We can export all MFA properties of users to search for users who have added or registered a second number or use a mobile number from a country without a branch office.
I use the code from the link below quite frequently:
2/ 'C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe' /c cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&start explorer FACTURE' 'PROFORMA&cls&cls&start notepad.vbe&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&cls&exit
Explorer is opened as a camouflage. In the background, the VBE script 'd:\notepad.vbe' runs (sample [1] ).
3/ The code is encoded (hence the E in VBE), but with CyberChef, we can at least get some readable code, but the script uses other obfuscation techniques, which are relatively easy to reversing.
@_bromiley wrote an excellent article about VBE files. [3]
2/ AnyDesk.exe (from the downloaded and mounted ISO archive) is already known by several AV vendors
(MD5 b7746c3c810615a1a8e367db9f3386eb).
3/ The user executed the malicious file, which resulted in a network request to an IP address belonging to AS 44477, Stark Industries Solutions (@UK_Daniel_Card - I learned my lesson 😜)
Check out the relations, where different themes were used for naming the ISO files.
1/ USB-Malware, part 3: Here we go again - a malicous USB-stick contained various shortcuts (DCIM.lnk, Video.lnk, etc.), including the malicious payload 'DCIM.JPG'.
1/ USB-Malware, part 2: Even though the Andromeda botnet was busted years ago, we still see infected USB sticks in corporate networks equipped with malicious code which tries to infect the host. 🧵
1/ In the last few weeks, we have investigated various infections with the malware dubbed "Raspberry Robin" by RedCanary.
As described by Microsoft and observed in our own investigations, the infections lead to further malware, in our case, Agent Tesla. 🧵
2/ Raspberry Robin uses msiexec.exe to download a malicious MSI package, using short domain names, as described in [1].
In addition, we observed port 8080 in the corresponding network request in all infections examined - a good indicator for #hunting in the firewall logs.
3/ @Kostastsale tweeted a regex for hunting these C2 requests and @felixaime a link to a repository consisting of Raspberry Robin domains (also called QNAP Worm). [3][4]
The domains contacted by our infected machines are also listed on the IOC inventory 👌 (passive DNS, anyone?)