As media claims of an imminent resignation by German MinDef Lambrecht are now gaining traction and credibility, let me be the first to buzz kill this particular piece of good news by claiming it will make very little difference.
You see, Lambrecht was not the actual root of the problem, which is a dysfunctional administrative apparatus responsible for the misery we call GER defence capability. This of course is not some genius revelation of mine but long term fact. The office is unpopular for a reason.
Above Lambrecht you have a Chancellor who, for good or bad (mostly bad) is calling the actual shots in defence. As a consequence Scholz regularly threw Lambrecht under the bus when it suited his knee jerk politics, notably with any sort of assistance for Ukraine.
Lambrechts statements how this time Bundeswehr really cannot spare any more materiel and we totally mean it, only to then transfer it anyway, had become a running joke for that reason.
Compounded is the problem by notable parts of military leadership being, directly or indirectly, responsible for the miserable readiness of relevant forces. The PUMA failure being the latest point in case.
If soldiers are not competent to maintain & in some cases even operate their gear, and alternatively no functional industrial support chain is in place to cushion such issues (as questionable as this may be), problems start far below the ministry.
How PUMA leak, supposedly from within the force, ended up being at best half successful shifting blame to industry, at worst a shotgun blast to the face revealing noted issues within relevant units is only the latest example of semi competently executed political infighting.
But wait, there is more. You also have a ministry full of functionaries seemingly incapable of performing basic tasks. The most recent example being budgeting not considering appropriate funding for training & fuel incl for units assigned to VJTF. A well oiled machine this ain't.
And so we end up with, supposedly, more change of leadership, but likely no change in attitude, structures & most notably political & administrative will to, you know, actually fix Bundeswehr. #Zeitenwende in the end means just doing all the same things we have done before. /end
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Launch of the third Lada-class SSK for the Russian Navy "Velikiye Luki" in St Petersburg. The hull had been laid down seven years ago, with work delayed & design revised in part due to multiple severe issues on the first of class "Sankt Petersburg".
Images via Weibo.
Lada class introduced several notable changes over preceding Kilo class and variants. Most significantly they are a single hull design. They are also significantly smaller than Kilo, with a much reduced crew. Other changes are sail mounted diving planes & different stern rudders.
One notable feature the boats were supposed to have is air independent propulsion (AIP) via fuel cell. But despite now and then reports of progress with design by builder Rubin & related promotion for export this has not yet been implemented.
New details emerge on the failure of 18 PUMA IFV. Industry estimates fleet can be brought back in time for VJTF duties. More notably however the list of issues suggests factors other than type-related problems are culprit for failures. m.faz.net/aktuell/politi…
Two most notable cases relate to damaged turret ring causing failure and a vehicle suffering wiring damage from overheating. In first (according to rumours) case cause is most likely an accidental obstacle collision. In second case rumor is plugs were set incorrectly.
Another notable episode (again rumours) refers to drive sprockets on several vehicles simply having been worn down past the replacement indicators, resulting in mobility failure.
After a gunnery exercise on a firing range in Germany 18 PUMA IFV suffered full system failures, notably in their (uncrewed) turret. While nature of defects was previously known, scale of issue unprecedented according to CO of 10th Panzerdivision. n-tv.de/politik/Komman…
CO estimates it will take 3 to 4 months to restore readiness. The unit was scheduled to deploy with VJTF assignment. This means older MARDER IFV will once again have to cover availability gap. "Readiness of vehicles despite sound preparation akin to playing the lottery.".
This incident tails with a recent parliamentary approval to upgrade remainder of PUMA fleet to S1 standard and order an additional 50 vehicles in a second batch. Vehicles currently affected are likely "VJTF23" version which does not differ significantly from final S1 version.
"(Scholz:) “And I am therefore also extremely pleased that (TKMS) will expand its production in Germany and will also start production at the Wismar site from 2024.”"
In initial excitement over "Sondervermoegen" of 100 bln there was also some guessing that Berlin will order additonal Type 212CD to replace their first batch of 212A due for major & costly MLU soon.
But like with everything else statements since have been absent to support this.
As mentioned a few times, lifetime of batch 1 212A is becoming increasingly iffy (professional term). They now approach 20 yrs of service, but modernisation still doesnt seem in place. Language to that effect ("MLU to draw lessons from 212CD") dropped from most recent reports.
The Russian stockpiles in MBT, in regards to condition and ability to bring them back into service, have been somewhat of a contentious talking point long before February. Sure, they will try what they can, but take the 9k figure with a shaker's worth of salt.
While it's never smart to underestimate an opponent, one key lesson from the campaign so far had been that Russian military materiel is in fact in worse condition than expected by many serious analysts. The appearance very early of vintage T-72 & now T-62 cases in point.
In any case, "military materiel in storage" is still treated a little too rosy IMO for all sorts of reasons. But suffice to say, when you walk into depots even with supposedly wealthy western forces today, how many chassis are missing key components cannibalised for use long ago?
Mit Respekt vor Sebastian, ich wuerde sowohl die "strategische Partnerschaft" als auch Singapurs Prioritaeten hier keinesfalls ueberbewerten. Speziell bei ersterem hat Berlin immer noch ernste Probleme, ueberhaupt mE die Definition von "strategisch" zu erkennen.
Gibts da viel Potential fuer Kooperation seitens speziell der militaerischen Betreiber, aber auch industrieller Kapazitaeten? Auf jeden Fall! Wird dieses Potential so in Berlin wahrgenommen oder besteht ein Interesse daran, es auszuschoepfen? Wuerde ich nicht drauf wetten.
Re Singapur, natuerlich faehrt man dort einen hart realistischen Kurs bzgl PRC. Aber es besteht nach wie vor kein Interesse daran, sich hier an ein Lager zu binden. Siehe zuletzt missglueckter Versuch der USA, den Stadtstaat als Kandidat fuer ein Flottenhauptquartier zu benennen.