1/ Interesting things appear to be happening currently on the Kinburn Peninsula (often erroneously called the Kinburn Spit), south-west of Kherson. Although exactly what is still uncertain, it's worth taking a look at why Kinburn matters.
2/ The Kinburn Peninsula is the hook-shaped peninsula at the mouth of the Dnieper Estuary. It's about 40 km (25 mi) long and about 9 km (6 mi) wide. The Kinburn Spit is the narrow curving 'tail', 8.5 km long, that extends into the estuary at the far west end of the peninsula.
3/ The peninsula is flat and sandy, with many small lakes and salt marshes. It's partly wooded with oaks and pines. There are only four small villages on the peninsula with about 850 pre-war inhabitants. Oddly, the border between Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts runs between them.
4/ Most of the peninsula is uninhabited. It's the site of a number of rare natural habitats, protected by the National Park "Biloberezhia Sviatoslava". Before the war, it was a popular place for hydrofoil trips from Kherson, beach holidays, camping and wilderness hiking.
5/ Sadly the peninsula has been badly affected by the current war. Large areas of forest have been burned, and fragile habitats are likely to have been badly damaged by military vehicles.
6/ The peninsula has always had strategic importance. Herodotus visited it in the 5th century BC, when it was known as Gilea ("Forest"). Its modern name comes from the 15th century Turkish fortress of Kilburun ("Beautiful Pole"), which was located on the spit.
7/ Kilburun/Kinburn Fort was fought over several times in the 17th century before it was captured by Russia in 1774. The Anglo-French fleet attacked and captured it in October 1855 during the Crimean War, and it was demolished under the terms of the subsequent peace agreement.
8/ Why is Kinburn so important? The strait between the spit and the north shore at Ochakiv is only 4km wide. As this map shows, it overlooks the entrances to both the Dnieper and to the Southern Bug river. It therefore controls access to Mykolaiv and Kherson ports.
9/ Another important factor is that the peninsula is the most westerly mainland point Russia has reached in its invasion of Ukraine. It's the nearest occupied territory to Odesa, 60 km away, and overlooks most of Ukraine's remaining routes into the Black Sea.
10/ For some reason Russia did not take control of the peninsula until around 10 June, three months after capturing the rest of Kherson oblast south of the Dnieper. It's not clear whether Ukraine had any forces there at the time.
11/ The Russian advance on Kinburn enabled it to launch missiles at Ochakiv port, capsizing the Ukrainian anti-submarine corvette Vinnytsia. The 81m landing ship Yury Olefirenko was filmed making a narrow escape under Russian bombardment.
12/ Russia soon turned Kinburn into a military base. Artillery, rockets and Iranian-made drones have all reportedly been fired from there. The peninsula and spit were fortified to blockade the strait and shell Ochakiv and the Ukrainian-held Pervomayskiy Island in the strait.
13/ The man in this propaganda video is mercenary commander Alexei Kondratyev, leader of the 'Don' Cossack Brigade of the Redut private military company. It appears that, at least in October-November 2022, Kinburn was held by Redut.
14/ Ukraine likely tried to probe Russian defences on Kinburn before the recent liberation of Kherson. Kirill Stremousov, the recently deceased head of the Russian administration in Kherson, claimed to have defeated a special forces raid in September.
15/ It's unclear what's been going on lately but unconfirmed reports and video appear to show amphibious armoured vehicles and/or boats crossing the Kinburn Strait at night, most likely from Ochakiv.
16/ Ukraine likely aims to stop Russia using the peninsula as a fire base. The fall of Kherson likely makes the peninsula untenable anyway, as it's now within artillery range from the Ukrainian-held north side of the Dnieper.
17/ What will happen next is not yet clear. Satellite images suggest that the Russians have set up new defensive lines at the neck of the peninsula.
18/ As @NLwartracker points out, though, the new defences are also within artillery range and the restrictive terrain makes movement difficult. So I would not expect these defences to last long against a determined attacker.
19/ It's possible, if the Ukrainians are feeling ambitious, that they could push further east to bypass the lines of defence that the Russians have set up in the rest of Kherson oblast. But that's speculation – we'll have to wait for official announcements. /end
1/ The question of why Russians aren't flocking to fight in the war in Ukraine is continuing to exercise Russian warbloggers. 'LIVE Z' highlights the devastating effect that indefinite military service is having on family life, which he says is a "defining issue". ⬇️
2/ "The women's issue, as I see it, hasn't been addressed at all. It's a defining issue in many ways...
3/ "From my experience, I know that women are reluctant to let their men go to war, and those who do let their children's fathers go often face a host of domestic problems and the complete indifference of their "guardianship" authorities.
1/ Russian soldiers are stopped from retreating by the use of blocking units, which threaten or if necessary shoot retreaters to discourage others. This is risky work for the blockers too, as the story of a soldier named Ivan, call sign 'Angel', shows. ⬇️
2/ Ivan's story – he is now dead – illustrates the dangers of being assigned to blocking duty. While some dedicated blocking units may exist, his story and that of another man (thread below) suggest that blocking is often done on an ad hoc basis.
3/ Ivan's widow Eva says that he was involved in evacuating the wounded and spent two days bringing a seriously injured colleague from the front line. He was then ordered to go back on combat duty but refused because he was exhausted, and went to sleep.
1/ Russian Railways is reported to have faked a Ukrainian attack to cover up its own culpability for a fatal derailment in the Leningrad region in September 2025, caused when a locomotive was ordered to be driven at over twice the permitted line speed. ⬇️
2/ The crash of a TEP70BS diesel-electric locomotive occurred on 14 September near Semrino station in the Gatchina district of the Leningrad region. The driver was freed after being trapped in the cab, but died in an ambulance.
3/ The crash occurred on the same day as the separate derailment of a locomotive pulling 15 empty tank cars in the Luzhsky district of the Leningrad region. Both crashes were widely suspected to be the work of Ukrainian or anti-Putin partisan sabotage.
1/ Following recent reports that Russia is recruiting alcoholics, drug addicts, and the elderly en masse to fight in Ukraine, a soldier on the front line near the Dobropillia salient reports that "marginalised individuals" are struggling to advance there. ⬇️
2/ Recent reports have highlighted how "homeless and hardened alcoholics" are being sent to the front line, despite their inability to cope with the demands of intense warfare. This is borne out by a new report from the Dobropillia area.
3/ Their influx is likely the result of a bounty scheme under which Russian police officers can earn 10,000-100,000 rubles ($125-$1,250) for sending detainees to the war. They are taking the opportunity to force 'undesirables' to sign army contracts.
1/ A Russian soldier has described how he was ordered by a drunken colonel to shoot his own comrades for retreating from a battle near Klishchiivka in eastern Ukraine. His account highlights the Russian practice of executing soldiers to encourage them not to retreat. ⬇️
2/ The unidentified soldier says that he has been fighting near Klishchiivka, east of the contested Ukrainian town of Kostiantynivka. According to his account, he received only three days' training in Vladikavkaz, after which he was immediately sent to the front line.
3/ He says that the men with him were sent to assault Ukrainian positions west of Klishchiivka but were totally unprepared and began to retreat under fire. However, his commander ordered that if they continued with their retreat, they were to be shot by their own side.
1/ 'HELL NO WE WON'T GO', part 4: what can be done to make going to war more attractive for increasingly sceptical Russians? ⬇️
2/ Russian warblogger Alex Kartavykh received thousands of responses to his question of why his followers are "still not storming Pokrovsk". The first thread in this series summarises what respondents gave as their reasons for not joining the army: