Financial data of $HOME's tenants show that many cannot afford rent, have not been paying rent, are in administration, are run by bad actors, and/or simply do not provide social housing services. 2/
Several of $HOME's largest tenants do not appear to be paying any rent. Financial accounts show zero outflow, and charity activities do not appear to include social housing. 3/
Circle Housing & Support, responsible for 7.5% of revenue in 2021, is in Administration. The administrator notes Circle had a round-robin transaction whereby it would receive donations from landlords to pay rent. $HOME 4/
Publicly available charity financials show that many of these charities may not have the ability to service these leases on a long-term basis. Government grants are assessed year-to-year, and charities claim rent is renewed on this basis. $HOME 5/
Despite claims to limit exposure per client to 15%: $HOME's largest tenants all appear to share the same office and are run by the same people, including Peter Mitchell, who was suspended as Labour Councilor of Croxteth amid allegations of sexual harassment 6/
The founder of Noble Tree Foundation has been named in several court cases overseas including allegedly fraudulent asset stripping in Zimbabwe, breach of contract with film producers and possible sale of counterfeit shares in a Swedish solar company. $HOME 7/
Operators of various $HOME tenants also have significant interest in for-profit development companies and other for-profit government subsidized programs in which tenants are foisted into. 8/
THE FINANCIALS
$HOME’s cash conversion is almost non-existent due to overdue receivables and straight-line uncollected rent. Given our review of $HOME's tenants, we do not believe these amounts are collectable. 9/
$HOME's accounts receivables are sitting at 70+ days as at HY 2022, with no impairments recorded. A review of various tenant leases lodged with HM Land Registry show payment terms are consistently 30 days. 10/
$HOME also claims to adopt a straight-line revenue model where substantial portions of rent are collected in the back-end of the 25-year lease terms. 11/
THE VALUATION
The valuation of $HOME's properties is entirely based on Yield (“Investment Method”). Any impairment to receivables, revenues, or yield will directly impact Home REIT’s balance sheet. 12/
Viceroy Research has pulled transaction records for every single $HOME investment property. These show properties appear to have been flipped between tenants in a short space for immense profits and no evidence of capex. 13/
There appear to be various middle-men and development companies which we could not verify who interact between vendors and $HOME. Some properties are bought and re-sold between parties in a matter of days. These transactions should be scrutinized. 14/
THE MANAGEMENT
$HOME outsources management to Alvarium, who is compensated on a percentage of NAV and is responsible for asset acquisitions. 15/
This model does not align Alvarium’s compensation with the performance of the portfolio, only with how much they spend on acquisitions. It also creates substantial audit risk in the revaluation of $HOME's book, and encourages fraud or other risk-taking behaviours. 16/
Alvarium appointed Gareth Jones to establish $HOME and subsequently become their CFO (now resigned). Gareth was previous Finance Director of Civitas, who has come under similar scrutiny. 17/
$HOME have nonetheless had three CFOs in 2022, the latest resigned less than 1 month before audited accounts are due. 18/
CONCLUSION
$HOME results are due on 28 November. We believe it will be a governance nightmare, and cash generation will decline.
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Viceroy’s research pushes the envelope on pervasive fraud at AIL, disgusting misconduct allegations, and their financial consequences. Globe Life is rotten from top to bottom. $GL #thread 1/viceroyresearch.org/2024/04/30/glo…
Viceroy is short Globe Life (NYSE:GL) following an extensive investigation of the company & its major subsidiary American Income Life.
h/t to @FuzzyPandaShort, who produced a solid report outlining the extent of fraud at GL. This report will push the envelope:
$GL 2/
THE BACKGROUND
Globe Life’s American Income Life (AIL) division is the predominant performance driver in terms of group captive agent headcount, life insurance net sales, group net sales, underwriting margin contributions, and sexual harassment claims. $GL 3/
$MPW have provided unsatisfactory responses to long lists of questions to the SEC, who has now closed its enquiry and published it's entire correspondence with MPW fron early 2023. 1/
The straw that broke the camel's back is a letter from the SEC demanding Steward financials.
$MPW CEO Steven Scamner responds that despite repeated requests to provide audited financial statements, Steward had not done so, and is otherwise not required by law to do so. 2/
This is absolutely laughable. It is a standard provision in any commercial loan, such as ABL and mortgage that audited financial statements MUST be produced. Steward must legally produce these audited statements or be in breach of its obligations to creditors $MPW 4/
SCA’s Forest Surveys: Beating Expectations
$SCA's 10-yearly forest surveys (FTAX) do not only establish inventory levels, but also lock-in growth and harvest rate simulations for extended periods of time. This is not unusual for a 100-year life cycle asset. 2/
SCA have significantly brought forward the timing of two FTAX surveys. Each survey locks-in material improvements to standing timber inventory & growth rates.
By locking-in increased long-term simulations of growth & inventory, $SCA are able to increase harvesting rates. 3/
$SCA valuation methodology has relied on short-term price fluctuations, interest rate fluctuations, & mark-to-market assumptions for numerous unrealistic inputs to massively inflate SCA’s forestry assets. 1/viceroyresearch.org/2024/01/25/sca…
We believe $SCA presents >50% downside risk.
Paper revaluation of SCA’s assets will not make SCA’s trees grow faster. Investors can choose to ignore this, but will still have to accept the cash yield that SCA produces. 2/
In 2019, $SCA adopted a market approach to valuing its forest assets as opposed to a DCF. This accounting change has inflated the paper value of SCA’s forest assets by over 100% in 2019 alone, and over 300% to date. 3/
Arbor’s high-risk multifamily residential bridge loans, which comprise substantially all of its asset book, are going bad fast. They cannot be refinanced. The end is near. $ABR 1/viceroyresearch.org/2023/11/16/arb…
In an industry plagued with delusion & bad decisions, $ABR stands out as the worst of the worst. A dive into Arbor’s underlying CLO data suggest its entire loan book is distressed and underlying collateral is vastly overstated.
We believe $ABR is a 🍩. $0.00. 2/
BACKGROUND
Many grifter gurus convinced themselves and/or their cult followers that the path to riches is paved with debt and multifamily residential slums in the Sunbelt. To those with short memories (only as far back as 2009), this is an easy investment sell. $ABR 3/