It is too early to ascertain the method of attack and the range of implications of this attack on the Kerch Bridge. It is certainly a punch in the face for Putin on his birthday. A couple of thoughts however in this short (for me) thread. 1/9 🧵
2/ First dropping a bridge span like this would take a lot of ‘bang’ (explosives) and good demolition design. As a sapper, we plan these kind of things all the time. The hardest bridges to drop are reinforced concrete like this. (Image: @RALee85)
3/ The amount of explosive required would be more than a few SF personnel could carry. A few trucks, or missiles / bombs would do the trick, if aimed at the right points of the bridge span.
4/ Second, the Ukrainians so far have been excellent at operational design and shaping operations in advance of their advances. This could be part of their design for taking back Crimea in the short term - or part of a deception operation to distract from other areas.
5/ Either way, it presents the Russians with a significant problem. It doesn’t stop resupply to Crimea (there are boats and the route through Melitopol), but it makes holding Melitopol even more important for the Russians. (Image: @TheStudyofWar)
6/ This would be the point in a class that the instructor would ask “so, what do we think the next operational objective for the Ukrainians might be?” Because of this, we may see Russian redeployments in the south, which will unveil other weaknesses & opportunities for #Ukraine.
7/ A third and final point: this is a massive influence operation win for Ukraine. Even if they didn’t do it, it is a demonstration to Russians, and the rest of the world, that Russia’s military cannot protect any of the provinces it recently annexed.
8/ And if we were impressed by the outflow of Russians after the recent naval aviation base attack, the rush to leave Crimea will be probably be even greater now. Lack of confidence in Putin and his military will grow.
9/ I am sure we will learn more details in the coming hours and days. But this ‘smoking incident’ is sure to be linked to other events in Ukraine’s overall military strategy. A bad month for Russia just keeps getting worse. Good. End.
There has been a lot of coverage about the Ukrainian uncrewed vessel shooting down at least one, possibly two Russian fighter bombers recently. It is a significant moment in 21st century war. But military institutions have much to do to exploit such capabilities. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
(Image: Naval News)
2/ Over the last year, there have been multiple events where uncrewed systems have launched other uncrewed systems and weapons to attack Russian forces. This has occured at sea and on land. It represents next generation robotic warfare.
3/ It is transforming the character of war. But to fully exploit this capability, military institutions must make tough decisions about the balance of crewed and uncrewed systems, as well as the balance between exquisite and cheap, massed systems.
I have just published my latest weekly update on the war in Ukraine, and the competition/confrontation with China in the Pacific. This week I explore Russia's '3-day peace' proposal, Russian casualties, the minerals deal, and the North Koreans learn and adapt. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The minerals deal is interesting. In 2017 Trump agreed with the President of Afghanistan that the US would help Afghanistan with its minerals. Trump then went behind Ghani’s back to negotiate an exit from Afghanistan with the Taliban. We should not expect too much from the U.S.-Ukraine agreement.
3/ Russia's monthly casualties have crept up this year to 40K per month.The maps in my update provide an indication of just how expensive each kilometre of Ukrainian territory has become for Russian forces, and what a poor return on their investment this has been for the Russian military. (Graph: @DefenceHQ)
An Easter truce has been declared by Putin. Not only is this a cynical act of someone who has sustained his aim to subjugate #Ukraine, it has huge practical challenges. So why has Putin done this and what does it mean for the war? 1/10 🧵 politico.eu/article/putin-…
2/ The truce is a short one - about a day. It is a truce that Putin has called unilaterally, so it is not binding on the Ukrainians in any way. That Putin has done this shows that he still believes that he has the upper hand in the war, and can dictate its tempo.
3/ But war is an interactive endeavour, and does not work like that. The Ukrainians and Russians are engaged along a nearly 1000 kilometre front line. The Russians have recently stepped up the tempo of attacks, and this momentum can’t just be turned off like a spigot.
Over the past three years, both sides in the #Ukraine war have learned and adapted. Battlefield, strategic and international collaboration and adaptation are accelerating and intensifying, resulting in a global Adaptation War. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In my latest piece, I examine how Ukraine and Russia have both 'learned to learn better' since the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022. I also look at their key battlefield and strategic adaptations.
3/ I also explore the emerging collaboration and adaptation between authoritarians. Russia's war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East have spawned a rapid expansion in the sharing of insights between Russia, Iran, China and North Korea.
In short, the ‘leader of the free world’ is considering siding fully with a brutal authoritarian, endorsing its invasion of a democracy, and agreeing with forced territorial expansion. 1/7 🧵 🇺🇦 reuters.com/world/trump-en…
2/ This will legitimise and encourage the same behaviour elsewhere in Europe by Putin, who is already conducting subversion and sabotage across the continent, and preparing his military for future aggression against other nations in Eastern Europe. The current posture and signalling from the Trump administration makes future war elsewhere in Europe almost certain.
3/ The leaders in Iran, North Korea and China are watching closely. Each have aggressive designs against democratic neighbours. Each will be highly encouraged by this clownish, amateur negotiating style and demonstrated lack of interest in defending democratic nations and values.
China admits its latest aggression around #Taiwan is a rehearsal for a blockade. This latest exercise is described as "stern warning and forceful deterrence" by an Eastern Theater Commander spokesman. A quick examination of the exercise and its purpose. 1/9 🧵 channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/chin…
2/ The spokesman also described the latest exercise as focusing on "sea-air combat-readiness patrols, joint seizure of comprehensive superiority, assault on maritime and ground targets, and blockade on key areas and sea lanes." Besides the obvious messaging and the application of military power to bully and coerce Taiwan, as well as other regional countries, into accepting Chinese pre-eminence over the Western Pacific region, why is China doing this now?
3/ First, these increasingly larger joint exercises normalise large-scale activity around Taiwan. This normalisation of military activity, at increasing scale and frequency over the past couple of years, complicates the ability of the U.S. to respond. It has to make a choice about when does the increasing scale become dangerous and worthy of an intervention.