#Russia_Gas: The EU may not buy gas from Russia's pipelines (except Hungary), but it increased its purchase of Russian LNG by more than 45% this year, especially when Russia cut off supplies (last time to Italy). This means that gas export revenues to Russia⤵️
are not really interrupted. Furthermore, it shows that liquidity in the LNG market must be increased by other producers (Qatar etc.) to reduce the need for imports from Russia.⤵️
LNG production (30 million metric tons per year in 2021) will be high on Russia's list of energy priorities to diversify risks from sanctions and maintain a large share of the global market (which will decline by 2030).
#Turkey_Russia: Payment for Russian gas is already being made in rubles. At this point, the ruble part of the payment is small, but the process will speed up. In September, Erdogan and Putin agreed that 25% of the gas coming from Russia will be paid for in rubles. In 2021,⤵️
Turkey imported 45% of Russia's gas (26.5 bcm), followed by Azerbaijan and Iraq, all through pipelines. LNG is also imported by Turkey, mainly from Nigeria and Algeria. Russia's decision to pressure Turkey to buy gas in rubles is part of the de-dollarization strategy.⤵️
Russia intends to increase the gas delivered to Turkey, as it has stopped supply to Europe through NS1 and may stop transport through Ukraine.⤵️
#Critical_Infrastructure: As Russia targets critical infrastructure in Ukraine and is suspected of being behind the NS1 and NS2 explosions, EU member states are increasingly concerned about the security of critical infrastructure on land and undersea. In October,⤵️
the EU Commission exchanged with member states a 5-point plan on the securitization of critical infrastructure, which encountered several objections in EU capitals: 1) Germany and some others are against the new aspects⤵️
that go beyond the Resilience of Critical Entities Directive (approved in September 2022; will enter into force in mid-2024); 2) France insists on voluntary participation in the common response to incidents; 3) The Netherlands suggests that government.nl/latest/news/20… ⤵️
#Russia_Sanctions: The US has been assuring its banks that they continue to do business in Russia with critical companies that are exempt from sanctions. To minimize the negative effects of sanctions on food and energy prices, financial institutions such as Citibank & JP Morgan⤵️
were allowed to transact with Gazprom and Phosagro and Uralkali (fertilizers). On the other hand, the Russians themselves were using the “grains deal” also to put pressure on the EU to ease sanctions on Russian fertilizer producers and Rosselhozbank.⤵️
The adjustment of sanctions by the US and the EU is part of the logic of not harming themselves more than Russia. Since inflationary tendencies are also fueled to some extent by sanctions, revisiting the sanctions regime means making them⤵️
#Russia_China: The reorientation of Russian exports to China, as a result of decoupling from the West, creates serious logistical problems. The duration of both rail and sea cargo has been significantly extended, causing delays of up to 30% compared to 2021. The main reason is⤵️
insufficient infrastructure due to the increase in import and export activity. The priority for Russia is the export of wood and coal, which makes importing other goods from China longer (and more expensive). Growing interdependencies between Russia and the Chinese market⤵️
will require large investments in critical transportation infrastructure. Rail and sea transport between the two countries could stabilize only from February 2023 (also depending on the COVID-19 policy of China).⤵️
#Russia_Sanctions: It appears that the Russian side wants to use the UN to facilitate the lifting of restrictions on the Russian agri-food exports (probably fertilizers too). Due to the sanctions that the prohibition of access to EU ports entails (physical access,⤵️
ship insurance, banking transactions, etc.), Russian exports of grain and fertilizers would be affected (something that EU/Borrell has repeatedly denied). After rejoining the “grain deal” on Ukraine, Moscow indicated that a compromise had been reached (with Turkish mediation) ⤵️
on (opaque) negotiations with the EU to exempt Rosselhozbank and Russian ships exporting grain and fertilizers from sanctions. The new deadline given by Russia is November 18. On the other hand, the Russian aggression against Ukraine continues.
#Moldova_EU: The EU is doing everything possible to support the government of Moldova. von der Leyen will visit and promised financial assistance to handle the worsening energy crisis. The problem is in the costs of the price of electricity and the risks of cutting off the⤵️
supply of Russian gas. Romania provides electricity but 60% of 90% is sold at market prices. Last year, the EU committed €60 million and allocated it in early 2022, after which some smaller amounts followed for energy crisis management. In addition, there is also a⤵️
€300 million credit from the EBRD for the energy crisis, according to which the Moldovan government bought up to 150 million m3 of gas for strategic reserves. It is very likely that von der Leyen will announce another amount during his visit to Chisinau. The injection of⤵️