2/17 Now I only have electricity for 4-6 hours a day, so I can't spend as much time on Twitter as I used to.
But I finally got to my calculations and clarified them to give you a clear picture (it may not be perfect and contain errors, like any analytics).
3/17 In general, the gap between Ukraine and Russia in military power is gradually decreasing.
This happens both because Russia has heavy losses and because Ukraine maintains or even strengthens its power due to the help of allies and war trophies.
4/17 Russia is the main supplier of heavy weapons to Ukraine (at least tanks and armored vehicles).
5/ Although the mobilization did not go well in Russia, the Russians managed to saturate the front line and complicate the advance of the Armed Forces.
The new mobilized who arrive at the front are already better prepared than the first batches. But they are also poorly equipped
6/17 Russia has also changed its tactics. This is the third time:
- at first, the Russians bet on heavy armored vehicles and rapid breakthroughs;
- in the summer, they changed their tactics and began to use groups of armored vehicles and infantry for attacks;
7/17 - now the assault is mainly carried out by infantry forces with the support of artillery (as in World War I).
8/17 Ukraine, on the contrary, now uses much more armored vehicles in the attack. The lack of a sufficient number of tanks forces the use of lighter equipment, but it is much more effective than an attack with only infantry forces.
9/17 Russia can probably afford to mobilize up to a million more soldiers. And it will allow to fight long enough. But the key issue is artillery. How much is it enough for?
10/17 I made some assumptions about the artillery earlier. Considering the tens of millions of old Soviet shells, I don't think that the RU artillery machine will run out anytime soon.
But the RU are running out of more scarce long-range shells for a distance of more than 20 km
11/17 Probably now Ukraine dominates at distances of 20-80 km. But supplies of 155mm shells and GMLRS are limited. And Ukraine needs longer-range capabilities to destroy the Russians' logistics.
12/17 Cutting off logistical routes and depleting supplies is the main premise of Ukraine's counteroffensive. Therefore, it is important for Ukraine to get more long-range systems and shells.
Battle of Pokrovsk
The battle of Pokrov became the biggest battle of this war. But it also became one of the largest battles in history in terms of the number of armored vehicles lost. 1/
2/ In the battles near Pokrovsk, Ru losses are close to the number of the entire Western Military District of the Ru Fed as of 2022, which was being prepared for war with NATO. And this is about 60% of the forces with which Russia planned to seize Ukraine in three days in 2022
3/ In October 2023, Ru defined the offensive on Pokrovsk as the main axis of its offensive campaign. Obviously, Putin is focused on the goal of completely capturing the Donetsk region as the highest priority goal in the coming years. But this offensive led to colossal losses.
Russia is suffering more and more losses trying to look like the side that is winning.
The dynamics of Russian losses indicates the price of the Russian offensive. 1/6
Russia had to go to a colossal increase in its losses in order to continue to look like the winning side. If in 2022 Russian losses amounted to about 200 soldiers per day (killed and wounded), in 2023 - about 500, then in 2024 Ru reached the mark of 1,0 and 1.5K soldiers per day
Russian losses increased 10 times compared to the first months of the war.
Given that the hostilities are taking place in fairly limited territories, the overall losses of the Russians are unprecedented. 3/6
Resources of war
Can Russia sustain this war for years? Here are some calculations to help estimate this.
Thread 1/
@RALee85 @olliecarroll @ragnarbjartur @konrad_muzyka @McFaul @HelloMrBond @SpencerGuard @JominiW
2/
Let's start with artillery, which looks the most vulnerable
Standard calculations of the resource of artillery barrels show that at the current rate of firing, Ru needs about 2.5-4К barrels per year. If we add to this direct losses in battles, Ru total need is about 4-5K per year
Half a year ago, I joined the procurement reform team of the Ministry of Defense-the Non-Lethal Procurement Agency (DOT)
This is my second "campaign" for reforms in the defense sector after Ukroboronprom in 2019. And here I would like to share some thoughts and my own experience
2/ Soviet architecture and corruption are the worst things Ukraine inherited from the USSR. In Soviet times, corruption was the only way to become a wealthy person. Wealth and commerce were prohibited by law, but the desire of people to live better did not disappear anywhere.
3/ For the first twenty years after the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainian society was aware of the problem of corruption, eventually defining it as the main enemy of democracy and the development of the state.
Struggle for resources
When Ukrainians say that we need more weapons, the West often thinks that it is a sign of ingratitude.
In fact, Ukrainians are grateful, but there is another side - how many weapons your enemy supplies to the front.
This thread will explore this topic 1/
2/ Russia
Many people look down on the Russian army after its defeats in Ukraine in the first year of the war.
But the Russian doctrine is based on the fact that Russia is able to withstand heavy defeats and incredible losses, but not to give up its political goals.
3/ Ru is still a significant power, if not in terms of the quality of weapons, but in terms of their quantity.
Since the beginning of the war, Ru has removed approximately 6,000 howitzers from its storage facilities.
Russia spent $22.8 billion on missile attacks on Ukraine.
This is more than half of all US military aid to Ukraine ($43 billion).
A short thread about missile attacks this winter: 1/7
2/7 Despite the sanctions, Russia has increased its missile production and can now produce about 100 missiles per month.
In October, Russia reduced the intensity of its use of missiles, apparently preparing for winter attacks on UA energy.
3/7 Air Defense Ukraine has become much more effective than a year ago. If until October 2022, Ukrainian air defenses shot down about 30% of missiles, then after the transfer of NASAMS, Iris-T, Patriot, Samp-T, Ukrainian air defenses began to intercept up to 80-90% of missiles.