Thread by @luminatus1

Author of the classic Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman has become only more critical of the U.S. govt’s approach to the problem.

He argues that U.S. society has been transformed for the worse by an extreme overreaction to a limited threat—limited, he insists,

by an extreme overreaction to a limited threat—limited, he insists, despite spectacular recent incidents, which he takes fully into account. Indeed, his discussion of just how limited the threat is marks a major contribution to the discussion and debate over the best way to a

just how limited the threat is marks a major contribution to the discussion and debate over the best way to a measured and much more effective response.

Overcoming the academic fatigue tht characterizes the prolific field of terrorism research is no easy task. Yet, Marc Sageman did it 2x
His last 2books, Understanding Terror Networks (2004) & Leaderless Jihad (2008), made of hm a prominent scholar in study of political violence

In Misunderstanding Terrorism,
Sageman, a former CIA officer in Afghanistan, forensic psychia-
trist, and political sociologist, builds upon some of the controver-
sial theses that have underpinned his scholarly success.
Sageman's overarching argument is that a deep misunderstand

Sageman's overarching argument is tht a deep misunderstanding of Islamist terrorism (which he calls "global neojihad," p. 5) has led the West 2overreact 2what is in reality a limited threat
Inthis book, his claim is supported by a re-assessment of the scope/nature of the terroris

In this book, his claim is supported by a re-assessment of the scope
& nature of the terrorist threat, as well as an attempt to theorize the common processes at work in the turn to political violence.

In the introduction, Sageman argues that conventional threat
assessments of terrorism artificially inflate risk estimates.
In his opinion, this is due to a combination of factors such as the stake that politicians have in fear-mongering and the impact that this

In his opinion, this is due to a combination of factors such as the stake that politicians have in fear-mongering & the impact that this
has on methodologies & datasets.

To tackle this issue, the first chapter introduces the study's original empirical data, which consist of a

To tackle this issue, the first chapter introduces the study's
original empirical data, which consist of a survey of global neo-jihadi plots & attacks in Western countries between 9/11 & 2011.
After justifying his--arguably restrictive--sampling crite-
ria, which exclude plots

After justifying his--arguably restrictive--sampling criteria, which exclude plots that do not constitute a "serious attempt at violence" (p. 25), sting operations-related acts, & attacks carried out by mentally disordered people without clear links to
jihadi networks

Sageman raises compelling arguments from the analysis of his dataset.
With a specific focus on the acts perpe
trated by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, he reaches two conclusions
that challenge conventional preconceptions and support some of
his previous argument.

. First, he contends that Islamist terrorism
has become largely leaderless (rather than being leader-led) and
home-grown (rather than being "on the move," p. 51). Second, he

Finding & stopping terrorists before they strike is often compared to looking for a needle in a haystack, a cliché that speaks to the difficulty of preventing a crime that, while deadly, is uncommon. 
Counterterrorism officials still suggest that the task would become easier

Counterterrorism officials still suggest that the task would become easier if they could use profiling to target Muslim communities. In other words, if they could shrink the size of the haystack.

But a new book by Dr. Marc Sageman, a veteran counterterrorism researcher & former CIA operations officer, argues that this approach, even if carried to its fullest extension in a nightmare scenario for civil liberties, would still be ineffective,

even if carried to its fullest extension in a nightmare scenario for civil liberties, would still be ineffective, because jihadist terrorism is such a statistically rare phenomenon.
In his book “Misunderstanding Terrorism,” Sageman counts 66 Islamic jihadist terrorist plots in

Sageman counts 66 Islamic jihadist terrorist plots in Western countries between 2002 and 2012,
involving a total of 220 perpetrators.

This figure works out to an average of 22 terrorists per year, across a population of roughly 700 million people.

Even narrowed to just the Muslim population in Western countries, estimated at roughly 25 million people,

that’s less than one in 1 million Muslims a year who could be considered terrorists

Describing a hypothetical dragnet conducted by Western countries that correctly identified terrorists 99 percent of the time,

but accused innocent people 1 percent of the time, Sageman asks us to imagine the following:

Therefore, in order to catch all 22 global neo-jihadi terrorists, they would put 250,000 Muslims in jail by mistake.

Because terrorism is so uncommon, he writes, any strategy for combating it that involves policing entire communities

Cos terrorism is so uncommon, he writes, any strategy 4 combating it that involves policing entire communities is likely to end up harming huge numbers of innocent people — thus feeding the same climate of alienation & hostility that fosters political violence in the first place

In the 1980s, Sageman helped organize Afghan resistance fighters against the Soviet Union.
Over the decades since, he has interviewed 100’s of individuals accused of involvement in jihadist terrorism, documenting the circumstances of their cases and their personal motivations.

“Misunderstanding Terrorism” analyzes every jihadist terrorist plot that occurred in the United States & Europe over a 10-year period ending in 2012.
The study excludes nonviolent terror-related cases, such as those involving financial donations or other material support charges

The study excludes nonviolent terror-related cases, such as those involving financial donations or other material support charges, as well as sting operations in which plots were developed by agent provocateurs — a tactic favored by U.S. law enforcement agencies but viewed

as well as sting operations in which plots were developed by agent provocateurs — a tactic favored by U.S. law enforcement agencies but viewed with skepticism in many European countries.

His research comes to two broad conclusions.

The first is that violent terrorist plots in Western countries are a statistically tiny phenomenon, which makes blanket counterterrorism approaches an ill-suited response.

