Given Putin’s renewed nuclear threats today, a quick thread on why #nukes really don’t offer an effective MILITARY tool. Before we go on; yes of course it would be a dangerous, world-changing break with the nuclear taboo, would invite conventional NATO retaliation etc. (1/5)
Typical ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons have a yield of between 1kt and 30kt. They are much smaller than megaton-range thermonuclear strategic nuclear warheads. Here is a very approximate model of a 10kt airburst over Lyman for illustration. Direct damage hardly clears the town. (2/5)
For scale, see here how this fits into just Donbas. Tactical nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for troops or civilians in the kilometre or two around the blast radius. But you would need to use lots to materially alter the balance of forces in Ukraine as a whole. (3/5)
Radioactive fallout would depend on burst-height, and would contaminate Russian territory too.
In short, not only does tactical nuclear use carry huge escalation implications and political dangers for Putin; it would be militarily ineffective unless done on a large scale (4/5)
Also, Russia only has nuclear weapons left as a credible deterrent/threat to wield against the West. If it used nuclear weapons against Ukraine and they did not produce decisive effect, it would badly damage the credibility of the last strategically credible card they hold. (5/5)
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A thread on the US approval for #F16 transfer to #Ukraine once pilot training is complete:
This US decision is important as it clears one of the obstacles to delivery from European operators - US authorisation as the original manufacturer.
Several issues remain, however: (1/10)
The first is who will service and turn the jets once in country? F-16 is a complex aircraft and the airframes likely to be sent are quite old. Even on high risk timeframes it will take years to train journeyman or master level maintainers who can supervise and assure. (2/10)
This means that just like any other FMS customer that the US has helped set up with an F-16 fleet, there will be a heavy reliance on civilian contractors to supervise and provide on-the-job training to Ukrainian maintainers in-country, even after months of initial training (3/10)
For those on the give Ukraine Tranche 1 Typhoon train, since the question has been asked; 1) The RAF does not have 53 serviceable Tranche 1s to give. There are far fewer now (c20-25). 2) Those remaining have much more limited combat/weapons capabilities than Tranche 2/3 (1/6)
3) Typhoon is not optimised for low altitude A-A, but would need to fly low near the frontlines in Ukraine, due to the Russian SAM threat. 4) Typhoon is not suitable to operate from dispersed, quite short and rough airbases that the UkrAF use to avoid Ru missile strikes (2/6)
5) The RAF Typhoon force is badly, badly overstretched already. Too many operational commitments with too few aircraft, and inadequate spares and munitions stocks. 6) Even a handful of Tranche 1s for Ukraine would use up lots of those scarce spares, engineers and airframes. (3/6)
Since the Dutch F-16 announcement has generated more talks on #fighters for #Ukraine; a few thoughts. 1) The Ukrainian Air Force would absolutely benefit greatly from Western fighters in terms of air-to-air and (potentially) air-to-ground lethality. But there are caveats (1/10)
Any western fighters that could plausibly be sent would still be at high risk from Russian SAMs, so would have to fly at very low altitudes within several tens of kilometres of the frontlines. This would dramatically reduce effective missile range and limit strike options (2/10)
Most common Western close-air-support weapons like Paveway II and AGM-65 Maverick require the pilot or a JTAC to use a targeting pod or other sensor to find, ID and designate the target for precision strikes. This sort of CAS is far harder when confined to very low level. (3/10)
A few thoughts on Western choices on supplying heavy weaponry and continued munitions shipments to #Ukraine;
There is a misleading narrative emerging about the political choices around the cost of long term support and the need for a ceasefire sooner rather than later (1/8)
If some sort of stalemate is reached (it absolutely has not been for now), and a ceasefire forced on Ukraine by limits on Western support; Russia will continue to rebuild offensive capability at scale. Therefore, Ukraine would still urgently need Western weapons at scale (2/8)
It is important to understand that currently Russian forces are slowly taking ground in the Donbass but at massive cost, and the appearance of bad Ukrainian force ratios is because 🇺🇦 is holding forces back to build up mobile units to go on the offensive again in Spring (3/8)
Given interest in the Iranian Shahed-136 (and smaller Shahed-131) loitering munitions now being used at a rapidly increasing scale by Russia in Ukraine, and some of the breathless claims being made about them; a brief thread on what they can and can't do compared to jets (1/20)
Far from being cutting edge, loitering munitions have been around since the late 1980s; the Israeli Harpy being the most successful. They are essentially slow, propeller-powered missiles. Early variants had anti-radiation seekers to home in on enemy SAM radars. (2/20)
They were developed to combine the capabilities of target decoys with those of anti-radiation missiles. Due to fuel efficient, slow flight, they could travel hundreds of kilometres and loiter for several hours. If enemy SAM radars illuminated to engage, they would be hit. (3/20)
On Saki Airbase in #Crimea. The first two explosions happen in the middle of drifting smoke from a clearly already established fire. Looks black like fuel. No missiles visible in any footage. Later a third explosion exactly the same size, colour and propagation rate occurs.
(1/4)
So, my best guess is that Ukrainian forces hit the base with a fairly small loitering munition or improvised UAV, like the strike in Sevastopol a few days ago.
(thedrive.com/the-war-zone/d…)
But this time they got lucky and hit a parked aircraft or fuel truck, starting a fire.
(2/4)
The VKS has a bad habit of leaving piles of munitions next to parked aircraft, including ones that are fuelled and armed. My working theory is that Ukrainian loitering munitions or saboteurs caused an initial fuel fire that engulfed either piles of bombs or armed aircraft..
(3/4)