic links and the co-responsibility for NI.
Others, like @Mij_Europe and @CER_Grant, were far more sceptical, stressing the pol dynamics at play in London (and to a lesser extent the EU) would continue to burden the relationship. So far, they have been proven right, with a confrontational rather than a cooperative dynamic.
UK public discourse seems to be even growing in furore over the Art. 16 debacle. But even if you acknowledge the EU Commission made a mistake, it is time for much needed perspective:
The EU Commission got under quick pressure from Ireland and corrected the mistake within a few hours. Further internal pressure will now lead to safeguards around the NI protocol.
While the UK gov is today threatening to trigger art. 16, last year threatened to violate the NI protocol with the Internal Market Bill and got the House of Commons to vote twice for that explicit violation of the UK's legal commitments.
Rumours are flying wild on how close we are to a #Brexit deal. My sense is that a deal is still possible, but the necessary compromises have yet to be made and time is running out soon.
To me it is therefore high time to think also about the political ramifications of no deal.
In this analysis, I look at three political scenarios: 1. Friendly no deal - in which EU and UK seemlessly continue negotiations and try to limit no deal fallout via unilateral actions and mini deals. Ruled out by the EU, though the temptation will be there in some member states.
2. A 'grown-up no deal' - in which the no deal consequences come, but after some confrontations both sides get back to negotiation table quickly. Preferred by EU, likely will be supported by US, but does not square with UK politics which will need to blame EU for no deal fallout.