The past week has seen a deluge of images in the media which show Russians being forcefully conscripted or fleeing their nation to avoid military service. 1/23 🧵 
2/ Despite some predictions of doom for Putin because of this, I think we need to be more prudent in our planning. The key question should be: If the Russians can mobilise the hundreds of thousands of soldiers they are calling up, what does this look like?
3/ First, they need to induct the quantity of soldiers needed. Many young Russian men are departing in a mass exodus from Russia. But millions of others will not have the means to leave Russia to escape their draft notices.
4/ These new recruits will travel to regional bases to be issued uniforms and equipment, and begin their training.
5/ Here is the first challenge for the Russians. Not only do they have a shortage of modern equipment for their people, but it is also likely that there will be a shortage of professional training staff.
6/ Much of the basic training in the Russian Army is conducted at the unit level. Not only is this vastly more inefficient than the western centralised approach, but it is also difficult to achieve a common training standard across the whole force.
7/ But individual training is only part of the Russian challenge. They then need to form these soldiers into cohesive units that can fight together. This is even harder than individual training and takes much longer.
8/ And given the majority of officers are either fighting, in hospital or dead it is unlikely much collective training will be conducted before these soldiers are dispatched for Ukraine.
9/ So far, as the Russians will assume, so good. They have their soldiers, they have given them uniforms and a modicum of training (probably around two weeks for many), and they are ready to deploy them to the front. The next challenge is getting them there.
10/ The Russians need to transport them to their units along the one-thousand-kilometre front line in Ukraine. This is challenging because of the Ukrainian capacity to hit targets deep behind the front lines.
11/ Any location where these reinforcements are concentrated will be excellent targets for Ukrainians long range artillery, HIMARS and air force attacks. As much as some might pity these new soldiers, they are legitimate targets.
12/ Finally, the Russians will reinforce depleted front-line units with these new and inexperienced soldiers. This is risky for both the green soldiers and the more experienced veterans they will join on the front line.
13/ Given the poor Russian leadership we have seen during this war, it is likely that integration of new soldiers will be haphazard. Many of them are unlikely to survive their first week on the job.
14/ Even with all these challenges, the Russians may still be able to deploy tens of thousands into Ukraine by the end of the year. Their logistic system will adjust to the inflow of new reinforcements, even if the process isn’t as effective as western methods.
15/ From this, we can draw three conclusions.
16/ First, the Ukrainians have a narrow window of opportunity before large numbers of these new recruits arrive. While some conscripts have already arrived, it will take a few weeks for large numbers of Russian troops to arrive. But it will begin in the coming months.
17/ The Ukrainians, as prudent planners, will be assuming this is the case. In the time between now and large scale arrival of mobilised troops, the Ukrainians will seek to take back as much territory and push back Russian defenders as far as possible.
18/ Second, this mobilisation is part of Russia’s larger strategy to draw out the war in the hope that western governments tire of supporting Ukraine. Putin’s attempt to use energy warfare to split Europe and end western assistance through higher energy costs has failed so far.
19/ Because of this, Putin seeks to test the strategic patience of the United States and the west by throwing hundreds of thousands of his young men into Ukraine to draw out the conflict.
20/ Finally, despite the chaotic nature of this mobilisation, the large numbers of new Russian troops will still have an impact on the war. They are not (yet) going to form large and effective formations capable of offensive operations.
21/ But they are going to fill defensive positions that must be bypassed or reduced by the Ukrainians. smh.com.au/world/europe/a…
22/ And because of that, the war will be prolonged. The surge of Russian soldiers into Ukraine in the coming months will not result in any decisive change of fortunes for Russia. All it means is that the cost of the likely Ukrainian victory will be much higher on both sides. End
23/ Thank you to the following whose images were used in this thread: @wartranslated @IAPonomarenko @NYTimes @DefenceU @sumlenny @WarMonitor3 @DefMon3
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