Thread by @mattia_n

Internal documents from #Claas, a 🇩🇪 agricultural machinery manufacturer, which are available to @DIEZEIT, show how Claas has been planning for months to systematically circumvent export restrictions in violation of EU's sactions. Small EN 🧵/1
zeit.de/2022/49/claas-…

Since mid-2022, the group has been working on the implementation of the secret project, says a high-ranking manager. To restart their factory in Krasnodar, just 450 km from Mariupol, in March 2023, #Claas is trying to exploit a loophole in the embargo regulations, ZEIT writes. /2

The company needed to bring in special parts, such as V-belts, hydraulic cylinders, gas springs, silencers or steel pipes, for its complex agricultural machinery that could be used for military equipment and thus are banned under EU sanctions. /3

In order to get the supplies across the blocked Russian border, Claas is using a trick: According to @DIEZEIT, the company is to export the important individual parts to Russia hidden in assemblies. /4

"The German mechanics are supposed to assemble the forbidden parts into new components. This would give them a different customs tariff number and make them invisible to the inspectors." /5

In late October, the first boxes of six "steering system kits" passed through customs clearance in Krasnodar. These also included six sanctioned hydraulic cylinders. /6

"According to ZEIT information, an earlier delivery had still been stopped at the EU's external border in late summer. Customs in Estonia saw the Claas goods as a sanctions violation and sent the parts back." /7

One sanctions lawyer consulted tells ZEIT" "The goods concerned here seem to fall under the EU's Russia sanctions. However, the actions of the companies would then not only be classified as criminal, since clearly intentional but..." /8

"...also showed, at the latest after the events in Estonia, a not inconsiderable criminal energy, which would drive the amount of the expected penalty up again vehemently - clearly in the direction of a prison sentence." Viktor Winkler, a specialized sanctions layer said. /9

So why all the risk-taking for the German agricultural giant #Claas? /10

In the last fiscal year 2021, #Claas generated a quarter of its sales in Central and Eastern Europe, more than one billion euros. More than 230 million euros in sales and 46 million euros in profits came from the Russian business alone, says an insider: "Record profits." /11

Just a few weeks before the invasion, Claas-Mühlhäuser chairwoman of the supervisory board, criticized the Russia sanctions, saying they were "ineffective".

After the RU conquest of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine in 2014, Claas-Mühlhäuser met with Putin several times. /12

Six years ago Claas was the first foreign company (!) to conclude a special investment agreement with the RU government. The Tucano combine harvester was given the status of a domestic product and has since been available for purchase by RU farmers with government subsidies. /13

"Claas was now able to participate in state tenders, received the same subsidies as domestic Russian companies, and was allowed to call itself the "Fatherland Producer."" /14

The special investment contract obliged Claas to carry out a large part of its production in Russia. For Claas, making itself so dependent on the Russian state was a strategic decision - two years after Russia's invasion of 🇺🇦 and the annexation of Crimea. /15

Failing to oblige with the Russian regulations, which would require assembly in Russia in violation of European sanctions, will likely cost #Claas millions of Russian subsidies and revenues. /16

An excellent investigation by @DIEZEIT and @ChristianFuchs_ and Claas Tatje raises many many important questions.

Did 🇩🇪 businesses make themselves so dependent on the RU market that they become the first important company to try to break the sanctions regime? It seems so! /end

PS: I hope the text will be available in English asap. FYI @B4Ukraine & @tkesho3