Here’s the first empirical analysis of the use of existing EU participatory tools, plus a proposal on how to revamp them via randomly selected citizens advising the EU 🧵#cofoe
1. After 70 years of integration, EU citizens largely marginalized in EU developments.
Yet they’re are entitled to “participate to the democratic life of the Union” since 2009, and to do so beyond elections….
2. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the EU today provides a wide array of participatory opportunities to its citizens to engage with – and potentially influence – EU decision-making.
Yet they remain little known and little used.
3. I’ve examined each EU participatory channel to discuss its rationale (what’s for?), accessibility (who can use it?), responsiveness (what can it be obtained in theory?), effectiveness (what can it be obtained in practice?).
Also gathered data set tracking their use over time
4. Despite being a pre-condition for citizens to participate in EU’s democratic life, the right of access to documents remains underdeveloped #FOIA#AccessToInfoDay
5. The systematic delays by the EU institutions in providing a response & the administrative complexities of confirmatory process & case law weaken the participatory potential of the right to access to documents in the EU. The reform of Regulation 1049/2001 is long overdue.
6. Public consultations
The Commission, unlike any EU Member State, is mandated to run a consultation for each new initiative.
7. Consultations typically shows a geographical imbalance, with a gradient of participation between the Member States in the northern and Western Europe and those in the south and east. Remember the #summertime consultation?
The accessibility of the EU right of complaint to the European Ombudsman, combined with the high rate of compliance with its decisions, make this participatory mechanism particularly relevant to individuals.
9. However, similarly to the PETI Committee, the Office of the European Ombudsman is highly dependent on the relevant institutions’ responsiveness in satisfying the demand of the complainant, as mediated by the @EUombudsman
10. Complaints to the EU Commission offer an accessible avenue for any member of the public, businesses, and civil society, which may significantly contribute to the Commission's monitoring by reporting shortcomings in the application of EU law by the Member States
11. The wide margin of discretion enjoyed by the Commission in determining whether to open an infringement proceeding - following a complaint - combined with its new administrative practice, render this mechanism little appealing to most citizens.
See @rdanielkelemen@Tom_Pavone
12. European Citizens Initiative
Despite the initial enthusiasm for this new transnational participatory instrument, the realities of day-to-day operation cast doubts on its ability to deliver on its democratic participatory potential #ECI
13. European citizens initiative
Limited visibility of the instrument, lack of user-friendliness in the registration & collection of signatures, combined with low effectiveness, have disempowered this instrument, to the point of disincentivising its use among citizens & CSOs
14. How do these channels of participation score?
When examined in terms of their accessibility, responsiveness, & effectiveness, these mechanisms’ ability in helping citizens to contribute to the Union’s democratic life appears limited, and democratic potential untapped
15. Here’s the major structural obstacles limiting EU citizen participation:
• Low EU (participatory) literacy
• Fragmentation EU participatory system & lack of self-awareness among its users
• Unequal access to EU participation
• Limited integration in EU decision-making
16. Ultimately the EU participatory instruments that have been created are detached from citizens’ political opinion-formation and will-formation – which solely occur at the domestic level –, and ultimately contribute very little to the legitimacy of the EU governance
17 The possibility of embedding randomly selected citizens into EU decision-making could offer - as witnessed in #COFOE - an opportunity to compensate for the current shortcomings of EU participatory democracy, notably its limited accessibility, responsiveness, and effectiveness.
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2. Neither the Treaty nor the rules of procedure expressly foresee an early departure of the holder of Council presidency.
They focus on pathological situations of “impediment” or “termination” for which an automatic replacement by the rotating president is foreseen. Yet these circumstances do not immediately apply here .
Michel is set to voluntarily step back
3. This suggests that a replacement for Charles Michel would need to be found and appointed by the time Michel will step back to run as MEP in Belgium, well Wallonia.
That new holder of #EUCO presidency will therefore merely complete Michel’s term to bring it to its natural expiration by the end of the year.
Charles Michel’s decision to prematurely leave the EU Council presidency to pursue his own political career as MEP is not only self-centred but also irresponsible:
it will pave the way for Viktor Orbán, the then president of the rotating presidency of the Council to take over #EUCO until a new appointment.
2. As anticipated, 6-months ago Viktor Orbán isn’t entitled to hold the rotating presidency of the EU due to his manifest conflict of interest between being in breach of EU law and potentially be the chair of the Council meetings deciding on sanctions.
Making him, even temporarily, the #EUCO president would be even more problematic and irresponsible politico.eu/article/suspen…
3. Charles Michel manifestly failed to leave a mark in EU politics as council president.
Whether he will make a difference as a leader of a national (well, regional) party in his native Belgium (Wallonie) remains an open question.
To whom does the proposed EU ‘Foreign Agents Law’ apply? 🧵
(spoiler: virtually EVERYONE including your NGO, consultancy, think-tank, research institute and you as natural personal insofar as you work with a third country).
2. Focus is on ANY provider of interest representation service, be they private organisations (consultancies), non-profits (NGOs, research institute) and individuals whose principle or occasional occupation is to influence decision-making processes at the MS and/or EU level, on behalf of a third country entity.
3. This suggests that NGOs, consultancies, think tanks and research centers based in Brussels receiving funding by third countries may be caught by the BELGIAN register to come.
🧵 Has Commissioner Várhely breached EU law when announcing solo the suspension of EU funds for Palestine?
As calls for his resignation multiply, here’re the provisions he manifestly breached but whose enforcement belongs to the sole President @vonderleyen A 🧵
2. By announcing the immediate suspension of the disbursement of the EU funds to Palestine - in reaction to the horrific attacks of Hamas on Israeli civilians on October 7th -, Mr Olivér Várhelyi breached Art. 5 of the Code of Conduct for the members of the EU Commission which operationalised their treaty obligations under Art 245TFEU
3. Under the principle of collegiality (Article 5.1 of the Code):
Members “ shall comply with the duty of loyalty towards the Commission…and act and express themselves with the restraint that their office requires.”
It’s a new collective understanding of the EU integration process, beyond full membership.
This can no longer be based on a ‘set menu’ but must move to ‘à la carte’ approach.
A thread 🧵
1. Ever since the central eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the process has been neglected, with the EU pretending to negotiate accession & candidate countries pretending to reform.
2. This has damaged the credibility of the enlargement process which has proven incapable of offering a credible accession prospect.
This has in turn confirmed the sceptics’ belief that enlargement is doomed as candidates not ready.
The ‘group of twelve’ - a Franco-German initiative - offers a credible and uniquely pragmatic approach to EU institutional reform.
Here’s why & how 🧵
2. Rather than getting trapped into endless discussions on the nature of the EU, the group offers a set of realistic reforms addressing the EU democracy crisis, which it soberly acknowledges in its multifaceted nature:
- common values (eg rule of law)
- lack of EU responsiveness to citizens’ demand & cross border challenges
- enlargement
3. The prospect of the enlargement of the EU offers the only window of opportunity for institutional reform: neither the present nor the future’s Union can’t work unless its institutional & political setting are adjusted to both new internal (eg vetoes) and external (eg Ukrainian grain) realities