Janis Kluge Profile picture
Dec 13, 2022 7 tweets 3 min read Read on X
#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7 Image
#Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7 Image
Russia's Finance Ministry doesn't count dividends from oil&gas companies as oil&gas revenue (one reason the actual reliance of the budget on oil&gas is greater than the offical numbers suggest). Gazprom dividends led to an increase in non-oil&gas revenue in November 2022. 3/7 Image
The budget deficit for 2022 will be larger than expected and reach ~3 trillion rubles. The previous estimate (see chart, -1.3 trillion) already accounted for a big increase in defense spending (from 3.5 to 4.7 trillion). Actual defense spending will be far beyond 5 trillion. 4/7 Image
Russia's Finance Ministry took 300 billion RUB from its National Welfare Fund in November, which doesn't affect the balance much. 5/7 Image
Withdrawals at the end of the year are not unusual (rather cash management than deficit financing). Still, the December withdrawal will be interesting. 6/7 Image
Russia's Finance Ministry has turned to the domestic capital market to finance its deficit, including record-breaking auctions on Nov 16 and Dec 7. Tomorrow will be the next OFZ auction. Next year, Minfin plans to issue a total of 3.5 trillion rubles (covers planned deficit). 7/7 Image

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More from @jakluge

Jul 20
When Russia started its full-scale invasion, it had three major resources:
1.) Huge stocks of old weapons
2.) Poor & unemployed men
3.) Super solid finances
This has allowed Putin to fight a big war while keeping most Russians in their comfort zone: Lots of guns AND butter. 1/5
All three are not limitless, and the economic consequence of that is inflation. Inflation is the result of urgently ramping up military production, pulling men from the labor market and sending them to the front, and from weakening trade and fiscal balances. 2/5
So the question for Putin is more and more: Guns OR butter? War in Ukraine OR a nice comfort zone for most Russians? That means: Should he switch to a real war economy (so far he hasn't...)? Should he do another round of mobilization? Raise taxes? 3/5
Read 5 tweets
Jun 16
The West needs to rethink sanctions and move from ad hoc measures to long-term economic containment. Russia will remain a threat to Europe for many years to come. The future of European security depends on the future of Russian economic might. 1/
brookings.edu/wp-content/upl…
Image
After two years of unprecedented sanctions, the Russian economy has exceeded expectations. Yes, sanctions have had a clear impact, but they leave Putin with enough resources to militarize Russia in the coming years and turn it into a conventional military threat to Europe. 2/
Time is an advantage for Russia. It allows for adaptation, new infrastructure, new supply chains, etc. But time can also be an advantage for the West - if it takes a strategic approach: Bolder restrictions on Russian energy exports are possible if markets have time to adjust. 3/
Read 8 tweets
May 5
Ein sehr gutes und wichtiges Gespräch zum Thema "Verhandlungen und Einfrieren" von @AliceBota und @MichaelOThumann. Es geht um die alten Mythen der Russlandpolitik, die gerade durch Wagenknecht und Mützenich eine Renaissance erleben, aber auch um die Verhandlungen von 2022. 1/6
Der Text von Charap&Radchenko ist dabei ebenfalls Thema. Michael Thumann berichtet von seinen Gesprächen mit Unterhändlern in Istanbul. Alice Bota beobachtet gut, dass alle russischen Äußerungen von den Autoren des Textes (geradezu ahistorisch) für bare Münze genommen werden. 2/6
Ganz zu schweigen von der (wie ich finde: unsäglichen) Überschrift des Artikels, die letztlich das einzige ist, was bei vielen hängen bleiben wird (und nebenbei Putins Propaganda bestätigt). Wirklich gut dagegen der Titel des Podcasts: "Dann halt einfrieren". 3/6
Read 6 tweets
Apr 16
The key problem I have with this piece is the assumption that Putin agreed to, or even cared much for, the Istanbul Communique at the time. The authors seem to have their own doubts (Putin agreed to debate the status of Crimea with Ukraine?).
1/4

foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-…
The authors fail to point out that Putin didn't appear to be deeply involved in the process at the time and only began bringing up the supposed "almost deal" much later, with the rather obvious intention to discredit the West and improve his image with the Global South. 2/4
I also find the role of Chalyi... interesting. He appears to be a key witness of the "Putin wanted a deal" theory. While he was part of the negotiations, he was criticized in Ukraine for being too understanding of Russia (maybe that's why Kyiv hoped he could help negotiate?). 3/4
Read 6 tweets
Mar 13
Although it will take many more attacks on refineries to create a real gasoline shortage in Russia (and even then, Belarus has available capacities), it is an effective strategy for many reasons:
1.) A gasoline shortage would be a political nightmare for Putin, because it would..
.. be felt and discussed by everyone. Gasoline prices are political, even in Russia. Average Russians are not willing to pay a price for the war.
2.) Refineries are important for the military. Of course the military will not feel shortages, but refineries are legitimate targets.
3.) There are very few civilian casualties. High gas prices make people angry, but nobody will starve, freeze etc. due to the attacks.
4.) Attacks on Russian refineries don't lead to rising oil prices globally, as long as crude exports continue. The effect is felt only in Russia.
Read 5 tweets
Dec 17, 2023
Why won't the Kremlin agree to a compromise in Ukraine? The answer lies in Putin's motives. Initially, it may have been imperialism and a desire to control Ukraine. That was bad enough, and difficult enough to stop. But after the full-scale invasion began, the motives changed.
The reason is that the Ukrainian military exposed the weakness of Putin's regime. Russia was humiliated on the world stage. Since then, it is not about domination: Putin needs to destroy Ukraine and humiliate the West because they openly challenged him and exposed his weakness.
Putin can't let Ukraine get away with this. Throughout his time in power, he has carefully cultivated a reputation for destroying and humiliating those who openly challenge him. Crucially, this destruction must be a spectacle, shocking and demoralizing. Saving face is not enough.
Read 8 tweets

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