🧵1/ An interesting note on the #مهسا_اميني hashtag and 'Op Iran' is the use of platform manipulation techniques. One technique has been the spelling out of numbers in Persian. This behaviour has resulted in at least 3.4 million tweets since 15th Sept 2022
2/ I downloaded a 140,000 sample of tweets on #مهسا_اميني along with a limited permutation of Persian numbers (20 and, 30 and, 40 and etc). The total number of tweets containing these numbers was around 3.4 million. Of course these aren't all possible number permutations 
3/ so the real number will be much higher. Many of the tweets are replies to tweets asking for engagement on the hashtag, some saying to do so because Iranian internet is down. A lot of the tweets making the requests get a lot of engagement too.
4/ The technique seemed to peak in mid September but has now died down. A lot of the activity appears to be from the 'BTS Army', a collection of online fan accounts for the KPop band who often do Twitter storms on social justice issues & for their fans (in Iran or elsewhere)
5/ It's not really clear how grassroots or authentic the BTS army is, but these techniques are techniques that violate Twitter's spam policy - esp artificial engagement. The technique will get something to trend (in theory but not necessarily), but also drown out other tweets
6/ A few of the accounts I looked at have been 'temporarily limited' already, although for the most part this technique seems to happen without much problem. I personally don't think it is useful for people wanting to get info from Twitter
7/ or having conversations about the issues in question. Anyway, it helps account for some of the phenomenal numbers we've seen around recent Iran-connected hashtags. Millions of tweets using number spam!
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