There are 5 major directions
1 main objective to fully capture annexed territories🤯
Ignoring Kherson front as impossible for a full-scale invasion over the Dnipro (1M is not enough for that)
Let's explore those directions.
1. Invasion from Belarus towards Lviv. Highly unlikely.
Long supply lines, swampy forested terrain.
The area would be a death trap for a big army 50K+, because of all the complexities.
Impossible to succeed for a smaller group.
2. Kyiv in "3" days. Insane but plausible.
The most vulnerable place of the front is E391/M02 road - there are no towns on the way it should be used as a spine for all the offense.
300km to Kyiv makes it almost impossible to repeat the March trip.
500km front wont be easy.
3. Kharkiv. 3 scales of invasion
Wide arc. Sumy - Kharkiv - Kupiansk. Not for now.
Deep. Vovchansk - Velykyi Burluk - Kupiansk. Useless.
Straight. Urazovo - Kupiansk. Certainly
Kupiansk is a focal point for 🇷🇺 success.
The area is crucial for both sides.
5. Zaporizhzhia. Land to trade.
45500 km2 chunk of a hostile land, that requires a lot of troops to secure the area.
Front line of 160km allows and 3 targets to attack (Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Velyka Novosilka) requires less forces than Donbass.
In a Year after the beginning of the war 🇷🇺 should not be able to sustain anything but infantry.
Dip in the equipment losses should could be enough to maintain enough stuff to replenish current losses with a reserves.
🇷🇺 is somewhere near of equilibrium point in gears.
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You cannot cover everything. Each army can only handle a certain capacity - men, logistics, command, and attention. Once you exceed it, you lose control and start wasting people. 🔽
Stretching the front is not about survival - it is about pressure. You do it when you have spare resources and want to force the enemy to bleed, to react, to stretch too. Otherwise, it is suicide disguised as courage. 🔽
There is a natural shape to every army. Its logistics, structure, and reserves define how wide and deep it can hold. Expanding beyond that breaks the system from the inside. 🔽
Russia used 5330 drones, 1109 (~20%) hit the target, some fall as debris damaging almost as many locations.
Number of artillery barrages continue to decrease.
FPV reporting was haevily impacted by the weather, but overall trend is the same as a month prior.
Bombs usage set an alltime record and was less impacted by the weather that landed FPVs.
MLRS usage stabilized at a 100 a day.
Dont expect big changes after Pokrovsk. Yeah its a hit but not a turning point. Just another town on the long road west. Russians will keep crawling 100-200 meters a day spreading pressure along the 60 km front slipping between defense points.
Villages are russain boosters little steps to jump forward and micro assault groups keep poking every corner. Endless Ukrainian defensive lines mean less than they should when the enemy throws bodies everywhere they always find a weak spot.
AFU doesnt have too many cards left to play so the same node defense stays the backbone. Its the only thing that still makes sense. But the way its used now doesnt really work. Settlements should be prepped better not just trenches but kill zones even inside single houses.
MoD RF reportedly captured 10 settlements and extend by 88km2.
Despite all the claims Ivanivka didn't get into report.
No minor settlements left left to capture in the Pokrovsk pocket.
GSUA reported 1034 attacks in total, 30% less than a previous week.
All the GSUA reported front has a significant gap around Huliaipole indicating activity of russian Army Group Dniepr focus on Zaporizhzhia direction.
AG East focus at cuting Huliaipole.
AG South operates at the edges at Kostiantynivka and Siversk, probably helping Center and West
Shepherds of sponge war
The sponge front makes it tempting to push forward, but drones make any movement excessively dangerous. Still, doing nothing is even worse unless you have proper hideouts. A network of isolated, dispersed hideouts creates a true sponge defense.
1/12
Fortifications alone don't stop anything. Without coverage, drones and bombs suppress observation and make deliberate breaks deadly. The real sponge defense is a network of isolated, dispersed hideouts - hard to target and easy to melt into.
2/12
Speed can decrease drone danger, but speed reduces maneuverability and situational awareness. Fast-moving vehicles are ideal mine targets. Trade-offs matter: survive the drone - but don't run into mines.
3/12
Rashanverse has no time dimension; Frontline isn't an exception, hence all time-based predictions consistently fail. With this and the Russians' recent dynamics in mind, let's explore how the Donbas offensive will evolve.
Beyond dense settlements, terrain remains the main factor. Roads are important but rarely used for assaults. Fortifications may slow down the advance but don't affect the vector of attack.
Grind allows focusing on high ground and using ravines for occasional jumps. Vectors of attack usually follow the watershed, with rare attempts to cross multiple streams in a single operation (hello Dobropillia).