#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7
#Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7
Russia's Finance Ministry doesn't count dividends from oil&gas companies as oil&gas revenue (one reason the actual reliance of the budget on oil&gas is greater than the offical numbers suggest). Gazprom dividends led to an increase in non-oil&gas revenue in November 2022. 3/7
The budget deficit for 2022 will be larger than expected and reach ~3 trillion rubles. The previous estimate (see chart, -1.3 trillion) already accounted for a big increase in defense spending (from 3.5 to 4.7 trillion). Actual defense spending will be far beyond 5 trillion. 4/7
Russia's Finance Ministry took 300 billion RUB from its National Welfare Fund in November, which doesn't affect the balance much. 5/7
Withdrawals at the end of the year are not unusual (rather cash management than deficit financing). Still, the December withdrawal will be interesting. 6/7
Russia's Finance Ministry has turned to the domestic capital market to finance its deficit, including record-breaking auctions on Nov 16 and Dec 7. Tomorrow will be the next OFZ auction. Next year, Minfin plans to issue a total of 3.5 trillion rubles (covers planned deficit). 7/7
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I really recommend this new report on #Russia's economy from CASE Center. The authors argue that the economy is much more resilient than commonly assumed. The conclusions are a bit too fatalistic in my view, but it is definitely worth reading. case-center.org/wp-content/upl…
The authors explain why - in their view - a lot of the earlier predictions for Russia's economy have not come true. It is not just an analysis "in hindsight": Already in March 2022, Dmitry Nekrasov wrote a forecast for Russia's economy that turned out to be very accurate.
Keep in mind that, at the time, even the Russian Central Bank and the Russian government were expecting a huge crisis in the Russian economy. It was the mainstream perspective, and Nekrasov contradicted it: telegra.ph/Ob-apokaliptic…
More Russian voices push back against the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine. Not surprisingly, Russia has zero interest in ending the war before it has defeated Ukraine. Apparently, ceasefires only existed in some Western dreams.
Similarly, Trenin says Russia is first and foremost interested in "the character of Ukraine's future regime and military potential". kommersant.ru/doc/7283219
Western idea of talks:
1.) ceasefire
2.) negotiations
Russian idea of talks:
1.) no more weapons for Ukraine
2.) negotiations
3.) ceasefire of Russia gets what it wants (regime change etc)
Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen dafür, dass es in der Ukraine in absehbarer Zeit Frieden geben könnte. Dass hierzulande so viel darüber gesprochen wird, zeigt nur den Realitätsverlust und Anmaßung der deutschen Debatte. Wir können den Krieg nicht von oben "befrieden".
Wir können den Ausgang das Krieges nur durch unsere Ukraine-Unterstützung beeinflussen (und ein stückweit über Sanktionen). Wir können aber nichts dirigieren oder erzwingen, und auch der globale Süden wird uns nicht aushelfen (wollen oder können).
Für viele ist es wohl noch ungewohnt, dass wir nicht die Macht und Mittel besitzen, einen Krieg mitten in Europa einfach zu "befrieden". Dass wir nicht bestimmen können, wie und wann er endet, dass wir keine übermächtigen Schiedsrichter mehr sind. Aber das ist die neue Realität.
For the past two years, it often seemed like sanctions could not hurt Russia. The Russian economy was on a massive sugar high, fueled by booming energy markets. But now things are changing. Russia's struggling coal industry is the best example.
After two crazy years, world market prices for coal have returned to something closer to normal. Suddenly it turns out that Russian coal can no longer break even at these more normal market prices. What happened? tradingeconomics.com/commodity/coal
The main reason is that sanctions have increased the cost of transportation, because some coal has to be redirected from Europe to India. The same thing happened with oil. But there is a difference: Oil margins are so high that it doesn't matter as much. energyandcleanair.org/july-2024-mont…
The average regional signing bonus for Russian soldiers is 596k rubles, it more than tripled from the beginning of the year. The average total bonus increased from 363k to 996k. But can the increase change people's minds about fighting in Ukraine?
When you enlist in the Russian military, your family can expect three different types of payments over the course of your (often literally short-lived) career:
- Signing bonus
- Monthly pay
- Compensation for death/injury.
If you want more men to sign up, increasing the sign-up bonus is the cheapest way to do it. It is the only risk-free payout for the recruits. Monthly pay depends on how long you survive, and compensation depends on whether the Russian bureaucracy deems you eligible.
How do sanctions affect the war in Ukraine? The simplistic explanation that "Russia is running out of money" is not wrong, but it is also not quite right. To understand the impact of sanctions, it helps to think of Russia's trade with the outside world as a big machine. 1/5
On one side of this machine, Russia puts in oil, metals, grain etc, and on the other side, this machine puts out computer chips, cars, and machinery. Sanctions sabotage this "trade machine" in many ways. As a result, Russia has to put in more barrels of oil to make it work. 2/5
If Russia's "trade machine" is not working well, it affects Putin's ability to solve the key economic problems of his war. There are essentially three distinct economic problems he faces (size of GDP, control over income, military production capacity / recruitment success). 3/5