.@ZelenskyyUa addresses “the peoples of the Caucasus, Siberia and other indigenous peoples of Russia.
Dagestanis do not have to die in a vile and disgraceful war of Russia. Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Circassians and any other peoples who came under the Russian flag.” 1/4
.@ZelenskyyUa addresses “the peoples of the Caucasus, Siberia and other indigenous peoples of Russia.
Dagestanis do not have to die in a vile and disgraceful war of Russia. Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Circassians and any other peoples who came under the Russian flag.” 2/4
.@ZelenskyyUa addresses “the peoples of the Caucasus, Siberia and other indigenous peoples of Russia.
Dagestanis do not have to die in a vile and disgraceful war of Russia. Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Circassians and any other peoples who came under the Russian flag.” 3/4
.@ZelenskyyUa addresses “the peoples of the Caucasus, Siberia and other indigenous peoples of Russia.
Dagestanis do not have to die in a vile and disgraceful war of Russia. Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Circassians and any other peoples who came under the Russian flag.” 4/4
👆🏻👆🏻👆🏻👆🏻This is exactly what I was talking about when I said you need different messages to different constituencies in Russia at today @BritishAcademy_ event with @LawDavF
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Anatol Lieven wrote a piece about why its necessary to encourage negotiations with Russia - but it’s based on problematic assumptions/assessments. 1 is premise that “factors that have worked against Russia will do the same to Ukrainian forces if they launch mass offensives” 1/9
Let me explain why people who study war but do not study Ukrainian society should be mindful of the assumptions they make & calculations they project on the trajectories of battle, war aims, and outcomes. The reason why the Russian offensive failed is not simply logistical or 2/9
about how this “type” of conflict (like WW2) gives the upper hand to the defensive side. It is because Russia did not find a society willing to support or join their war effort. Hence having to resort to violent war crimes including concentration camps, torture, reeducation. 3/9
🧵1) Ukrainians have been dying 4 European values + chance 2 join EU since 2014! That’s not why they deserve #candidatestatus. #Ukraine deserves candidate status because even in context of war, economic crisis & pandemic their democracy strengthened & consolidated #EmbraceUkraine
2) Since 2014, in face of Russian invasion + pandemic - Ukrainians went to polls 8 times: 2 presidential (1 with 2 rounds), 2 parliamentary, 3 national local elections (1 at the height of the pandemic). All = free & fair. Unlike elsewhere in Europe voters shunned radical parties!
3) Since 2014 pol elite (although not without their moments of infighting) rallied around key reforms. 2014-2019 we saw numerous reforms with most important in transparency & decentralization. Latter = hugely successful increased local faith in democracy
Russian intel driving “new” strategy (take SE) is wrong & won’t result in “win” & strategic goal. There’s a reason why RU hasn’t been able 2 fully take Mariupol/most cities in Donbas after 2 months & it’s the same reason when hey tried & failed 2 take Mariupol in 2014/15 a🧵1/8
Mariupol 2014/15 ordinary LOCAL Russian speaking Ukrainians (workers at plants) organized community patrol groups 2 protect their city! Oligarchs backed & the UKR army (with help of volunteer battalions) defended. But it was ordinary local folks who defended what was “theirs” 2/8
When war began in 2014 median recruit was a local (from south East) male Russian speaker. Majority of volunteers came from SE regions. When we visited Ukrainian controlled Donetsk it was Eerie because all local men of fighting age were absent they volunteered 2 defend Donbas. 3/8
I am puzzled by political scientists unwillingness to accept that maybe the surveys are not wrong & that maybe, in fact, Russians did rally around the flag & moved in their willingness to back the war once it started. 🧵1/3
We should understand how motivated reasoning works & the activation of affective identity. State TV propaganda has been focused on affective ID & tapped into underlying beliefs among Russians that Ukrainians although a brotherly nation is one lower in rank. 2/3
& 1 that should submit 2 Russian demands. Humiliation of 1st weeks only further allowed 4 formation of collective beliefs about blame attribution. Once losses experienced instead of blaming themselves Russians find blame outside of their in-group & blame “lower” Ukrainians. 3/3