#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7
#Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7
Russia's Finance Ministry doesn't count dividends from oil&gas companies as oil&gas revenue (one reason the actual reliance of the budget on oil&gas is greater than the offical numbers suggest). Gazprom dividends led to an increase in non-oil&gas revenue in November 2022. 3/7
The budget deficit for 2022 will be larger than expected and reach ~3 trillion rubles. The previous estimate (see chart, -1.3 trillion) already accounted for a big increase in defense spending (from 3.5 to 4.7 trillion). Actual defense spending will be far beyond 5 trillion. 4/7
Russia's Finance Ministry took 300 billion RUB from its National Welfare Fund in November, which doesn't affect the balance much. 5/7
Withdrawals at the end of the year are not unusual (rather cash management than deficit financing). Still, the December withdrawal will be interesting. 6/7
Russia's Finance Ministry has turned to the domestic capital market to finance its deficit, including record-breaking auctions on Nov 16 and Dec 7. Tomorrow will be the next OFZ auction. Next year, Minfin plans to issue a total of 3.5 trillion rubles (covers planned deficit). 7/7
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Don't expect a ceasefire in Ukraine: Russia will not agree to it - yet. Putin knows that the war is his biggest asset. As soon as he agrees to a ceasefire, he will lose all his leverage. Trump will celebrate and then lose interest. Violating "Trump's" ceasefire later on is risky.
A ceasefire will be the last thing Putin agrees to, after he has secured (not in writing, but in reality) everything he wants: Regime change in Kyiv, recognition of new borders, crippling Ukrainian military, roll-back of NATO troops from the Eastern Flank and a few more things.
The "problem" is that Trump cannot give Putin what he wants, because he does not control it alone. He needs EU and Kyiv to play along, and they won't. Seeing this problem, Putin is already demanding that Trump has to put more pressure on Europe. But this is unlikely to work.
Many Russian regions are offering huge sign-on bonuses to find more recruits for the war in Ukraine.
It seems to be working: I analyzed regional budget spending on bonuses for over 20 Russian regions and - while noisy - the data says that recruitment in Russia is accelerating.
The regions I analyzed are just a small part of Russia, but they are very diverse and from different parts of the country, and they tell a similar story (which may not be that surprising): Offering millions of rubles attracts more recruits.
One particularly interesting (very preliminary) finding of the analysis is that the rate of recruitment in most regions is proportional to the region's population size, be it rich or poor, large or small, ethnic or non-ethnic, industrial, rural or urban regions.
The newest sanctions on Russian energy are nothing less than a paradigm change: For the first time, the goal is to cut Russian export volumes. Before, the goal was to make oil exports less profitable for Russia, but to keep the volumes intact.
The US did not just target any export volume, but made sure to hit Russia's most profitable export routes the hardest: Oil from Russia's Pacific ports had a small discount and low shipping costs, making it much more profitable then exports from the Baltic/Black Sea to India.
It also makes a lot of sense to go after those tankers that are the most specialized and the hardest to replace.
Overall, the measures look well thought through and will reduce Russian revenues, both in the budget and in the trade balance.
Great text: Bitcoin is a fascinating Ponzi-like / pyramid scheme. More and more people jump on the bandwagon, hoping to profit. Early adopters get rich. Late adopters now hope that governments will create "reserves", i.e. join the Ponzi scheme, to keep the party going...
Bitcoin doesn't appear to be a Ponzi scheme - because there is no Ponzi! The system is decentralized. In the early years of Bitcoin, there was a lot of talk of possible use cases of Bitcoin. That has almost disappeared, now it is just the hope of the value going up up up.
Companies like Microstrategy have even managed to create small pyramids within the larger Bitcoin pyramid. It goes without saying that no government should ever participate in a pyramid scheme. It should never bail out gamblers with taxpayers' money.
A few notes on Sam Charap's latest article: Charap and I have a fundamentally different views of Russia, Putin's interests and goals, and the history of the war in Ukraine. I still like to check where exactly the disagreements materialize in the arguments and the conclusions.
It is not difficult to find interpretations in the text that I violently disagree with: For example: that the Istanbul negotiations were anywhere close to ending the war. The re-framing of the process as "almost successful" initally began in conspirational corners of the debate.
The point of the story was to blame the West for the war - esp. Biden and Johnson - and to portray Russia as willing to compromise. Since 2023, Putin has been promoting it. One member of the Ukrainian delegation also keeps confirming it (Chalyi), but his case is complicated.
I really recommend this new report on #Russia's economy from CASE Center. The authors argue that the economy is much more resilient than commonly assumed. The conclusions are a bit too fatalistic in my view, but it is definitely worth reading. case-center.org/wp-content/upl…
The authors explain why - in their view - a lot of the earlier predictions for Russia's economy have not come true. It is not just an analysis "in hindsight": Already in March 2022, Dmitry Nekrasov wrote a forecast for Russia's economy that turned out to be very accurate.
Keep in mind that, at the time, even the Russian Central Bank and the Russian government were expecting a huge crisis in the Russian economy. It was the mainstream perspective, and Nekrasov contradicted it: telegra.ph/Ob-apokaliptic…