2/ For deployment, they use Add-MpPreference to configure exclusions in Windows Defender (extensions, paths and processes), #NSudo to launch binaries with full privileges and #GnuPG to encrypt the payloads.
Initial MSI file has 0 hits in VT.
3/ All payloads are hosted on @Bitbucket, in a repository that was created in August 2022.
In just 3 days, #Gozi and #RedLine have been downloaded 2477 and 2503 times respectively.
ZLocal.gpg has been downloaded more than 48193 times since December 24, 2022 (potential victims).
4/ ZLocal.gpg is a .NET binary that reports infected computers that are part of a local area network (LAN).
This validation is done by using Gong-Shell (github.com/grokys/gong-sh…) to read the Network Neighborhood directory and looking for other connected resources/devices.
5/ For Google Ads, they use multiple compromised domains to redirect to the fake/malicious sites, e.g.:
🚨 1/ Ongoing campaign primarily targeting security researchers here on Twitter.
Possibly they are trying to exploit some vulnerability in Internet Explorer and database tools like Navicat. I haven't been able to get the malicious payload yet, but something fishy is going on 🤔
2/ Tweets mention things like #0day, #databreach, #Kimsuky, #Lazarus and point to a file download on pan[.]baidu[.]com, just now removed.
There is also a repo on Github with connection data and credentials to supposed DBs and Web Apps that ask to use IE 🤭
3/ I tried 211.143.190.233:2222, at first glance harmless, but in the code we see that it points to a rather suspicious .JS.
When we deofuscate and clean, a hidden URL appears that could load the next stage, however I could not get it (maybe geofenced or some other trick).
1/ Part of the script used by #TA569 (Initial Access Broker) to inject the Keitaro TDS code into compromised sites 🚩
In this variant, if the IP is correct and the red_ok cookie is not declared, the injection is shown and the infection flow continues until #SocGholish or others.
2/ Two #KeitaroTDS domains in use by #TA569:
- jqueryns[.]com
- jqscr[.]com "new"
In the IP of the latter there is also the domain jqueryj[.]com with a panel that at first sight I cannot recognize 🧐 but is some kind of bot/stealer/clipper, very likely related. / @ViriBack
3/ To get an idea of the scope, if we search on publicwww for the domain "jqueryns[.]com" we get 2196 infected sites, for the domain "jqscr[.]com" we get another 196 compromised sites so far.
2/ Para DIGITALPROSERVER.COM, el atacante indica que vende acceso a más de 500 DBs y sitios que incluyen importantes medios digitales, noticieros, radios, etc.
Como muestra, el atacante publicó credenciales y una de las Webshell que tenía instalada en El Mostrador (reportado)
3/ Para TESORERIA.CL, el atacante al parecer explotó una vulnerabilidad de Inyección SQL y además obtuvo acceso a la Intranet a través de la VPN.
Una de las evidencias muestra al atacante modificando información personal de una persona de apellido "Piñera Echenique".
1/ So, site impersonating @Fortinet downloads signed MSI that uses Powershell to run #BatLoader, if the user is connected to a domain (corporate network) it deploys: