#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7
#Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7
Russia's Finance Ministry doesn't count dividends from oil&gas companies as oil&gas revenue (one reason the actual reliance of the budget on oil&gas is greater than the offical numbers suggest). Gazprom dividends led to an increase in non-oil&gas revenue in November 2022. 3/7
The budget deficit for 2022 will be larger than expected and reach ~3 trillion rubles. The previous estimate (see chart, -1.3 trillion) already accounted for a big increase in defense spending (from 3.5 to 4.7 trillion). Actual defense spending will be far beyond 5 trillion. 4/7
Russia's Finance Ministry took 300 billion RUB from its National Welfare Fund in November, which doesn't affect the balance much. 5/7
Withdrawals at the end of the year are not unusual (rather cash management than deficit financing). Still, the December withdrawal will be interesting. 6/7
Russia's Finance Ministry has turned to the domestic capital market to finance its deficit, including record-breaking auctions on Nov 16 and Dec 7. Tomorrow will be the next OFZ auction. Next year, Minfin plans to issue a total of 3.5 trillion rubles (covers planned deficit). 7/7
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The newest sanctions on Russian energy are nothing less than a paradigm change: For the first time, the goal is to cut Russian export volumes. Before, the goal was to make oil exports less profitable for Russia, but to keep the volumes intact.
The US did not just target any export volume, but made sure to hit Russia's most profitable export routes the hardest: Oil from Russia's Pacific ports had a small discount and low shipping costs, making it much more profitable then exports from the Baltic/Black Sea to India.
It also makes a lot of sense to go after those tankers that are the most specialized and the hardest to replace.
Overall, the measures look well thought through and will reduce Russian revenues, both in the budget and in the trade balance.
Great text: Bitcoin is a fascinating Ponzi-like / pyramid scheme. More and more people jump on the bandwagon, hoping to profit. Early adopters get rich. Late adopters now hope that governments will create "reserves", i.e. join the Ponzi scheme, to keep the party going...
Bitcoin doesn't appear to be a Ponzi scheme - because there is no Ponzi! The system is decentralized. In the early years of Bitcoin, there was a lot of talk of possible use cases of Bitcoin. That has almost disappeared, now it is just the hope of the value going up up up.
Companies like Microstrategy have even managed to create small pyramids within the larger Bitcoin pyramid. It goes without saying that no government should ever participate in a pyramid scheme. It should never bail out gamblers with taxpayers' money.
A few notes on Sam Charap's latest article: Charap and I have a fundamentally different views of Russia, Putin's interests and goals, and the history of the war in Ukraine. I still like to check where exactly the disagreements materialize in the arguments and the conclusions.
It is not difficult to find interpretations in the text that I violently disagree with: For example: that the Istanbul negotiations were anywhere close to ending the war. The re-framing of the process as "almost successful" initally began in conspirational corners of the debate.
The point of the story was to blame the West for the war - esp. Biden and Johnson - and to portray Russia as willing to compromise. Since 2023, Putin has been promoting it. One member of the Ukrainian delegation also keeps confirming it (Chalyi), but his case is complicated.
I really recommend this new report on #Russia's economy from CASE Center. The authors argue that the economy is much more resilient than commonly assumed. The conclusions are a bit too fatalistic in my view, but it is definitely worth reading. case-center.org/wp-content/upl…
The authors explain why - in their view - a lot of the earlier predictions for Russia's economy have not come true. It is not just an analysis "in hindsight": Already in March 2022, Dmitry Nekrasov wrote a forecast for Russia's economy that turned out to be very accurate.
Keep in mind that, at the time, even the Russian Central Bank and the Russian government were expecting a huge crisis in the Russian economy. It was the mainstream perspective, and Nekrasov contradicted it: telegra.ph/Ob-apokaliptic…
More Russian voices push back against the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine. Not surprisingly, Russia has zero interest in ending the war before it has defeated Ukraine. Apparently, ceasefires only existed in some Western dreams.
Similarly, Trenin says Russia is first and foremost interested in "the character of Ukraine's future regime and military potential". kommersant.ru/doc/7283219
Western idea of talks:
1.) ceasefire
2.) negotiations
Russian idea of talks:
1.) no more weapons for Ukraine
2.) negotiations
3.) ceasefire of Russia gets what it wants (regime change etc)
Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen dafür, dass es in der Ukraine in absehbarer Zeit Frieden geben könnte. Dass hierzulande so viel darüber gesprochen wird, zeigt nur den Realitätsverlust und Anmaßung der deutschen Debatte. Wir können den Krieg nicht von oben "befrieden".
Wir können den Ausgang das Krieges nur durch unsere Ukraine-Unterstützung beeinflussen (und ein stückweit über Sanktionen). Wir können aber nichts dirigieren oder erzwingen, und auch der globale Süden wird uns nicht aushelfen (wollen oder können).
Für viele ist es wohl noch ungewohnt, dass wir nicht die Macht und Mittel besitzen, einen Krieg mitten in Europa einfach zu "befrieden". Dass wir nicht bestimmen können, wie und wann er endet, dass wir keine übermächtigen Schiedsrichter mehr sind. Aber das ist die neue Realität.