Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Oct 25, 2022 25 tweets 9 min read Read on X
The winter months approach in #Ukraine. It will have an impact on the war, but it won’t shut down the war as some have theorised. A thread on the likely impact of winter on the war in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵 Image
2/ Recently, it has become common to compare the coming winter in #Ukraine with the Russo-Finnish Winter War, fought from November 1939 through to March 1940. Image
3/ The Finns resisted a massive Soviet invasion of their nation, resulting in a peace agreement temporarily ending hostilities. The Winter War is used as a historical example of David versus Goliath, as well as the clever use of terrain and weather by a defending military force.
4/ But it also offers another important lesson for observers of the war in Ukraine; wars can be fought, and battles can be won, during the most extreme weather, including the depths of winter. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
5/ Both the Russian and Ukrainian strategies are predicated on a continuation of hostilities over winter. However, they will have different approaches. For Russia, their aim is to draw the war out over winter and well into 2023.
6/ A key element of this is the insertion of masses of newly mobilised troops into Ukraine to stabilise the front line. But the most important aspect of Russia’s strategy for winter is its strategic energy warfare.
7/ Putin’s energy war, which has already affected 30% of power generation capacity in Ukraine, will see heating restricted, more burst water pipes and a range of other hardships for the population.
8/ While stockpiling of warm clothing and firewood commenced some time ago, many Ukrainians are either displaced from their homes, or living in damaged residences, making them more vulnerable to the ravages of winter.
9/ This ‘denial of heat’ by Putin during the coldest months of the war is a deliberate strategy to both terrorise the population, and to pressure the Ukrainian government for either a ceasefire or some other accommodation with the Russian invaders. kyivindependent.com/national/russi…
10/ But, as we have seen from the hardy Ukrainians, their resilience and very high support for expelling the Russian Army means that this is an unlikely outcome for Putin.
11/ Putin, by now, probably hoped that his strategic energy warfare would have had a greater impact on the populations of European nations that had become reliant on Russian energy. reuters.com/business/energ…
12/ However, a combination of new energy sources, rationing and stockpiling means that Putin has not yet been able to exert leverage over Europeans to reduce their support for Ukraine. That could change, however.
13/ For Ukraine, they have fought hard for eight months to seize the initiative from the Russians in this war. They will want to continue to use the momentum & use the winter as an opportunity to continue seizing back their territory.
14/ There will be challenges, though. The cold saps the energy from soldiers faster than in warmer conditions. Warm weather clothing, hot food and protection from the elements are key to preserving a military force. Image
15/ Vehicle mobility is problematic. Wheeled vehicles in particular struggle in cold and boggy conditions, and this will have an impact on the logistic support for both sides. Tracked vehicles, however, have superior mobility in such conditions. Image
16/ Concealment in winter is difficult. Foliage disappears & the green colours that most military vehicles are painted makes them stand out against the stark white of snow. The heat of humans & equipment stands out more against the cold environment.
17/ Making up for this however is that flying in winter months can be more challenging for both crewed and autonomous aerial vehicles.
18/ There are many other tactical impacts of cold weather on military operations. But as historical examples such as the Battle of the Bulge, the Winter War, Chosin Reservoir and the more recent conflict around Siachen Glacier demonstrate, winter does not shut down wars. Image
19/ The Ukrainians, who have been clever strategists and tacticians throughout this war, may take the advice of the Finns from the Winter War. warontherocks.com/2016/07/lesson…
20/ They found that it was “not sufficient to adapt to a harsh geography. Rather, the goal should be to develop new forms of operational art that enable one to leverage that same geography against an ill-adapted foe.”
21/ We may see more adaptations by the Ukrainians to use winter to their advantage. Regardless, Ukraine and Russia will continue to pursue their war aims throughout the winter, albeit at a lower tempo. engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukr…
22/ There is a final salutary lesson when making comparisons between Ukraine in 2022 and Finland in 1939. The Winter War of 1939-1940 was actually the beginning of a longer conflict between Finland and the Soviet Union.
23/ Known as The Continuation War, this conflict lasted until September 1944 and resulted in over one million dead, wounded and missing between the belligerents. ImageImageImage
24/ It is an uncomfortable scenario, but one possible future for the current war. End. smh.com.au/world/europe/w…
25/ Thank you to those whose images and other resources were used in this thread: @Reuters @KyivIndependent @RALee85 @War_Mapper @smh @EngelsbergIdeas @CSIS @USArmyCMH @IAPonomarenko

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More from @WarintheFuture

Jun 11
Ukraine has just struck a Russian defence plant with its new long-range FP-5 missiles and damaged a key bridge to Crimea. Things keep getting worse for Putin and Gerasimov. My Part 2 assessment of Russia's losing war, and how Putin might reverse things. 1/5 🧵 Image
2/ Russia is losing its war on Ukraine. But a losing trajectory is not a settled outcome. Part 2 of Losing on Every Dimension examines the five "reversal conditions" that could still rescue Putin, and what the West must do to lock in his defeat.
3/ The most revealing point about these five reversal conditions. With one exception, none lies within Russia's own control: a US settlement, the oil price, China's treasury, North Korean manpower, and Western fatigue. Russia's escape from defeat depends on the decisions of others.
Read 5 tweets
Jun 8
For the first time since the invasion, Russia is losing more troops than it can recruit. Net territorial movement over the past three months has favoured Ukraine. Part 1 of my new assessment, I explore how Russia is "Losing on Every Dimension" - military, cognitive, moral, industrial and economic. 1/7 🧵Image
2/ MILITARY. In 2025 Russia paid roughly 200 casualties per square mile taken. In the first five months of 2026, with a net gain of 17 square miles, it paid over 9,600 per square mile. The meat grinder is grinding through Russian men faster than Russia can produce them. Tactical operations are now unified with mid-range and long-range strikes.
3/ COGNITIVE. Russia's narratives are decoupling from a battlefield made visible by open-source reporting. When Putin has to ask Ukrainian permission to hold parades, and cannot hold an international forum without a Ukrainian attack, his narrative about inevitable war crashes.
Read 7 tweets
May 28
Our darker angels have returned. For a decade, influential scholars argued that major war was on an irreversible decline. Pinker's 'Better Angels' thesis became almost orthodoxy in parts of the security studies world. But, as @lawdavf has written, war has a future. 1/4 🧵 Image
2/ Fast forward to 2024. PRIO records 61 state-based conflicts — the highest since World War II. 129,000 battle deaths. The fourth most violent year since the Cold War. The 2024 data from SIPRI and PRIO is unambiguous: a historic peak in state-based conflicts, the fourth most violent year since the Cold War, and a Russo-Ukrainian war that has now consumed an estimated 500,000 lives.
3/ The analytical failure wasn't just academic. Governments that accepted the 'war is fading' narrative underinvested in defence, deterrence and industrial capacity. Ukraine paid some of the price. But most Western nations are still underinvested in force structure, defence industry, war stocks and most importantly, national will to resist authoritarian aggression.
Read 4 tweets
May 11
China fields a military where 70-80% of soldiers are only children. Every battlefield death risks extinguishing a family line. This demographic reality shapes Xi's strategic calculus in ways Western analysis should pay more attention to. My new piece explores this. 1/5 🧵mickryan.substack.com/p/one-child-on…Image
2/ China's one-child policy ended in 2015. Its military consequences are only beginning. By 2015, ~70% of PLA soldiers and 80% of combat troops came from one-child households. There is almost no historical precedent for a major military force comprised almost entirely of only children.
3/ The research is sobering. Only children are measurably less trusting, less resilient, less risk-tolerant, and less competitive than those with siblings. These are not ideal traits for combat. They are increasingly the defining traits of the PLA's human capital.
Read 5 tweets
Apr 16
Some initial thoughts on the new Australian National Defence Strategy released today in Canberra. Overall, the focus and trajectory of Australia's defence strategy remains consistent with the 2024 version. There are some notable things worth highlighting. 1/15 🧵🇦🇺 Image
2/ The new NDS shifts more towards a true 'defence' strategy rather than just a 'military' strategy that was described in the 2024 version. There is stronger language around national civil preparedness, fuel security, and economic security. This is good. But these are also topics that should be in a National Security Strategy - if Australia had one!
3/ Spending. There is an uptick in spending. This is a positive. There is a claim that we might get 3% of GDP on defence at some point in the future. The reality is that because we are well short of this now, trying to fund both AUKUS and the ADF at the same time with current spending is challenging (nice word for not possible), and conventional military capabilities are degrading - and not modernising fast enough.
Read 15 tweets
Mar 22
“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵 Image
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
Read 6 tweets

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