It is too early to ascertain the method of attack and the range of implications of this attack on the Kerch Bridge. It is certainly a punch in the face for Putin on his birthday. A couple of thoughts however in this short (for me) thread. 1/9 🧵
2/ First dropping a bridge span like this would take a lot of ‘bang’ (explosives) and good demolition design. As a sapper, we plan these kind of things all the time. The hardest bridges to drop are reinforced concrete like this. (Image: @RALee85)
3/ The amount of explosive required would be more than a few SF personnel could carry. A few trucks, or missiles / bombs would do the trick, if aimed at the right points of the bridge span.
4/ Second, the Ukrainians so far have been excellent at operational design and shaping operations in advance of their advances. This could be part of their design for taking back Crimea in the short term - or part of a deception operation to distract from other areas.
5/ Either way, it presents the Russians with a significant problem. It doesn’t stop resupply to Crimea (there are boats and the route through Melitopol), but it makes holding Melitopol even more important for the Russians. (Image: @TheStudyofWar)
6/ This would be the point in a class that the instructor would ask “so, what do we think the next operational objective for the Ukrainians might be?” Because of this, we may see Russian redeployments in the south, which will unveil other weaknesses & opportunities for #Ukraine.
7/ A third and final point: this is a massive influence operation win for Ukraine. Even if they didn’t do it, it is a demonstration to Russians, and the rest of the world, that Russia’s military cannot protect any of the provinces it recently annexed.
8/ And if we were impressed by the outflow of Russians after the recent naval aviation base attack, the rush to leave Crimea will be probably be even greater now. Lack of confidence in Putin and his military will grow.
9/ I am sure we will learn more details in the coming hours and days. But this ‘smoking incident’ is sure to be linked to other events in Ukraine’s overall military strategy. A bad month for Russia just keeps getting worse. Good. End.
Putin replaces #Shoigu. Putin calls on new Russian defence minister to lead 'innovation'. This says a lot about the transformation in the decade before 2022 that occurred (or was supposed to occur) under #Shoigu. 1/9 🧵 edition.cnn.com/2024/05/12/eur…
2/ The decade of reforms under Gerasimov and #Shoigu before 2022 did not posture the Russians optimally for the initial phase of their large scale invasion of #Ukraine.
3/ However after much learning in the first year of the war, the Russians were able to begin larger-scale #adaptation of their force. Mobilisation of people and industry are two key examples. My recent piece here explores how Russia has pulled ahead in strategic adaptation. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia…
Iran is attacking #Israel directly. Normally content with employing proxies to do its dirty work for it, Iran is currenlty launching what appears to be a multi-wave aerial attack with drones and missiles. What might this mean? 1/10
2/ The U.S. has stated that it will defend Israel, and has the military assets in the region to contribute to this mission. We also might see a rapid airlift of air defence missiles and other materiel from the U.S. to Israel.
3/ Besides direct attacks from Iran, the Iranians may also call on its proxies to launch concurrent attacks to overwhelm Israeli sensors, C2 and decision making.
One of my big takeaways from my latest #Ukraine visit is the need to change strategy. Current war strategy is focussed on 'defending Ukraine'. This is now a strategy for defeat and must evolve. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦 lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…
2/ It is clear that the strategy of #Ukraine and its partners must evolve to 'defeat Russia in Ukraine'. This is hardly a new insight (I have published on this topic in Foreign Affairs). But the grim situation at present demands an urgent shift in strategy, and a revised Ukrainian theory of victory.
3/ Russia has recovered psychologically from the shock of its early military failures. The Russian president and his government possess a renewed sense of optimism about the trajectory of Russian operations.
The increasing use of drone v drone warfare in #Ukraine has been a trend long in development. Earlier, we have seen aerial drones take out other aerial drones, as well as recover downed enemy drones. 1/15 🧵🇺🇦
2/ With the increasing deployment of uncrewed ground combat vehicles, there will be more and UAV v UGV combat similar to that in the video as well as UGV v UGV. At this point in their development, however, UGV remain slow and vulnerable to attack by humans and UAV.
3/ But, the battlefield adaptation cycle will slowly change this. Not only will individual UGV increasingly have lower visual and electronic signatures, they will be used in larger numbers. The pace of change in the relevant technologies makes this almost inevitable.
Ukraine reinforces that Crimea is still on the agenda, and that they retain an objective of making the presence of the Russian military there untenable. But this is part of a wider, adaptive strategic strike program. 1/7 🧵
2/ This is also another illustration of the sophisticated collection, analysis, planning and execution capabilities of Ukraine’s evolving strategic strike system, which uses both Western and indigenous missiles and drones.
3/ The Crimea strike campaign, along with the degradation of Russian oil refining capacity, appear to remain the two highest priorities for the maturing Ukrainian strategic strike complex.
The Putin re-election campaign is now complete. What might this mean for Russian military #strategy as we shift into the northern spring and summer? 1/22 🧵🇺🇦 kyivindependent.com/western-leader…
2/ Clearly, the main effort will remain its campaign to subjugate Ukraine by degrading and destroying its tactical forces, conducting strike operations against operational, strategic and civilian targets, and its ongoing diplomatic and strategic influence operations.
3/ For several months, the Russians have been conducting tactical actions to advance in the east and south of #Ukraine. Some are opportunistic, taking advantage of Ukrainian force / arty shortfalls and terrain.