There are 5 major directions
1 main objective to fully capture annexed territories🤯
Ignoring Kherson front as impossible for a full-scale invasion over the Dnipro (1M is not enough for that)
Let's explore those directions.
1. Invasion from Belarus towards Lviv. Highly unlikely.
Long supply lines, swampy forested terrain.
The area would be a death trap for a big army 50K+, because of all the complexities.
Impossible to succeed for a smaller group.
2. Kyiv in "3" days. Insane but plausible.
The most vulnerable place of the front is E391/M02 road - there are no towns on the way it should be used as a spine for all the offense.
300km to Kyiv makes it almost impossible to repeat the March trip.
500km front wont be easy.
3. Kharkiv. 3 scales of invasion
Wide arc. Sumy - Kharkiv - Kupiansk. Not for now.
Deep. Vovchansk - Velykyi Burluk - Kupiansk. Useless.
Straight. Urazovo - Kupiansk. Certainly
Kupiansk is a focal point for 🇷🇺 success.
The area is crucial for both sides.
5. Zaporizhzhia. Land to trade.
45500 km2 chunk of a hostile land, that requires a lot of troops to secure the area.
Front line of 160km allows and 3 targets to attack (Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Velyka Novosilka) requires less forces than Donbass.
In a Year after the beginning of the war 🇷🇺 should not be able to sustain anything but infantry.
Dip in the equipment losses should could be enough to maintain enough stuff to replenish current losses with a reserves.
🇷🇺 is somewhere near of equilibrium point in gears.
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Shepherds of sponge war
The sponge front makes it tempting to push forward, but drones make any movement excessively dangerous. Still, doing nothing is even worse unless you have proper hideouts. A network of isolated, dispersed hideouts creates a true sponge defense.
1/12
Fortifications alone don't stop anything. Without coverage, drones and bombs suppress observation and make deliberate breaks deadly. The real sponge defense is a network of isolated, dispersed hideouts - hard to target and easy to melt into.
2/12
Speed can decrease drone danger, but speed reduces maneuverability and situational awareness. Fast-moving vehicles are ideal mine targets. Trade-offs matter: survive the drone - but don't run into mines.
3/12
Rashanverse has no time dimension; Frontline isn't an exception, hence all time-based predictions consistently fail. With this and the Russians' recent dynamics in mind, let's explore how the Donbas offensive will evolve.
Beyond dense settlements, terrain remains the main factor. Roads are important but rarely used for assaults. Fortifications may slow down the advance but don't affect the vector of attack.
Grind allows focusing on high ground and using ravines for occasional jumps. Vectors of attack usually follow the watershed, with rare attempts to cross multiple streams in a single operation (hello Dobropillia).
In a modern positional warfare, seizing ground isn't enough - attackers must capture stable positions they can hold. This thread explains why those points turn tactical gains into lasting control - and why taking them often comes at a very high cost.
From the attacker's perspective, a stable position is more than a point on a map - it's a foundation for control. Capture it and you gain decisive lines of movement, observation, and logistics; fail and your gains evaporate.
Stable positions solidify control: they anchor supply routes, protect rear areas, enable forward basing for artillery and drones, and deny the defender easy counterattack corridors. For an occupier, they turn fleeting footholds into lasting presence.
Cheese Defense review
Heavy drone usage has significantly reshaped modern defensive tactics in Ukraine.
For the AFU, adapting means balancing exposure risks with the need for flexibility along one of the world's longest active frontlines.
Instead of rigid continuous lines, the AFU uses "pockets" - fortified strongpoints or "super nodes".
These hubs resist enemy attacks while visible gaps let AFU hold more ground with fewer troops.
Those gaps aren't empty. They’re filled with mines, obstacles & kill zones to slow Russian advances.
Drones amplify this: RuAF UAVs search for weak spots, while AFU FPVs & loitering munitions strike intruders.
Russian forces of Army Group East are attempting to secure tactical gains on the front by shifting their focus westward, away from Novopavlivka, in an effort to cross the Vovcha river and establish a foothold.
With Novopavlivka as an obvious answer.
AFU are relying on the high ground west of the river and defensive bubbles centered around major strongholds to contain the offensive. In exchange, Ukrainian defenders appear willing to concede some empty territory, of 13 people per square kilometers.
Russians may be allowed to advance as far as Vyshneve, in the area between the Yanchur and Vovcha rivers, moving along AFU main ditches in a narrow corridor behind the defensive lines.
That will give them up to 300km2 to report but no real benefits to threaten AFU.