Since the Dutch F-16 announcement has generated more talks on #fighters for #Ukraine; a few thoughts. 1) The Ukrainian Air Force would absolutely benefit greatly from Western fighters in terms of air-to-air and (potentially) air-to-ground lethality. But there are caveats (1/10)
Any western fighters that could plausibly be sent would still be at high risk from Russian SAMs, so would have to fly at very low altitudes within several tens of kilometres of the frontlines. This would dramatically reduce effective missile range and limit strike options (2/10)
Most common Western close-air-support weapons like Paveway II and AGM-65 Maverick require the pilot or a JTAC to use a targeting pod or other sensor to find, ID and designate the target for precision strikes. This sort of CAS is far harder when confined to very low level. (3/10)
Stand-off weapons like AGM-154 JSOW, GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb or AGM-158 JASSM are (broadly) designed to hit fixed targets. Glide weapons are also dependent on altitude and speed of the launch aircraft for range so would be more constrained from low altitude launches. (4/10)
So while Western fighters with stand-off weapons would offer Ukraine an improved capability to destroy fixed Russian targets near the frontlines from a safer distance, they would be adding to existing strike options like HIMARS and drawing from limited stockpiles. (5/10)
Air-to-air, altitude constraints due to Russian SAMs also apply. Western fighters would offer much better range if supplied with latest AIM-120C/D or (ideally) Meteor than Mig-29/Su-27 with R-27R/ER. But handicapped by firing from low and slow compared to Russian fighters (6/10)
As such, only Meteor would likely provide an absolute effective range advantage over R-37M carried by high-altitude Su-35S and Mig-31BM CAPs. Supplying these weapons would help the Ukrainian Air Force a great deal, but they are sensitive and available in v limited numbers. (7/10)
So; Western fighters will undoubtedly provide a major boost to Ukrainian Air Force survivability and air-to-air lethality against the Russian VKS once supplied. However, they would still be at risk from Russia's SAM systems, and have limited dynamic ground attack options. (8/10)
Furthermore, they must disperse with a minimal visible ground operations and logistics footprint to avoid focused Russian missile strikes on airbases. This mediates in favour of Gripen or F-18 as types able to operate from rough, short fields with compact support equipment (9/10)
These considerations matter because Western capacity is not limitless
Logistics, training and personnel working on jets for Ukraine is capacity not used for other things like SAMs, vehicles, ammunition. The question is should this be the priority now, or should it wait? (10/10)
+1 for May 2023:
Now that F-16 has been de-facto selected; it’s key that a long ranged AIM-120 variant be supplied to give the UkrAF competitive BVR reach against Russian Su-35 with R-37M firing from a higher altitude!
Also a mobile ground support footprint to avoid strikes.
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If you’re wondering, this is the turbojet motor remains from a Russian cruise missile that devastated the #Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv
Air defence missiles like those fired by NASAMS are rocket powered. They don’t feature these turbojet engines. Only cruise missiles do.
Technical correction: it’s the small turbofan motor remnants from a Russian cruise missile. Same point applies; air defence missiles are rocket powered, and don’t feature turbofan (or turbojet) engines like cruise missiles do.
Thanks to @FRHoffmann1 and others for correcting me!
Also the 20kg frag warhead of the AIM-120 missile used by NASAMS, which Russia claims hit the hospital, is far too small to have caused the structural demolition and wide blast damage at the hospital.
But the 450kg warhead of a Kh-101 is the right size to cause this damage.
A thread on the US approval for #F16 transfer to #Ukraine once pilot training is complete:
This US decision is important as it clears one of the obstacles to delivery from European operators - US authorisation as the original manufacturer.
Several issues remain, however: (1/10)
The first is who will service and turn the jets once in country? F-16 is a complex aircraft and the airframes likely to be sent are quite old. Even on high risk timeframes it will take years to train journeyman or master level maintainers who can supervise and assure. (2/10)
This means that just like any other FMS customer that the US has helped set up with an F-16 fleet, there will be a heavy reliance on civilian contractors to supervise and provide on-the-job training to Ukrainian maintainers in-country, even after months of initial training (3/10)
For those on the give Ukraine Tranche 1 Typhoon train, since the question has been asked; 1) The RAF does not have 53 serviceable Tranche 1s to give. There are far fewer now (c20-25). 2) Those remaining have much more limited combat/weapons capabilities than Tranche 2/3 (1/6)
3) Typhoon is not optimised for low altitude A-A, but would need to fly low near the frontlines in Ukraine, due to the Russian SAM threat. 4) Typhoon is not suitable to operate from dispersed, quite short and rough airbases that the UkrAF use to avoid Ru missile strikes (2/6)
5) The RAF Typhoon force is badly, badly overstretched already. Too many operational commitments with too few aircraft, and inadequate spares and munitions stocks. 6) Even a handful of Tranche 1s for Ukraine would use up lots of those scarce spares, engineers and airframes. (3/6)
A few thoughts on Western choices on supplying heavy weaponry and continued munitions shipments to #Ukraine;
There is a misleading narrative emerging about the political choices around the cost of long term support and the need for a ceasefire sooner rather than later (1/8)
If some sort of stalemate is reached (it absolutely has not been for now), and a ceasefire forced on Ukraine by limits on Western support; Russia will continue to rebuild offensive capability at scale. Therefore, Ukraine would still urgently need Western weapons at scale (2/8)
It is important to understand that currently Russian forces are slowly taking ground in the Donbass but at massive cost, and the appearance of bad Ukrainian force ratios is because 🇺🇦 is holding forces back to build up mobile units to go on the offensive again in Spring (3/8)
Given Putin’s renewed nuclear threats today, a quick thread on why #nukes really don’t offer an effective MILITARY tool. Before we go on; yes of course it would be a dangerous, world-changing break with the nuclear taboo, would invite conventional NATO retaliation etc. (1/5)
Typical ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons have a yield of between 1kt and 30kt. They are much smaller than megaton-range thermonuclear strategic nuclear warheads. Here is a very approximate model of a 10kt airburst over Lyman for illustration. Direct damage hardly clears the town. (2/5)
For scale, see here how this fits into just Donbas. Tactical nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for troops or civilians in the kilometre or two around the blast radius. But you would need to use lots to materially alter the balance of forces in Ukraine as a whole. (3/5)
Given interest in the Iranian Shahed-136 (and smaller Shahed-131) loitering munitions now being used at a rapidly increasing scale by Russia in Ukraine, and some of the breathless claims being made about them; a brief thread on what they can and can't do compared to jets (1/20)
Far from being cutting edge, loitering munitions have been around since the late 1980s; the Israeli Harpy being the most successful. They are essentially slow, propeller-powered missiles. Early variants had anti-radiation seekers to home in on enemy SAM radars. (2/20)
They were developed to combine the capabilities of target decoys with those of anti-radiation missiles. Due to fuel efficient, slow flight, they could travel hundreds of kilometres and loiter for several hours. If enemy SAM radars illuminated to engage, they would be hit. (3/20)