The Great Rotation: With the invastion of Ukraine, VVP decided to use gas as a weapon & cut pipeline flows into Europe.
In return, Europe maxed out LNG terminal capacities & contracted every available free LNG cargo globally to compensate the collapse of Russian flows.
2/n
Europe was able to attract LNG by being the best business globally.
How? By offering the highest prices. A cargo owner such as Trafigura or Total which bought LNG at Cheniere in US for $4.1/MMBtu + $3 gasification fee in Jan 2022 booked a pre-shipping profit of $21/MMBtu.
3/n
It however gets more complicated.
First, as with for all commodities, natural gas prices have the function to match demand and supply daily to accomodate the commodity's specific logistics as natgas can only be consumed or stored.
That means that Europe's LNG import terminal buyers are free to discount a cargo owner's price to TTF, Europe's gas hub price.
They must: storages in the UK, ESP, FRA or ITA (major regasification hubs) are now 100%, 93%, 99% & 95%-filled, respectively.
5/n ESP %-filled
Here is one (of many) mismatches of European gas infrastructure from the "big rotation".
Neither the UK or ESP have enough storage to accomodate their regas terminal capacities.
In addition, ESP is pipeline export constraint into France (MidCat pipeline project pending).
6/n
Consequently, TTF/NBP are down hard (& in s-term cantongo) & LNG trades at a discount to TTF.
Means? A Nov cargo into Spain was heard trading at TTF minus $30/MMBtu. Call it a "regas terminal slot discount".
For now, the stop-loss is Far East minus shipping cost.
7/n
However, cargo owners (and TTF) know winter is around the corner. At that point Europe's consumption is 2-4x higher than now.
Hence, they prefer to float their tankers and sell into higher Dec TTF prices which are currently at $42/MMBtu (3rd bullett from left).
8/n
Consequently, LNG floating storage is going vertical (below; Mt).
9/n
This in turn removes LNG shipping capacities globally and, among others, sent LNG shipping spot rates to $375,000 per day - an all time record.
10/n
TTF $10/MMBtu lower for Oct/Nov, LNG cargo discounts of $15/MMBtu & higher shipping rates (true for East of Suez rates too) will reduce LNG flows into Europe to match storage availability.
Message: Politicians don't need a price cap. Floating prices do the work instead.
11/n
What EU politicians however need to do if they are serious about reducing prices is to create a 50-70mt LNG export capex boom.
That in turn needs l-t contracts as terminal capacity expansion needs $bn for which Qatar et al must sell cargo for 20 years to earn it back.
12/n
Sadly, l-t contracts are in conflict with European climate laws which require the industry to be net-zero by 2050.
Why would EU utilities, majors or trading houses sign l-t LNG contracts with Qatar on that basis?
Here is my theory how the major incident - a so called blackout - occurred at 12:30 CET today in the power system of Spain & Portugal:
1/n
At the time of the incident, Spain and Portugal operated the grid at very high renewables share of about 66% - i.e solar (55%) and wind (11%; eolica)
2/n
While this isn’t unusual for Spain, it does mean that the grid operates with little inertia (resistance to change) during such time. The grid is therefore vulnerable to external effects…!
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.