1/14 How we identified blocks containing MEV both pre and post-merge for our submission to the Ethereum Merge Data Challenge.
π§΅π #Ethereum#EthereumMerge#MEV
2/14 One aspect of the merge was the introduction of Flashbots' mev-boost, this is a first implementation of proposer builder separation (PBS) and has resulted in a clearly defined and structured method for including MEV opportunities within blocks.
3/14 This has also created new methods of identifying MEV from on-chain data.
Ethereum's execution clients tend to pack transactions in blocks by ordering them by gas price and including the transactions with the highest gas price first.
4/14 However, pre-merge, Flashbots had implemented a way in which bundles of transactions could be submitted to a miner to be included in a block.
5/14 This enabled "searchers" to find and extract MEV opportunities by including their own transactions along with mempool transactions in a bundle.
Miners would then include these bundles at the start of the block.
6/14 Therefore, pre-merge, one of the best ways to identify MEV in a block was to see if the transactions were not ordered by gas price, as this would allude to the inclusion of MEV bundles.
7/14 This method was far from perfect. False positives were caused by execution clients using different ordering methods and false negatives were missed due to alternative methods for including MEV. e.g. MEV bots tuning the gas price of their transactions in the mempool.
8/14 Post-merge, MEV "builders" collect together bundles of transactions into a block and use "relays" to transmit these blocks to the mev-boost software running on Ethereum validatorsβ nodes which then propose the block.
9/14 As the proposers expect payment for the inclusion of a block, builders generally include a final transaction that sends most of the block's fees and MEV to the proposer's fee recipient address.
10/14 This gives us two new methods for identifying MEV: 1) checking if the final transaction in a block is from the block's (/builder's) fee recipient address and to the proposer's fee recipient address. 2) using the relays' API which returns included blocks.
11/14 We plotted % of MEV blocks per hour against time for these three identification methods, a month either side of the merge.
12/14 The transaction ordering method showed ~80% MEV pre-merge and ~40% post-merge, increasing to ~60%. The other two post-merge methods were very closely correlated, increasing from ~20% to ~50% and beginning to converge with the transaction ordering method.
13/14 The transaction ordering method was likely higher due to the aforementioned false positives, and we hypothesized that the conversion was due to more MEV bots using MEV builders for transaction inclusion, so the other two methods captured a larger proportion of total MEV.
14/14 It's worth noting that a more accurate yet involved method for identifying MEV may be to look at the balance changes of proposers' fee recipient addresses.
Withdrawals have been live on #Ethereum for almost 2 weeks, and now that the chaos of #Shapella has subsided, I thought it was time for a π§΅on the trends weβve been seeing. π
Note: the time of the Shapella upgrade is annotated on all of these charts.
1/ Shapella enabled validators to change their withdrawal credentials, this is required to receive withdrawals if they werenβt set when creating the validator. For the first 48hrs, ~4k credentials were processed an hour. Since then they have been few and far between.
2/ The proportion of validators with 0x01 (withdrawable) credentials has subsequently increased by just over 40% and is now sitting at ~86.5%.