[Curve vs Uniswap part 3]
Thesis: @CurveFinance is better positioned to be the core DeFi infra than @Uniswap
TLDR: 1. $CRV ponzinomics? a MISNOMER
- how inflation can be a scheme in game theory
- $CRV emission formula decoded 2. UniV3 needs stacks = worse cost structure
@CurveFinance@Uniswap 2. This is in response to a reply from a respectable DeFi OG @WinterSoldierxz who regularly publishes institutional-grade research. Those who haven't followed him should do it.
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz 3. $CRV ponzinomics is one common argument from critics: 28% inflation is crazy and $UNI doesn't have the issue. I argued that $CRV emission is not a cost, as it is prepaid by projects before emitted as the cost of projects to maintain on-chain liquidity!
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz 4. @WinterSoldierxz tried to show emission cost > profits.
First, it is not a cost as said.
Second, the calculation below missed one key aspect: $veCRV holders have to accumulate $CRV continuously & lock 4 years to maximise voting right for gauges!
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz 5. Thus, apart from bribes & tx fees, projects prepay $CRV emission by buying & locking more $CRV. @ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ and other whitelisted projects keep locking $CRV; @fraxfinance and some others try to get whitelisted to buy & lock $CRV. This is their cost of liquidity.
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 6. Clearly, money for buying $CRV & time value for locking $CRV haven't been taken into account. Stats show 46.7% of emitted $CRV is locked, most permanently. Thus this forms an integral part of $CRV tokenomics that is not negligible.
That means people are disincentivised to work hard!
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 9. Inflation drives consumption, for otherwise you won't be able to afford what you can now, and people work hard to earn more $$.
In this process, wealth is always channeled to more productive people or businesses which manage to meet/create the increase in aggregate demand.
Come back to crypto: what does it mean for inflation in $CRV tokenomics?
It is a a gradual process of governance power redistribution, favouring those more loyal and committed to the community!
With inflation, #CurveWars players cannot simply be idle and do nothing and meanwhile still keep their governance power and influence in the community.
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 12. Moreover, bribery cited below is just those for $vlCVX: bribes for 289M out of 567M $veCRV, leaving bribes of 49% $veCRV NOT counted yet.
In sum, most fails to take into account (a) ALL bribes + (b) $$ for buying $CRV + (c) time value for locking $CRV
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 15. $CRV emission formula is against any monopoly! How?
Let's revisit the formula: boost mechanism calculates one's earning weight by taking the smaller amount of two values. People often neglect the 'min' which prevents any $veCRV holder is too dominant to get most $CRV emitted
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 16. Put simply, a party's earning weight is capped by liquidity it provides. After $CRV emission is directed by voting gauge weight, how much one can get out of the portion of $CRV emitted to a particular pool is based on one's earning weight/total earning weight in that pool.
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 17. Example
Support there is a pool of $50k with $10k from X, $10k from Y, and $30k from Z, while X has 40% $veCRV, Y has 1% $veCRV, and Z has 1 $veCRV.
If $100 $CRV is emitted to it, we calculate each party can get how much $CRV by first calculating the
total earning weight:
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@WinterSoldierxz@ConvexFinance@StakeDAOHQ@fraxfinance 22. Next, UniV3 supporters always argue stacks built on it make it more composable and better user exp.
But they don't consider this mean a worse cost structure: those stacks aren't doing it for free, and each of them charges a fee for providing services
[Curve vs Uniswap part 2]
Why is @CurveFinance better positioned itself to be the core DeFi infra than @Uniswap?
TLDR: 1. $CRV tokenomics protects Curve against competition [1-13] 2. Curve’s liquidity-as-a-service: functionalities that solve on-chain liquidity issue [14-19]
...
@CurveFinance@Uniswap ... 3. UniV3 loses pricing power by
(i) malfunctioning at extreme market as liquidity dries up outside of LPs' various price ranges [20-22],
(ii) lifting threshold of liquidity management for new projects to set up pools of long tail assets permissionlessly [23-26] & ...
@CurveFinance@Uniswap ...
3(iii) stirring up competition among LPs which
(a) poses extra difficulty for new projects to bootstrap liquidity [27-32] &
(b) puts v3 itself at risk of being outcompeted [32-34] 4. CurveV2 Summer [36-40]
If you get confused by the logic flow, come back to TLDR!
Here we go!
This prompts me to write a 🧵to provide perspectives that not many people will take into account when comparing among DEXes
@CurveFinance@Uniswap@DeFi_Made_Here 2. Firstly, after the launch of Uni v3, Uniswap gives up its pricing power. What does that mean? For any asset traded among several exchanges, only 1 exchange can have pricing power.
Analogy:
ADR of a stock VS a stock in an exchange where it is mostly traded
), Uni v3 LPs lose money consistently with respect to toxic order flow, and thus it is suggested that it is not worth providing liquidity on Uni v3 most of the time
@a16z@Tim_Roughgarden@DuneAnalytics@thiccythot_ 2. What is toxic flow? Toxic flow is when the price marked to the future is worse than the execution price after accounting for fees and price impact. Toxicity is the result of adverse selection of passive market makers on Uniswap by market takers.
@fraxfinance@Lido@Rocket_Pool 1. @fraxfinance's $frxETH has its own reason for a higher APR for liquid staking. To understand more its flywheel effect, check out here:
I am not gonna talk about this, but First Mover Disadvantage that results from the status quo before Shanghai Update
@fraxfinance@Lido@Rocket_Pool 2. All things start from the fact that, for every $ETH as staking reward gained by stakers, they cannot be auto-compounded. That is, staking rewards will not be restaked and make it reward-bearing.
A short 🧵 to explain the flywheel of liquid staking services provided by @fraxfinance - why it generates more yields than other liquid staking providers:
$frxETH = stablecoin as each pegged to 1 $ETH
$sfrxETH = staked $frxETH, rebasing as POS reward is accrued in the form of $frxETH, so that each $sfrxETH is worth more $frxETH over time
2. $frxETH itself generates no yield, but it can allow users to gain yields in 2 ways:
i. It can be staked as $sfrxETH to earn staking reward in $frxETH
ii. It used to provide liquidity on Curve pool of $ETH - $frxETH pair to earn reward from Curve emission