Justin Bronk Profile picture
Sep 30 5 tweets 3 min read
Given Putin’s renewed nuclear threats today, a quick thread on why #nukes really don’t offer an effective MILITARY tool. Before we go on; yes of course it would be a dangerous, world-changing break with the nuclear taboo, would invite conventional NATO retaliation etc. (1/5) Image
Typical ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons have a yield of between 1kt and 30kt. They are much smaller than megaton-range thermonuclear strategic nuclear warheads. Here is a very approximate model of a 10kt airburst over Lyman for illustration. Direct damage hardly clears the town. (2/5) Image
For scale, see here how this fits into just Donbas. Tactical nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for troops or civilians in the kilometre or two around the blast radius. But you would need to use lots to materially alter the balance of forces in Ukraine as a whole. (3/5) Image
Radioactive fallout would depend on burst-height, and would contaminate Russian territory too.

In short, not only does tactical nuclear use carry huge escalation implications and political dangers for Putin; it would be militarily ineffective unless done on a large scale (4/5) Image
Also, Russia only has nuclear weapons left as a credible deterrent/threat to wield against the West. If it used nuclear weapons against Ukraine and they did not produce decisive effect, it would badly damage the credibility of the last strategically credible card they hold. (5/5) Image

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More from @Justin_Br0nk

Sep 26
Given interest in the Iranian Shahed-136 (and smaller Shahed-131) loitering munitions now being used at a rapidly increasing scale by Russia in Ukraine, and some of the breathless claims being made about them; a brief thread on what they can and can't do compared to jets (1/20) Image
Far from being cutting edge, loitering munitions have been around since the late 1980s; the Israeli Harpy being the most successful. They are essentially slow, propeller-powered missiles. Early variants had anti-radiation seekers to home in on enemy SAM radars. (2/20) Image
They were developed to combine the capabilities of target decoys with those of anti-radiation missiles. Due to fuel efficient, slow flight, they could travel hundreds of kilometres and loiter for several hours. If enemy SAM radars illuminated to engage, they would be hit. (3/20) Image
Read 20 tweets
Aug 9
On Saki Airbase in #Crimea. The first two explosions happen in the middle of drifting smoke from a clearly already established fire. Looks black like fuel. No missiles visible in any footage. Later a third explosion exactly the same size, colour and propagation rate occurs.
(1/4)
So, my best guess is that Ukrainian forces hit the base with a fairly small loitering munition or improvised UAV, like the strike in Sevastopol a few days ago.
(thedrive.com/the-war-zone/d…)
But this time they got lucky and hit a parked aircraft or fuel truck, starting a fire.
(2/4)
The VKS has a bad habit of leaving piles of munitions next to parked aircraft, including ones that are fuelled and armed. My working theory is that Ukrainian loitering munitions or saboteurs caused an initial fuel fire that engulfed either piles of bombs or armed aircraft..
(3/4)
Read 4 tweets
Aug 9
A quick thread on the prospects for Western fighters for the Ukrainian Air Force (UkrAF) in the short-medium term
First, what are they needed for? Well there are two primary tasks, alongside others like SEAD and strike:
First primary one is intercepting cruise missiles (1/n)
Russian cruise missiles regularly hit Ukrainian civilian, military and industrial buildings all over the country. They are launched from long-range bombers or ships.
The bombers will stay far out of intercept range, but the missiles can be shot down by SAMs and fighters. (2/n)
Ukraine's primary defence against cruise missiles are its long range S-300PS/PT and S-300V1 SAM systems, as well as shorter ranged SA-11 and SA-8 SAMs. However, it's Mig-29 and Su-27 fighters also regularly attempt intercepts, most likely with R-73 heat-seeking missiles.
(3/n)
Read 26 tweets
May 9
Some good stuff here, but a few notable errors:
Ukraine had several brigades of S-300PS/PT and S-300V1 when the invasion began, plus SA-11s (which got most Russian jet losses), some SA-15 and plenty of SA-8s. They didn't start with MANPADS and then get S-300 from Slovakia (1/3)
Russia doesn't have '4000 combat aircraft' to play with. It has approx 110 Su-35, 150 Su-30SM/M2, 130 Su-34 and c120 Su-25SM/SM3 plus c150 Mig-31BM/K. Deployed around 320 fighters/fighter bombers for Ukraine ops, has lost at least 25. (2/3)
I just don't think airpower is the 'most important [explanatory] factor' here. Neither side's air force has serious battlefield interdiction/CAS capabilities in terms of munitions, training, CONOPS, pods. Neither could decisively use air superiority to battlefield effect.. (3/4)
Read 4 tweets
Feb 19, 2021
A few thoughts from me on the latest report of growing discord between France and Germany over SCAF/FCAS:
(1/9)
reuters.com/article/us-ger…
This is unlikely to be more than one side of a complex story, with different perspectives in the various political, industrial and military stakeholder groups precluding easy categorisations of the 'French' or 'German' (or 'Spanish') attitude to future combat air (2/9)
Having said that...
For German decision makers this project is primarily driven by political and industrial factors, in that order.
For the French it is about military capability, industrial viability and political considerations, in that order.
(3/9)
Read 9 tweets
Jan 10, 2020
In response to a suggestion by @shashj, a few points of comparison in circumstances between the shoot down of Ukraine Airlines #PS752 and other tragic accidental shoot downs. The most obvious comparison is with Iran Air 655 so I’ll start there. 1/
As is likely in the case of #PS752, when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air 655, the sensors on the cruiser had all the info necessary to see that the target was not military. A series of misjudgements and oversights by the crew led to the disaster. 2/
However, the Vincennes’ helicopter had recently taken fire from an Iranian fast attack boat, and the ship was in Iranian waters in response. Iran Air 655 was coming from the direction of a major Iranian military base too. So there was a plausible military threat at the time. 3/
Read 11 tweets

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