IRGC-ASF Commander BG Hajizadeh has told press that Iran has developed a hypersonic missile that can manoeuvre at extremely high speed both inside and outside the atmosphere. He said among its capabilities will be to not just bypass, but target missile defence systems. #hyperhype
He emphasised that the missile will be able to evade both endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric ABM systems, and that it will be able to destroy any target, *especially* ABM systems. He described this as a generational leap that won't be countered for decades.
This is interesting because Iran has described what we think is a missile with a HGV before. That was Kheybar-Shekan, and it had a MaRV-type triconic HGV.
However, Kheybar-Shekan (pictured) only has fins for controlling its flight and hence its manoeuvring capability is mostly within the atmosphere. Hajizadeh saying the new hypersonic weapon will be able to manoeuvre outside the atmosphere implies the use of gas steering, or...
...it could be of the type with an arrowhead shape, designed for more lift and manoeuvring capability in the upper atmosphere. Or maybe a combination of the two.
What's for certain is that like Kheybar-Shekan, this missile will likely be a MRBM to have sufficient energy to make the necessary manoeuvres, and to get to the altitudes that Hajizadeh is talking about.
It's also encouraging to see Hajizadeh talking about targeting ABM systems specifically, considering their proliferation in the region.
Ah I see the rednecks have found this thread. Here's something about Iran's missile tech for you guys, enjoy ☺️
Anyway, there's a reason for Iran's focus on defeating ABM systems. Since 2011 Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar have agreed deals totalling over $25 billion for THAAD ABM systems, which have exo-atmospheric capability. This new missile would add to Iran's arsenal targeting THAAD.
There's also Israel's Arrow-2 which is comparable to THAAD. But above those are SM-3 (shipborne, protecting US carriers), and Arrow-3 which are truly exoatmospheric interceptors of the highest calibre. Iran's hypersonic missile will have these systems in its sights.
Iran still has large stocks of older Qiam and Ghadr missiles (improved versions of Scud and Shahab-3 respectively) in inventory, so an ABM-killer to clear the way for these missiles would be a force multiplier.
Aside from the missile's reentry vehicle itself, it will be interesting to see what missile will launch it. It will boost likely be a boost-glide vehicle, which means a ballistic missile.
My money is on the Raafe rocket motor which was used in the recent Qaem-100 SLV test. It's powerful, light, and compact. It's the bleeding edge of Iran's (unclassified) booster tech, and would make a suitable first/single-stage booster.
Israel's assassination of Nasrallah gives us an insight into how they might tackle Iran's nuclear facilities.
Israel used 40-80 BLU-109 "penetrator" JDAMs rather than dedicated bunker busters. F-15s were completely loaded with bombs (7 each) & no external fuel tanks.
BLU-109s can penetrate approximately 6 ft (1.8m) of concrete. It's unknown how deeply buried Hezbollah HQ was, but it's clear that the Israelis made successive hits at multiple points to penetrate it.
This is clearly a huge effort, but it wouldn't be feasible against Iran...
The obvious main difference is range. Carrying 7 tons of draggy ordinance next door to Lebanon against no air defences is easy. But Iran's enrichment sites are 1500km away and heavily protected, dispersed, and buried.
Reminder to all to be vigilant of the disinformation on both sides during this war, which can take many forms.
5 Examples
1. Journalists posting stories briefed to them by officials on one side, designed to present a particular narrative. An common technique in propaganda wars
2. Fake or old/unrelated videos posted by either side. Designed to exaggerate or minimise the scale of friendly or enemy action, or allege warcrimes. Usually simple clout-chasing, sometimes organised disinfo.
3. Propaganda by omission and censorship. Tight censorship is (obviously) important for OPSEC, but can also be used by both sides to control the narrative of who is winning and who is losing.
Many focused on Shoigu - Secretary of Russia's Security Council and former Defence Minister - and Major General Bagheri, Chief of General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces.
But I thought the entourage was more interesting...
During the meeting with Bagheri, key Russian officials included Shoigu's deputy Venediktov, and also Dmitry Shugaev. Shugaev is Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, responsible for military-technical cooperation between Russia and foreign countries.
The Iranian side included Brig. Gen. Mehrabi, who was also present when Shoigu visited Iran in 2023 as Defence Minister. The US sanctioned Brig. Gen. Ghoreishi in 2023 (while he was at another post), claiming he negotiated UAV exports to Russia.
Hezbollah has so far denied that its rockets hit the area in Madjal Shams. We'll see what info comes out but for now I'll say this explosion seems quite large to be from a failed interceptor or anything like that.
Next few hours will decide if there is a wider war or not
I've seen some say this was a Falaq rocket. Falaqs have relatively large (50+kg) warheads.
These are some images I've seen from the blast epicentre. There is only a very small crater.
I would say that the visually large blast is more consistent with fuel rather than explosives.
Blast warheads in rockets/bombs are high velocity and create large craters but aren't "fiery" like fuel explosions are (low velocity).
The crater is more like a 122mm rocket but the fiery blast doesn't match. It's possible a rocket or even debris hit some fuel.
It could be the booster section of a Blue Sparrow target ALBM which has a separable payload section. However there is no reported sighting or hearing of impact anywhere in Iraq or Iran of the payload section.
This would make sense as from what we know Blue Sparrow isn't a weapons system and it wouldn't really be able to hit anything. Could just be a very minor demonstration of "we did something"
I don't usually praise Iran's public messaging but everything since Op. True Promise has been spot on. In all levels of govt, military, and foreign ministry.
Crucially for deterrence purposes, Iran has repeatedly promised that Israeli attack in response would not be acceptable.
This is important because it aligns with the int'l consensus that the conflict shouldn't be escalated. So Iran's own deterrence goals are backed by int'l pressure on Israel not to escalate further.
There are numerous examples of the above but other aspects have been positive too
Intentions of strike made clear, will to de-escalate emphasised. This kind of message has been repeated multiple times over the past days to make clear that Iran is not interested in escalation, laying the blame for any future conflict on Israel.