#InternetShutdowns violate fundamental human rights and Ethiopian authorities must restore internet access in Tigray. We have repeatedly called for an immediate end to this shutdown, which has been ongoing for the past 2 years, throughout our participation at #IGF2022.
Tech and social media platforms must address legitimate concerns such as misinformation and hateful content, to fulfill their obligation to respect human rights, keep people safe as they come back online, and prevent authorities from attempting to justify any kind of disruptions.
Over 6 million people in Tigray have been cut off from the internet since Nov 2020, making it difficult for journalists and human rights defenders to document violations, leading to impunity with regards to the crimes committed in the region. #ReconnectTigray
In the context of one of the world’s deadliest conflicts, the shutdown in Tigray has disrupted access to education and healthcare, decimated livelihoods, and made it impossible for millions of people to simply communicate with their families and let them know how they are.
At #IGF, we’ve spoken with officials from the Ethiopian government, African Union, and UN system, as well as diplomats from around the world, private sector stakeholders, and civil society partners, making it clear that the disruptions in Tigray must come to an end.
Join nearly 100 CSOs from Tigray, Ethiopia, across Africa, and the world, as well as individuals from 102 countries, calling on the @_AfricanUnion to condemn the shutdown in Tigray and take action to bring it to an end. Sign the petition ➡️ accessnow.org/tigray-ethiopi…#KeepItOn
As Ethiopian + Tigrayan authorities are meeting in the Tigrayan town of Shire for further peace talks, Ethiotelecom announced that its services will be available in the town “in a few days.” Words are not enough. We will not relent until the internet is fully restored in Tigray.
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"Normally, people get hacked once or twice or three times in rare situations. But, in this case, we saw a really intensive use," says Access Now's @pnigroh.
In the past few years, NSO has been added to the U.S. Entity List (a form of sanctioning) and has faced major lawsuits by Apple and Meta (WhatsApp).
Le rapport couvre les coupures délibérées d’internet par des gouvernements en 2021 — la montée de l'autoritarisme numérique et de la censure dans le monde.
En 2021, les autorités ont délibérément coupé l'accès à internet à 182 reprises dans 34 pays.
On observe une résurgence spectaculaire de l’utilisation de cet outil de répression alors que 159 coupures d'internet ont été enregistrées dans 29 pays en 2020.
Les gouvernements bloquent délibérément l’accès à internet avec l’objectif commun de réduire au silence militants, journalistes et citoyens ordinaires.
Cela se produit généralement lors d’événements nationaux clés ou en période de conflit politique.
We are seeing some viral Instagram posts that claim a new iOS update allows people to track your "precise location."
This is not quite right 🧵
While apps like Facebook and Instagram can track your location (if you have the setting on), random users don't have access to this information.
The most they can see is if you publicly tag your location in a post.
Just last week, Apple released an urgent iOS update that helps protect users against some serious security vulnerabilities, including ones that could allow hackers to completely take over devices.
The Indian gov’t is thwarting efforts to investigate the use of Pegasus spyware.
The Supreme Court today echoed sentiment shared by the public & parliamentarians alike since the #PegasusProject findings last year — “the Indian gov’t is not cooperating.”
The Supreme Court now has the investigating committee’s report, which is not yet public, but reportedly states that malware was found in 5 out of the 29 phones examined, but that there was no “conclusive proof” of Pegasus spyware.
Four things need to be top of mind for the SC bench led by the Chief Justice of India:
1. Forensic analysis to trace spyware cannot be “conclusive” — the investigation must obtain direct information from the gov’t on procurement and use of spyware.