The problem with this assessment of the OPEC+ cuts, & the tanker commentary that you post, is the sticky assumption that oil demand will grow 2.1 mbpd next year, per the IEA latest. This is nonsense, and with tomorrow’s IMF WEO release, this is “should” start to change. #tankers
https://twitter.com/ed_fin/status/1579394310709342210
We have argued that retail tanker longs are disadvantaged by listening to shipbroker & sell side analysts, who do not have the analytical tools & large datasets to convert alternative macro outlooks into new oil & tanker demand forecasts, amidst lagged demand data.
Both the IMF & IEA are hopeless at economic inflection points, like where we have been this year, and unfortunately, both shipbrokers & the sell side are reliant on the IEA outlooks, who in turn, are driven by the slow-moving IMF.
Last week, the IMF confirmed that they are downgrading their forecasts, observing that one third of countries will be in recession for 2022-23. The question is “how much?”, after cutting the 2023 global outlook by 65 bp in July, the biggest inter-report cut since 2008. #tankers 
They are unlikely rush to forecast a global recession, but they will probably place total Europe into slight decline and trim the rest of the world a bit. Europe is looking extremely weak, led by Germany & other natgas-exposed countries. #tankers
Our European outlook would produce a 0.7 mbpd yoy decline for Europe, even with gas-to-oil switching (which is grossly misunderstood & misused). We have the US with a mild 0.7% recession in 2023, and this provides a 0.3 mbpd yoy decline. Just these two equal the OPEC+ net cut.
The IEA “should” start to migrate their forecasts lower post-IMF, but it has become a dysfunctional organisation, so hard to predict its Nov report response. Probably mild, so not to worry, the brokers will continue to bleat “more tonne-miles”, amidst lagged demand visibility.
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