In the last 48 hours, reports have emerged of a potential Russian withdrawal from its Dnipro west bank defensive positions. While this may fit General Surovikin’s overall strategy for #Ukraine, it will be difficult to execute successfully. 1/24 🧵
2/ Somewhere in the headquarters of a Russian Combined Army Army in south Ukraine, a staff officer is pulling out his doctrinal publication to plan an orderly withdrawal of Russian forces back across the Dnipro. Why are withdrawals conducted and what are some considerations?
3/ Withdrawals, which are considered a ‘retrograde operation’ in US Army doctrine, are designed to allow a force to disengage from the enemy and redeploy on a new mission or to a new location, while minimising casualties.
4/ This quote from Australian Army doctrine is also useful: “Withdrawal is a task employed regularly during mobile defence or the delay to accomplish the overall aim of resuming offensive action…it should be treated as a routine tactic rather than a harbinger of disaster.”
5/ For the Russians, the drivers for withdrawing back across the Dnipro might include resupply difficulties, needing those troops for higher priority missions, and the likelihood of maintaining their current positions resulting in their destruction.
6/ I know the Russians have not been great at following their own doctrine in this war. But, once a decision is made to withdraw, what are the planning considerations?
7/ First, deception is vital. The reality is however that it is difficult to conceal from the enemy an intention to withdraw. At some point it becomes obvious what will occur.
8/ However, some deception might be achieved by stepped up patrols, increased fire support, decoys, simulating normal activities and communications discipline. For the Russians on the Dnipro west bank, this will be difficult but not impossible.
9/ A second consideration is how to sequence the withdrawal. This includes when and how to evacuate logistic stocks, headquarters, recon elements and ground combat forces. It will depend on where and in what strength the enemy is pressing the force that is to withdraw.
10/ For the Russians, getting this sequence right will be vital. They will have to balance the preservation of their force with using it to hold off the Ukrainian advancing forces. They need enough forces to prevent a rout but not so much that they lose a large part of the force.
11/ A 3rd issue for Russia will be disrupting the Ukrainians ability to interfere with the withdrawal. We should expect to see increased air defence, jamming & artillery used by withdrawing Russians, as well as greater air support. They may also use civilians as human shields.
12/ A 4th consideration will be command and control. This isn’t just about who is in charge. It is about controlling an orderly withdrawal in the planned sequence. MPs are vital for road space control, route discipline & ensuring units don’t ‘vacate’ defensive positions early.
13/ Achieving control is also about good battle discipline. Tactical leaders at all levels must hold their positions until their assigned withdrawal time. This can be very difficult when there is a strong inclination to move rearwards earlier than the plan directs.
14/ And this battle discipline is more likely to break down as the size of the remaining defending force is reduced. Russian battlefield leadership and discipline in this war has not been great. We might expect the later stages of their withdrawal to be chaotic.
15/ In general, a withdrawing force will want to achieve what is called a ‘clean break’. This is disengagement of the enemy in a way that avoids their ability to follow up and pursue the withdrawing force. The Dnipro River will be a key element of Russia’s clean break approach.
16/ Once again, getting the sequence for withdrawing troops right is critical in achieving a clean break. A lot of artillery (probably from the Dnipro east bank), jamming & air support will be required. And a lot of ferries to transport troops & equipment across the Dnipro.
17/ A key part of achieving a clean break is an effective rear guard. A rear guard force can help provide a clean break for the withdrawing force and prevent enemy pursuit. I would expect that for the Russians, the rear guard will consist of armoured and mounted infantry forces.
18/ These forces can move & fight rapidly and have a better chance of achieving a clean break & surviving to cross the Dnipro to fight another day. However, we might also see the Russians ‘dump’ newly mobilised troops to stay, fight, delay and die to buy time for the withdrawal.
19/ Ultimately, a successful withdrawal requires excellent planning and coordination. But this is underpinned by good leadership. The concept for how the withdrawal will be sequenced and executed must come from the senior commander.
