#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7
#Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7
Russia's Finance Ministry doesn't count dividends from oil&gas companies as oil&gas revenue (one reason the actual reliance of the budget on oil&gas is greater than the offical numbers suggest). Gazprom dividends led to an increase in non-oil&gas revenue in November 2022. 3/7
The budget deficit for 2022 will be larger than expected and reach ~3 trillion rubles. The previous estimate (see chart, -1.3 trillion) already accounted for a big increase in defense spending (from 3.5 to 4.7 trillion). Actual defense spending will be far beyond 5 trillion. 4/7
Russia's Finance Ministry took 300 billion RUB from its National Welfare Fund in November, which doesn't affect the balance much. 5/7
Withdrawals at the end of the year are not unusual (rather cash management than deficit financing). Still, the December withdrawal will be interesting. 6/7
Russia's Finance Ministry has turned to the domestic capital market to finance its deficit, including record-breaking auctions on Nov 16 and Dec 7. Tomorrow will be the next OFZ auction. Next year, Minfin plans to issue a total of 3.5 trillion rubles (covers planned deficit). 7/7
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New data on Russian recruitment: Around 200,000 men signed a contract in the first half of 2025. Dmitry Medvedev claims the number is 210,000 - my latest estimated based on regional budget data indicates 191,000.
By now, I'm pretty confident that my recruitment estimates based on regional budget data are useful. Over the last 1.5 years, they closely tracked the quarterly results based on federal data (which is always published with a big delay).
The great thing about regional budget data is that: It allows for monthly estimates, providing a more detailed and up-to-date picture of recruitment dynamics without relying on official statements.
The discussion about European peacekeepers is deeply dishonest. Is the idea to sneak them in while Russia is not looking? Hoping that Russia will be afraid to attack them afterwards? Should we get Putin drunk so he agrees to the deployment and when he sobers up it is too late?
If anything, these peacekeepers will be an invitation for Russia to test Europeans by attacking them in Ukraine. Are European societies ready to see thousands of their soldiers dying there? Because Putin certainly would be willing to sacrifice his people to expose Europe.
My impression is that European leaders boldly talk about peacekeepers as if they could be deployed tomorrow, knowing very well that the conditions for deploying them (especially: Russian agreement and US protection) will never come. This is a problem.
The current situation: Russia is exploring what it can get from Trump. The minimum it would want for a ceasefire is control over Ukraine, i.e. some form of surrender by Kyiv. This could take a number of forms: a new Russian-controlled president, restrictions on Ukraine's army...
Although the US position has diverged from Europe's, it is still far from Russia's. At least some in the US administration believe that Ukraine could remain independent after a deal, or that the Europeans could send in troops. Both are non-starters for Moscow.
The big question is whether Russia will manage to negotiate a deceptive deal with its inexperienced US counterparts. A deal that - to the US team - looks like Trump gets what he wants (just a ceasefire), while in fact it will lead to what Russia wants (Russian control over Kyiv).
Don't expect a ceasefire in Ukraine: Russia will not agree to it - yet. Putin knows that the war is his biggest asset. As soon as he agrees to a ceasefire, he will lose all his leverage. Trump will celebrate and then lose interest. Violating "Trump's" ceasefire later on is risky.
A ceasefire will be the last thing Putin agrees to, after he has secured (not in writing, but in reality) everything he wants: Regime change in Kyiv, recognition of new borders, crippling Ukrainian military, roll-back of NATO troops from the Eastern Flank and a few more things.
The "problem" is that Trump cannot give Putin what he wants, because he does not control it alone. He needs EU and Kyiv to play along, and they won't. Seeing this problem, Putin is already demanding that Trump has to put more pressure on Europe. But this is unlikely to work.
Many Russian regions are offering huge sign-on bonuses to find more recruits for the war in Ukraine.
It seems to be working: I analyzed regional budget spending on bonuses for over 20 Russian regions and - while noisy - the data says that recruitment in Russia is accelerating.
The regions I analyzed are just a small part of Russia, but they are very diverse and from different parts of the country, and they tell a similar story (which may not be that surprising): Offering millions of rubles attracts more recruits.
One particularly interesting (very preliminary) finding of the analysis is that the rate of recruitment in most regions is proportional to the region's population size, be it rich or poor, large or small, ethnic or non-ethnic, industrial, rural or urban regions.
The newest sanctions on Russian energy are nothing less than a paradigm change: For the first time, the goal is to cut Russian export volumes. Before, the goal was to make oil exports less profitable for Russia, but to keep the volumes intact.
The US did not just target any export volume, but made sure to hit Russia's most profitable export routes the hardest: Oil from Russia's Pacific ports had a small discount and low shipping costs, making it much more profitable then exports from the Baltic/Black Sea to India.
It also makes a lot of sense to go after those tankers that are the most specialized and the hardest to replace.
Overall, the measures look well thought through and will reduce Russian revenues, both in the budget and in the trade balance.