2/ For deployment, they use Add-MpPreference to configure exclusions in Windows Defender (extensions, paths and processes), #NSudo to launch binaries with full privileges and #GnuPG to encrypt the payloads.
Initial MSI file has 0 hits in VT.
3/ All payloads are hosted on @Bitbucket, in a repository that was created in August 2022.
In just 3 days, #Gozi and #RedLine have been downloaded 2477 and 2503 times respectively.
ZLocal.gpg has been downloaded more than 48193 times since December 24, 2022 (potential victims).
4/ ZLocal.gpg is a .NET binary that reports infected computers that are part of a local area network (LAN).
This validation is done by using Gong-Shell (github.com/grokys/gong-sh…) to read the Network Neighborhood directory and looking for other connected resources/devices.
5/ For Google Ads, they use multiple compromised domains to redirect to the fake/malicious sites, e.g.:
1/ So, site impersonating @Fortinet downloads signed MSI that uses Powershell to run #BatLoader, if the user is connected to a domain (corporate network) it deploys:
- SEDENA México (6 TB)
- Policía Nacional Civil de El Salvador (4 TB)
- Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia (275 GB)
- Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (50 GB)
- CCFFAA del Perú (35 GB)
- Ejercito del Perú (70 GB)
🚨 Cuidado con las descargas desde #Anonfiles (utilizado por muchos actores maliciosos), puede que en vez del archivo que querías, termines instalando, no solo 1, sino que 7 clases distintas de #Malware 👀
Revisemos por ejemplo: /anonfiles.com/7c62z4s9ob/Youtube_Viewer_rar
1/X
Al hacer click en "download" se descarga automaticamente un archivo que tiene de nombre "YouTube+Viewer.rar[.]zip" pero la descarga se realiza desde /yfilesstorage.com/Youtube+Viewer.rar.zip?c=AISJk2FCGQUA4ksCAENMFwAMAMyKTf0A (.ZIP protegido con contraseña) 🤔
2/X
Lamentablemente esto pasa desapercibido para usuarios menos prudentes.