Thread by @jmkorhonen

I'm increasingly troubled by how Western analysts fail to grasp how differently Eastern Europe sees what is at stake if Ukraine loses. Discussions about #nuclearweapons are a case in point.

Here's a great piece about proliferation by @Nick_L_Miller.

foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/17/ukr…

I agree with prof. Miller, an expert on this topic: proliferation cascade, ie other countries seeking nuclear weapons if they prove useful now, is not the main concern now, and is still unlikely. That's why I haven't discussed it.

But. Much depends on the outcome of this war.

From what I've gathered, Eastern Europe strongly sees war in Ukraine as near-existential. In Eastern Europe, many believe (and not without justification) that the West abandoned them in 1945. Now the threat from the East has returned. And the West seems to hesitate already.

People in the West, especially those too young to remember the 1980s, don't seem to grasp the depth of trauma the Kremlin caused in Eastern Europe. The Soviet rule may have had some redeeming features Putin's Russia doesn't have. But it *was* a brutal prison of the people.

To analysts in the West, the war in Ukraine is mostly power politics. I don't fault them for that: Eastern European analysts are equally detached from conflicts in, say, Middle East. But there's a risk of disconnect and misunderstandings.

I think it would be fair to say that the balance of Eastern European opinion sees the risk of nuclear war as preferable to a Russian victory in Ukraine.

Probably, in my subjective judgment, even the incineration of a few cities wouldn't change this calculus materially.

Nuclear use would be a shock. It would frighten everyone, including me.

But the experience Eastern Europe has with the Kremlin and the signals I read from the east strongly suggest that after the initial shock, the determination to fight to the finish would only increase.

This quip from Minna Ålander, an analyst from FIIA, about Finnish civil defense shelters is a bit tongue-in-cheek. But not totally. No one wants nuclear war. But we are unlikely to roll over and surrender if nukes are used.

https://twitter.com/minna_alander/status/1579185759286091776?s=20&t=x6MXCw-8lVC6MBulRO6J_g

And this brings me back to proliferation cascades. They remain unlikely for now. But if the Russian nuclear weapons prove useful for cutting off Western support, I believe the probability of e.g. Poland or even Finland acquiring independent nuclear weapons increases considerably.

Because if this war shows that Western allies will balk if threatened by nuclear weapon use, why should even NATO members trust that their allies will protect them against Russia?

Perhaps Biden would. But what about Trump 2.0?

That's the major blind spot in prof. Miller's factually accurate and excellent analysis. He correctly notes that seeking nuclear-armed allies is usually preferable to seeking an independent nuclear deterrent.

But can the ally be trusted?

Trump's election put the world on notice: From now on, U.S. support is guaranteed for four years at a time at most.

I said at the time and will continue to say that it did immeasurable damage to U.S. interests and that the full costs will be revealed only decades later.

If the perception - note that the perception doesn't have to equal the truth - coming out of this war is that the Kremlin can use nuclear weapons to stop the West from supporting Eastern European countries, and given the unstable politics of the U.S., what happens?

At the very least, the world's autocrats will take note: nuclear weapons are very useful for imperial conquest. That's still the greatest threat in my opinion: other autocrats would blunder into wars they cannot win and then threaten nuclear use.

But Eastern Europe will be asking questions. If the war ends in terms favorable to Russia, I wouldn't be surprised at all if in a decade Poland acquires independent nuclear weapons.

I'm unsure how *I* would answer if asked whether Finland should seek nuclear weapons.

I've said repeatedly that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, and both weapons and especially reliable means of employment (C^3, delivery systems, etc.) are money pits of dubious utility.

But what if the Kremlin perceives it won because of nukes? I really don't know.

These differences in how this war is perceived in the West and in Eastern Europe can cause some unwelcome surprises. I implore the Western analysts to make an effort to understand better how and why the Eastern Europeans think!

PS. Forgot to mention that even more probable outcome than actually existing nuclear weapons would be the construction of "breakout capability", that is, the capability to rapidly construct a nuclear device if needed.