20/ This senior command must have excellent tactical acumen, good understanding of the terrain and a good appreciation of the capabilities of the withdrawing force. He must understand that getting it wrong can result in the loss of the entire withdrawing force.
21/ Given reports of the Russians beginning a withdrawal, we may see how these considerations play out for the Russians in the coming days and weeks. There is much that can wrong for them. And following on their heels will be a determined, aggressive Ukrainian ground force.
22/ The Ukrainians will be keen to destroy or capture as much as possible of the Russian force on the west bank of the Dnipro. Not only would these Russians not be able resume offensive operations in the future, but it would also be a significant strategic influence success.
23/ And ultimately, capturing the west bank prevents any near-term Russian advances on Odesa. It will also provide a launch point for future Ukrainian offensives to secure the rest of the south, including Crimea. End.
In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵
2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.
3/ Implication 2: Lowering the Cost of AI to the Edge. Might AI LLM that use the same approach as DeekSeek-R1 mean military organisations can do everything they want to do with AI, at the levels they want to do it, in a much quicker timescale than imagined?
This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦 pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.
3/ Now to the implied problems, which are as concerning as those specifically covered in the article.
This week, I published a two-part article that reviewed the seven key elements of the war in #Ukraine that are likely to have the most influence on the trajectory of the war in 2025. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ The 7 key endeavours are:
- The Ground War.
- The Strategic Strike and Air Defence War.
- The Mobilization War.
- The Economic War.
- The Robot and Algorithm War.
- The War of Narratives.
- The Learning and Adaptation War.
3/ I also examined where the key asymmetries in the war are at the moment, such as manpower, air defence and innovation. Understanding these can help Ukraine target Russian critical vulnerabilities, build capacity to minimise its weaknesses, and inform the conduct of any ceasefire negotiations.
A useful update from @IAPonomarenko. In 2025, the West must not rush to force #Ukraine into an unjust peace with a brutal regime that began an unnecessary war, fought it poorly, used its military to rape, loot, torture and murder its way across a neighbour, and is unlikely to abide by any ceasefire agreement. 1/7 🧵
2/ 20th century politicians (eventually) came to understand that the rise of fascist, aggressive regimes like contemporary Russia (and Nazi Germany) had only one solution: defeat of their physical and ideological means of aggression against their neighbours.
3/ The big words from 21st century politicians, accompanied by tiny portions of national wealth dedicated to defence and support for countries like Ukraine and Taiwan, is not deterring Russian or Chinese aggression. It is actually helping their rise and increasing their power.
In the past 48 hours, reports have emerged of a Ukrainian attack on Russian positions near the village of Lyptsi in the Kharkiv region. The attack utilised dozens of uncrewed ground combat vehicles (UGV). 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The UGVs were apparently supported throughout the activity by FPV drones. While this doesn’t make the attack fully autonomous – the vehicles need human operators – it is one of the more significant examples of drone combat in this war.
3/ The Battle of Lyptsi is an important step in the transformation of the character of war from a purely human endeavour to something quite different in the 21st century. But none of the battlefield functions envisioned for uncrewed systems will be effective without the transformation of military institutions that wish to use them. This includes armies but also the civilian bureaucracies that support them.
This week, I provided the latest assessment on the relevance of Ukraine lessons to the Pacific at a seminar in Jakarta. I have expanded on this for a new article. 1/5 🧵
2/ First, I explored the key lessons from the war in #Ukraine since the Russian large-scale invasion in 2022. I proposed 7 major lessons, although time & more analysis will produce others. These include meshed civ-mil intelligence collection / analysis, drone warfare, leadership and the adaptation battle.
3/ Next, I explored the key ‘filters’ that might be used in translating lessons from #Ukraine so that are more relevant for the prevailing circumstances in the Pacific. Key filers include geography, weather, civil infrastructure and the capabilities of potential adversaries.