1/ USB-Malware, part 3: Here we go again - a malicous USB-stick contained various shortcuts (DCIM.lnk, Video.lnk, etc.), including the malicious payload 'DCIM.JPG'.
The file DCIM.JPG is - surpise - not an actual JPG image but an obfuscated malicious VBS script. [1]
3/ The execution of the malicious script resulted in the following actions:
dcim.jpg was copied to c:\users\<username>\perflogs\dcim.jpg, following by setting the file attributes 'system' and 'hidden'.
4/ wscript.exe was copied to c:\users\<username>\perflogs\ and renamed into 'csrss.pif' [2]
Since Microsoft signed the file (wscript.exe), this results in a good #Hunting opportunity (Microsoft signed binary started from a directory within AppData).
5/ The malware sets ShowSuperHidden to zero (HKEY_USERS\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced)
for hiding system files.
If you're recording registry modifications, this would be another hunting opportunity.
6/ Next, persistence:
Good ol' Run key: run\visionneuse de photos windows'
1/ USB-Malware, part 2: Even though the Andromeda botnet was busted years ago, we still see infected USB sticks in corporate networks equipped with malicious code which tries to infect the host. š§µ
1/ In the last few weeks, we have investigated various infections with the malware dubbed "Raspberry Robin" by RedCanary.
As described by Microsoft and observed in our own investigations, the infections lead to further malware, in our case, Agent Tesla. š§µ
2/ Raspberry Robin uses msiexec.exe to download a malicious MSI package, using short domain names, as described in [1].
In addition, we observed port 8080 in the corresponding network request in all infections examined - a good indicator for #hunting in the firewall logs.
3/ @Kostastsale tweeted a regex for hunting these C2 requests and @felixaime a link to a repository consisting of Raspberry Robin domains (also called QNAP Worm). [3][4]
The domains contacted by our infected machines are also listed on the IOC inventory š (passive DNS, anyone?)
1/ We received a PDF from a third party, created from an Excel workbook. The document was forwarded to a customer and rejected by two different mail gateways due to a "macro detection".
However, the original workbook does not contain a macro. Why is the PDF rejected anyway? š§µ
2/ With the command pdf-parser.py -a -O $filename (from @DidierStevens), we can display the elements in the PDF document.
In fact, a JavaScript object is present in the PDF document.
3/ We can display the JavaScript code with the following command line:
python pdf-parser.py -k /JavaScript -O $filename
Which doesn't look like very readable code, though š¤
1/ "They tried to stay stealthy and used the sysinternal's procdump tool, renamed in error.log to bypass Windows Defender detection and dump lsass process memory" [1]
A similar trick was presented by @mrd0x in November 2021. [2]
2/ This technique does not work as of today (well, yesterday) and generates a Defender AV alert on my test machine.
Pay attention to the detection name, which is "HackTool" in the screenshot below.
3/ I can't stress enough how awesome @cyb3rops' AV cheat sheet is, which lists the Highly Relevant AV Keywords, with "HackTool" at the top (newest version here [3]).
As a system admin or SOC analyst, when seeing these keywords in an alert, the alert should be prioritized. šš§Æ