It is too early to ascertain the method of attack and the range of implications of this attack on the Kerch Bridge. It is certainly a punch in the face for Putin on his birthday. A couple of thoughts however in this short (for me) thread. 1/9 🧵
2/ First dropping a bridge span like this would take a lot of ‘bang’ (explosives) and good demolition design. As a sapper, we plan these kind of things all the time. The hardest bridges to drop are reinforced concrete like this. (Image: @RALee85)
3/ The amount of explosive required would be more than a few SF personnel could carry. A few trucks, or missiles / bombs would do the trick, if aimed at the right points of the bridge span.
4/ Second, the Ukrainians so far have been excellent at operational design and shaping operations in advance of their advances. This could be part of their design for taking back Crimea in the short term - or part of a deception operation to distract from other areas.
5/ Either way, it presents the Russians with a significant problem. It doesn’t stop resupply to Crimea (there are boats and the route through Melitopol), but it makes holding Melitopol even more important for the Russians. (Image: @TheStudyofWar)
6/ This would be the point in a class that the instructor would ask “so, what do we think the next operational objective for the Ukrainians might be?” Because of this, we may see Russian redeployments in the south, which will unveil other weaknesses & opportunities for #Ukraine.
7/ A third and final point: this is a massive influence operation win for Ukraine. Even if they didn’t do it, it is a demonstration to Russians, and the rest of the world, that Russia’s military cannot protect any of the provinces it recently annexed.
8/ And if we were impressed by the outflow of Russians after the recent naval aviation base attack, the rush to leave Crimea will be probably be even greater now. Lack of confidence in Putin and his military will grow.
9/ I am sure we will learn more details in the coming hours and days. But this ‘smoking incident’ is sure to be linked to other events in Ukraine’s overall military strategy. A bad month for Russia just keeps getting worse. Good. End.
This week, the Chinese Foreign Minister told Europe's Union’s top diplomat that China can't afford a Russian loss in #Ukraine because the U.S. would then shift its whole focus to Beijing. China wants the war in Ukraine to continue for as long as possible. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Despite Chinese protestations they are not a party to the war and that it seeks peace talks, Wang Yi has confirmed the strategic lens through which China actually views the war. Their calculus is this: China benefits from prolonging the war in Ukraine.
3/ There are three main reasons why Xi and his advisors view a continuation of the war in Ukraine as an advantage for China in the medium and long term. These elements of advantage rest in the strategic, economic, and ideological domains.
Ukraine is teaching the rest of us what 'innovation in contact' looks like. While there are many nations exploring human-machine teaming for military operations, none are able to conduct the ultimate test of their ideas and technology like Ukraine does in combat every single day. 1/4🧵🇺🇦
2/ What we are witnessing from the Ukrainian armed forces is world-leading learning and adaptation on how crewed and uncrewed systems can operate together to achieve military objectives in very tough operational circumstances.
3/ This Ukrainian learning and adaptation is occuring across the land, air and sea domains, and features the evolution in operational concepts, organisations, training, technology, military-industrial collaboration as well as how military institutions can learn how to learn better.
Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted at multiple levels since 2022. Over the last couple of years however, the adaptation battle between Ukraine and Russia has metastasized into a global adaptation war. Democracies now confront an ‘authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc’. 1/7
2/ For some time, it has been clear that the four major authoritarian regimes – Iran, North Korea, China and Russia – have a shared interest in degrading American influence and destroying the post-WW2 order. This has led to a range of different agreements, leader summits and collaborative relationships between these four nations. It may have begun years ago but has been accelerated since 2022 by the war in Ukraine.
3/ This evolving ‘learning and adaptation bloc’ has resulted in its four key participants sharing battlefield lessons, collaborating in technology development and sanctions evasion, while also sharing and collaborating on methods of coercion, subversion, misinformation and, of course, learning and adapting.
In war, stupidity and intellectual laziness gets punished. So, selection and development of good leaders matters. But, also punished is a suboptimal learning and adaption culture. A special assessment of what Iran should have learned from military conflicts in the past year - and didn't. 1/4
2/ To attack Iran, Israel had to first work its way through proxies closer to Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. At some cost, Israel was able to remove these two organisations as consequential threats, which then left Iran as Israel’s key adversary. But Iran, through its lack of learning from how Israel destroyed the Iranian proxy forces around Israel, left itself open to the kind of attack that it is now enduring.
3/ Over the past few days, the Israeli’s have exploited the Iranians inability to systemically learn and adapt from the very obvious and accessible lessons about leadership vulnerability, air defence, and partner reliability presented in the past year.
Operationg Rising Lion is now in its second day. What insights can be gleaned, and what are the key questions about the ongoing Israel-Iran war? 1/8
2/ I think these are the ten key issues, and questions, at the 24 hour mark of the war. I will cover a couple briefly.
- Israel’s decapitation operations.
- The U.S. reaction.
- The battle of narratives.
- Has Iran learned from Russia?
- Have Israel and Ukraine Been Collaborating on Creative Drone Operations?
- Lessons for crewed-uncrewed teaming.
- Reinforcing the need for national air, drone and missile defence.
- How long can Israel sustain operations?
- Impact on Ukraine?
- Who else might exploit this opportunity?
3/ Israel’s decapitation operations. Israel targeted multiple military and scientific leaders in the first wave of attacks. Israel’s decapitation operations. There are short-term and long-term reasons for this. First, the immediate desired impact was to degrade strategic decision-making.
The spectacular Ukrainian attack on multiple airbases today highlights the progress that #Ukraine has made building an effective long-range strike capability since 2022. There are many lessons that western military organisations might take from this. But there are also some insights on this war, and the future of war, as well. 1/5 🇺🇦 🧵
2/ The attacks, part of a longer campaign to place cumulative pressure on Russia’s economy, political leaders and war-making capacity, will probably not be a decisive turning point in the war. They will however have a military impact.
3/ Military impacts include a reduction in Russian missile carrying / launching aircraft, a reassessment of the locations of these aircraft, possible changes in the air and drone defences at Russian bases, as well as a nice morale bump for the Ukrainians.