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Mick Ryan, AM

@WarintheFuture

Jan 19

From the beginning of the Russian invasion, arguments over provision of different weapons & technologies to #Ukraine have been waged in Europe and the US. Perhaps the most long-standing, and important, is provision of American or European tanks. 1/22 🧵🇺🇦

2/ My aim in this thread is not to argue whether they should be provided. I think it is obvious they should. If Russia can deploy T90s or even its new T-14s (according to British Intelligence), why are we denying similar capabilities to #Ukraine?

3/ The objective here is to explore the considerations for the introduction of western tanks into the Ukrainian armed forces. The need is well established. Tanks are a valuable part of the modern combined arms team. Tanks save lives!

Read 22 tweets

Mick Ryan, AM

@WarintheFuture

Jan 18

Over the northern hemisphere winter, eastern Ukraine has been the scene of bitter and intense combat. The offensives around #Bakhmut & #Kreminna highlight the different strategic & cultural approaches that Ukraine and Russia have applied in this war. 1/23 🧵🇺🇦

2/ Both offensives have featured trench and urban warfare, artillery duels, very short-range engagements between infantry and tanks, as well as long range strikes on supply and headquarters locations. But there are differences. abc.net.au/news/2023-01-1…

3/ One of the key differences is an asymmetry between Russian and Ukrainian operational thinking. For this Russian offensive, there has been a focus on securing towns like #Bakhmut & #Soledar that have limited strategic utility.

Read 23 tweets

Mick Ryan, AM

@WarintheFuture

Jan 16

Recently, comparisons with the WW1 stalemates on the western front from 1915 have been used by some observers of the war in #Ukraine. It makes for good headlines but there is one problem; it just isn’t true. 1/22 smh.com.au/world/europe/n…

2/ At the beginning of 1915, the war on the Western Front had reached a stalemate. There were technical, strategic and doctrinal reasons for this. The machine gun changed tactics and killed soldiers by the thousands, as did more accurate and concentrated artillery.

3/ Poor communications hampered the coordination of the different elements of the massive armies. A lack of protected mobility meant that even when a breach was made in enemy lines, the enemy could more quickly fill the gap than the attacker could exploit it.

Read 22 tweets

Mick Ryan, AM

@WarintheFuture

Jan 13

Earlier this week, I published a thread that was the first of two parts examining how #Ukraine and Russia might think about – and plan – the inevitable offensives to come in 2023. The #Gerasimov appointment pushed this second part back a couple of days! 1/25 🧵

2/ In Part 1, I proposed seven considerations for those planning these offensives: purpose; design; timing; location; resources; adaptation; & politics. I then examined the first 4 in detail. Today, I explore the final 3 considerations.
(Part 1👇)

https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1612943234598305793?s=20&t=1wC1ugsGip_9JazOEyPs-g

3/ Resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades, Divisions or Corps, will be needed.

Read 25 tweets

Mick Ryan, AM

@WarintheFuture

Jan 12

It is 322 days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today, an examination of the announcement that Russian General #Gerasimov ‘is taking charge’ of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 1/25 🧵🇺🇦

2/ The Russian Defence Ministry has announced that General Gerasimov has been appointed “commander of the combined forces group for the special military operation in Ukraine.” bbc.com/news/world-eur…

3/ General Gerasimov is the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. He was appointed to this position by President Putin in November 2012.

Read 25 tweets

Mick Ryan, AM

@WarintheFuture

Jan 10

Its nearly 11 months since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began. While we are currently in a lower tempo period, both sides are planning offensives for 2023. Today I begin a two-part exploration of the considerations for planning & conducting large-scale campaigns in 2023. 1/24 🧵

2/ What I won’t be doing is predicting where these offensives might take place. Despite this, the extensive preparations for these activities are characterised by several common considerations, which I will examine.

3/ The context for these offensives is that Russia has lost the initiative in this war at every level. While it can mount surges of drone and missile attacks, even these will decline in effectiveness as Ukraine’s AD capacity builds up.

Read 24 tweets

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