There are 5 major directions
1 main objective to fully capture annexed territoriesπ€―
Ignoring Kherson front as impossible for a full-scale invasion over the Dnipro (1M is not enough for that)
Let's explore those directions.
1. Invasion from Belarus towards Lviv. Highly unlikely.
Long supply lines, swampy forested terrain.
The area would be a death trap for a big army 50K+, because of all the complexities.
Impossible to succeed for a smaller group.
2. Kyiv in "3" days. Insane but plausible.
The most vulnerable place of the front is E391/M02 road - there are no towns on the way it should be used as a spine for all the offense.
300km to Kyiv makes it almost impossible to repeat the March trip.
500km front wont be easy.
3. Kharkiv. 3 scales of invasion
Wide arc. Sumy - Kharkiv - Kupiansk. Not for now.
Deep. Vovchansk - Velykyi Burluk - Kupiansk. Useless.
Straight. Urazovo - Kupiansk. Certainly
Kupiansk is a focal point for π·πΊ success.
The area is crucial for both sides.
5. Zaporizhzhia. Land to trade.
45500 km2 chunk of a hostile land, that requires a lot of troops to secure the area.
Front line of 160km allows and 3 targets to attack (Orikhiv, Huliaipole, Velyka Novosilka) requires less forces than Donbass.
In a Year after the beginning of the war π·πΊ should not be able to sustain anything but infantry.
Dip in the equipment losses should could be enough to maintain enough stuff to replenish current losses with a reserves.
π·πΊ is somewhere near of equilibrium point in gears.
β’ β’ β’
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#4Fun
There are 3 interconnected graphics: the number of repelled attacks and Russian losses @GeneralStaffUA
and territorial changes by @Deepstate_UA
While the raw data is difficult to interpret, applying a 7-day average reveals some patterns.
The DS data has some lag and may require adjustments, but it offers valuable context, particularly for interpreting the number of unrepelled attacks. Since September, there have been five distinct spikes in Russian losses.
Notably, the correlation between attack spikes and loss spikes began to diverge after the Russian Kursk operation, shifting the losses wave function by approximately seven days relative to repelled attacks.
#Thoughts
π·πΊ "Lost" fortification section on the Volnovakha front.
There must be at least two lines.
Majority of π·πΊ fortifications are build on the hill behind the water stream and the link between those valleys.
For some reason second line is missing on the Vremiivskiy lendge.
Without control of Vuhledar there was no chance to build anything along Kashlahach river.
The ledge made the area too deep to justify the construction 25km away from the front.
Incomplete uneven fronts complicates and hight expectations postponed the decision, So non were build.
While @Nrg8000 map shows a continuous lines of fortifications. @AndrewPerpetua use dots in the data representation.
Volnovakha is a watershed, all the rivers goes there so its a natural direction for the offense.
Defense is defined by
a1. main fortifications protected by the streams and lowlands
a2. the forest that protects the city from the North.
a3. 20km deep buffer.
In order to break the city πΊπ¦ should prepare the battlefield for it.
Important task is to cut of H20, but T0512 would be out of reach.
City is surrounded by the villages it would be a hard task to get over it.
Pavlivka - Petrivske - Krasna Poliana road is the starting point.
#Map fortifications and roads
Probably under impression after previous πΊπ¦ operations π·πΊ decided to concentrate their efforts on the roads, ignoring underdeveloped direction of Azov Upland.
@Nrg8000 Logic of π·πΊ fortifications is next 1. Protect hubs (crossroads and storages) 2. Protect the elevation (force the enemy to go always uphill) 3. Protect the Black Sea Lowland access (fast track)
The "welcome" eastern section requires too much efforts from the attacking side and will rely on maneuver defense.
The major obstacle is the infrastructure. Supply lines should stretch along the dirt roads and the closes exit in Bilmak is fortified.
Another 20 destroyed artillery units reported.
For some reason no talks about the reported artillery position strikes.
The first such event was reported at Jan 11, the next in Jan 27, next Mar 7, it has never been a consistent event.
Everything has changed in May.
Other distinct categories in the reports are
S-300 - were reported several times
MLRS - there were only 3 cases, all in April
EW - 13 were hit in May 19,20 and reported constantly since April.
EW is a Special equipment category and it has spiked in March.
Artillery is the only combat component where πΊπ¦ has some advantage over π·πΊ.
When π·πΊ has a lot of stuff and can execute firewall strategy, πΊπ¦ can simply outshoot the enemy limiting their capabilities.
In order to overcome that π·πΊ will rely on aviation.