(Twin Towers of Illegal Wars
Men led by their God)

The second takeaway is that “social identity theory” — that is, how people self-identify in a crisis — is the primary motivating factor behind terrorist attacks

Despite efforts to protect civil liberties, Sageman writes that profiling-based approaches have led the US to “grossly overestimate the violent terrorist threat & commit a very large number of assessment errors.”
The politically driven manipulation of the threat of terrorism

The politically driven manipulation of the threat of terrorism has led Americans to “fibrillate in fear and bankrupt [themselves] with security” in response to a threat that is much smaller than they have been led to believe.

‘Chronic Threat Of Extremism’

But why does the threat of terrorism resonate so much more in the popular imagination than other dangers?

Sageman argues that #IdentityPolitics influence our response to violence, both for victims and for perpetrators.

Most Americans perceive terrorism as something that comes frm an “out-group” rather than from ppl with whom they identify
As a result, an attack creates a sense of solidarity, leading people 2react emotively, in contrast to the oft-muted response to more common forms of violence

This identity-driven reaction to terrorist violence also causes people to overestimate how prevalent terrorism really is, making them willing to commit wildly disproportionate resources to fighting it

#Femicide
Billions on #Prevent

This identity-driven reaction to terrorist violence also causes people to overestimate how prevalent terrorism really is, making them willing to commit wildly disproportionate resources to fighting it

This identity-driven reaction to terrorist violence also causes people to overestimate how prevalent terrorism really is, making them willing to commit wildly disproportionate resources to fighting it

#Femicide epidemic
#CounterTerrorism #ThreatInflation

Sixteen years after 9/11, the war on terror still appears to have no end in sight, driven on by a circular logic of violence and retribution

Obama administration, the U.S. govt tried 2frame its counterterrorism programs as not specifically targeting Muslims,

while still carrying out airstrikes overseas/launching controversial “countering violent extremism” programs in Muslim communities

Although in recent years some national security experts like Sageman have begun to point out the self-defeating nature of American counterterrorism policies

Donald Trump’s approach – focusing explicitly on Muslim communities, implementing discriminatory immigration policies, expanding military action abroad, and declaring an open-ended war against the amorphous concept of “radical Islam” – isn’t a course correction

Sageman argues that identity politics are also what fundamentally drives the terrorists themselves. 

U.S. government policies can consciously or inadvertently fuel a sense of conflict between different groups, in this case Muslims and Westerners.

Several govt studies have also pointed to politics as a driver of terrorism, finding U.S. foreign policy as the most frequently cited motivation.)

“All of us see the world through the prism of identity, so whn we see an escalation of a conflict happening between ‘us’ and ‘them,’

it inevitably leads some people toward political violence,” Sageman told The Intercept in an interview.
‘Looking at it in terms of foreign policy, when the govt attacks other countries, oftentimes people who have a link to that country or identify with the people there will start

oftentimes people who have a link to that country or identify with the people there will start categorizing themselves alongside the victims of those attacks.”
By categorizing huge swaths of the global population as enemies or potential enemies,

Trump is engaging in hostile posturing toward very large numbers of people who pose no threat to the United States.
Meanwhile, the rising death toll from his military actions has the potential to be a force-multiplier for terrorist recruitment.

Thanks to advances in information technology, the destructive effects of U.S. military actions are more easily recorded & disseminated than they were a few decades ago.

As they escalate, these actions are likely to trigger an emotive “in-group” reaction among those people who

As they escalate, these actions are likely 2trigger an emotive “in-group” reaction among those people who perceive themslvs as targeted, Sageman says
Likewise, terrorist attacks in Western countries will trigger an emotive “in-group” reaction amng Americans, continuing the cycle

In Sageman’s view, factors like ideological extremism and economic deprivation, sometimes cited as root causes of terrorist violence, are secondary to political identity.

He notes that the phenomenon of identity-based violence has been repeated in different cultural and religious contexts in American history – including by people most Americans would now consider part of the “in-group.”

the Mexican-American War of 1846, an entire battalion of Irish Catholics fighting in the U.S. Army defected to the Mexican side out of a sense of solidarity with the suffering of their Mexican co-religionists, & in protest of the discrimination then faced by Catholics in the US

this episode is largely forgotten today in the U.S., its memory continues to linger for some in Mexico and Ireland.
Sageman believes that the only path to winding down our present conflict is to expand our own “in-group.”

In the United States, Sageman said that would mean “bringing everybody into the fold and saying that we’re all Americans, equally, and not just focusing exclusively on one group and defining them as suspicious and not completely part of the fold.”

“Crafting a sense of national identity that includes people instead of driving them further apart is what a leader is supposed 2do,” he added. “If we are unable to respond to real threats in a proportional & focused manner, & if we see continue 2see this cumulative radicalisation

If we are unable to respond to real threats in a proportional and focused manner,
and if we see continue to see this cumulative radicalization of discourse, we will end up with more political violence at home, not less.”

‘to real threats in a proportional and focused manner’

Only ‘Islamists’ object to safeguarding children,
the guise which Prevent was embedded nationwide after the #TrojanHorseAffair

https://twitter.com/luminatus1/status/1489305862502031361?s=46&t=WGeDiZNoECZ1M8S72H-Y9w

to real threats in a proportional and focused manner’

Criticising Prevent is ‘enabling terrorism’ says EX PM Cameron whose own govt’s Libya links to Manchester Arena & three other terror arrack are bound in secret under our sacred ‘national security’

#BlasphemyLaws in Britain

‘to real threats in a proportional and focused manner’

Criticising Prevent is ‘enabling terrorism’ says EX PM Cameron whose own govt’s Libya links to Manchester Arena & three other terror arrack are bound in secret under our sacred ‘national security’

#BlasphemyLaws of #Prevent