ESET Research Profile picture
Nov 25, 2022 9 tweets 7 min read Read on X
On November 21st #ESETResearch detected and alerted @_CERT_UA of a wave of ransomware we named #RansomBoggs, deployed in multiple organizations in Ukraine🇺🇦. While the malware written in .NET is new, its deployment is similar to previous attacks attributed to #Sandworm. 1/9
@_CERT_UA Its authors make multiple references to Monsters, Inc., the 2001 movie by Pixar. The ransom note (SullivanDecryptsYourFiles.txt) shows the authors impersonate James P. Sullivan, the main character of the movie, whose job is to scare kids. 2/9
@_CERT_UA The executable file is also named Sullivan.<version?>.exe and references are present in the code as well. 3/9
@_CERT_UA There are similarities with previous attacks conducted by #Sandworm: a PowerShell script used to distribute the .NET ransomware from the domain controller is almost identical to the one seen last April during the #Industroyer2 attacks against the energy sector. 4/9
@_CERT_UA This PowerShell script is what @_CERT_UA calls #POWERGAP, and was used to deploy #CaddyWiper using #ArguePatch (see cert.gov.ua/article/39518). 5/9
@_CERT_UA RansomBoggs generates a random key and encrypts files using AES-256 in CBC mode (not AES-128 like mentioned in the ransom note), and appends the .chsch file extension. The key is then RSA encrypted and written to aes.bin. 6/9
@_CERT_UA Depending on the malware variant, the RSA public key can either be hardcoded in the malware sample itself or provided as argument. 7/9
@_CERT_UA Last month, Microsoft notified about a similar operation in Ukraine and Poland, where ransomware called #Prestige hit logistics companies. They also attributed these attacks to #Sandworm. 8/9
@_CERT_UA IoCs:
F4D1C047923B9D10031BB709AABF1A250AB0AAA2
021308C361C8DE7C38EF135BC3B53439EB4DA0B4
ESET Detection names:
MSIL/Filecoder.Sullivan.A
MSIL/Filecoder.RansomBoggs.A
9/9

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with ESET Research

ESET Research Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @ESETresearch

Jul 18
#ESETresearch discovered a signed, vulnerable, ad-injecting driver from a mysterious Chinese company. This threat, which we dubbed HotPage, comes self-contained in an executable that installs its main driver and injects libraries into Chromium-based browsers. 1/7
Image
Image
Using Windows’ notification callbacks, the driver component monitors new browsers or tabs being opened. Under certain conditions, the adware will use various techniques to inject shellcode into browser processes to load network-tampering libraries. 2/7
Image
Image
Using Microsoft’s Detours hooking library, the injected code filters HTTP(S) requests and responses. The malware can replace the content of the current page, redirect the user, or simply open a new tab to a website full of gaming ads. 3/7 Image
Read 7 tweets
Aug 30, 2023
#ESETresearch identified two GREF campaigns targeting #Android users with @signalapp and @telegram apps trojanized into cyberespionage tools .
@LukasStefanko

1/9 welivesecurity.com/en/eset-resear…
Image
Signal Plus Messenger and FlyGram were built by merging the BadBazaar espionage code, previously used to target #Uyghurs and other #Turkic minorities, into the respective base app’s code. 2/9
The purpose of both apps is data exfiltration. Signal Plus Messenger presents the first documented case of spying on a victim’s Signal communications by secretly autolinking the compromised device to the attacker’s Signal device. 3/9 Image
Read 9 tweets
May 10, 2023
#ESETResearch warns about a CPIO archive named “Jump Crypto Investment ” uploaded to VirusTotal from the USA 🇺🇸. It is another malicious PDF viewer distributed by #Lazarus #APT for #macOS @pkalnai @michalmalik 1/7 Agreement.zip

Image
@pkalnai @michalmalik The archive contains a fully functional – but malicious – PDF viewer, and a crafted “locked” PDF file. When the file is opened in the viewer, the malicious code is triggered. The functionality is very similar to the malware reported by @JamfSoftware. 2/7 jamf.com/blog/bluenorof…
Image
@pkalnai @michalmalik @JamfSoftware First, the malicious PDF viewer decrypts a decoy document embedded inside the original PDF file, and displays it to the target. 3/7 Image
Read 7 tweets
Apr 20, 2023
#ESETResearch confirms Lazarus is linked to the recent #3CX supply-chain attacks. Based on code similarities and network infrastructure, we connect the 3CX incident with a Linux case of DreamJob, a long-term Lazarus operation using job offer as lures. 1/6 welivesecurity.com/2023/04/20/lin…
First, let’s look at the timeline. It shows that the trojanized macOS version of the 3CX Desktop App was ready two months prior to the distribution of the Windows version. Also interesting is that the attack was in preparation as early as December 2022. 2/6 Image
It was reported that Mandiant has found Mac malware they call SIMPLESEA inside the 3CX network. While we do not have the sample, their description of this malware overlaps with second-stage Linux malware we found while investigating a recent Operation DreamJob case. 3/6 Image
Read 6 tweets
Mar 14, 2023
#ESETResearch discovered an attack by APT group Tick against a data-loss prevention (DLP) company in East Asia and found a previously unreported tool used by the group. welivesecurity.com/2023/03/14/slo… @0xfmz 1/6
In 2021, in the DLP company’s network, the attackers introduced trojanized installers of the legitimate application Q-dir, part of a toolkit used by the company. When executed, the installer dropped the open-source ReVBShell backdoor and ran the original Q-dir application. 2/6 Image
Subsequently, in 2022, on customers of the DLP company’s software, the trojanized Q-dir installers were deployed using remote support tools. Our hypothesis is that this occurred while the DLP company provided technical support to their customers. 3/6
Read 6 tweets
Mar 2, 2023
#ESETResearch analyzed a new #MustangPanda backdoor. Its C&C communications is done over #MQTT using the open-source QMQTT library, so we named it MQsTTang. This library depends on parts of the Qt framework, statically linked in the PE. welivesecurity.com/2023/03/02/mqs… 1/5
A sample of MQsTTang was identified by @Unit42_Intel on 2023-02-17. As stated in that thread, the backdoor uses the legitimate MQTT broker 3.228.54.173. This has the benefit of hiding their actual C&C servers from victims and analysts. 2/5
This malware family is also tracked as "Kumquat" by @threatinsight.
3/5
Read 5 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(