Top 50 countries in #China 🇨🇳debt portfolio and their quality
With #China now being a central creditor, question is whether it wants to work alone or with others, including the #IMF & how it would engage with the other creditors and with the #MDBs.
2 recommendations💡 to make progress on the #CommonFramework:1⃣Building trust with MDBs, especially #IMF, to reform debt restructuring process in mutually profitable ways 2⃣Domestic innovations to produce effective central coordination mechanism in Beijing.
1⃣Innovations should be driven by will to empower debtor countries to develop themselves, with recovery & growth strategies as backbones of debt restructuring deals, backed by fin. assurances for new money by #MDBs, adapted conditionalities & with fair burden sharing between all.
2⃣Chinese creditor organizations should coordinate their interests so as to be able to negotiate as one creditor group. Their control over a larger share of debt would improve their bargaining power.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
New (and inaugural) FDL Working Paper! 🚨🚨🚨🚨
In "The coming debt crisis", findevlab.org/the-coming-deb… @ChAlbinet and @mkessler_DC look at sovereign external debt dynamics for 113 developing countries under simple assumptions and find that:
Under conditions prevailing in end-2021, debt service dynamics were deteriorating moderately. Debt service for the median LIC rises fast until 2023, but declines afterwards, dynamics for LMICs are more persistent
Using IMF-WB DSF thresholds (which are highly discussable, but are useful, if only because they are used in assessing restructuring needs), 28 countries cross their risk level (in terms of debt serv / revenues). The real break was COVID, and it declines after 2024