[Curve vs Uniswap part 3]
Thesis: @CurveFinance is better positioned to be the core DeFi infra than @Uniswap

TLDR:
1. $CRV ponzinomics? a MISNOMER
- how inflation can be a scheme in game theory
- $CRV emission formula decoded
2. UniV3 needs stacks = worse cost structure
@CurveFinance @Uniswap 2. This is in response to a reply from a respectable DeFi OG @WinterSoldierxz who regularly publishes institutional-grade research. Those who haven't followed him should do it.

For his counter-arguments, refer to his thread:


In-depth content here we go!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz 3. $CRV ponzinomics is one common argument from critics: 28% inflation is crazy and $UNI doesn't have the issue. I argued that $CRV emission is not a cost, as it is prepaid by projects before emitted as the cost of projects to maintain on-chain liquidity!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz 4. @WinterSoldierxz tried to show emission cost > profits.
First, it is not a cost as said.
Second, the calculation below missed one key aspect: $veCRV holders have to accumulate $CRV continuously & lock 4 years to maximise voting right for gauges!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz 5. Thus, apart from bribes & tx fees, projects prepay $CRV emission by buying & locking more $CRV. @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ and other whitelisted projects keep locking $CRV; @fraxfinance and some others try to get whitelisted to buy & lock $CRV. This is their cost of liquidity.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 6. Clearly, money for buying $CRV & time value for locking $CRV haven't been taken into account. Stats show 46.7% of emitted $CRV is locked, most permanently. Thus this forms an integral part of $CRV tokenomics that is not negligible.

Why do projects have incentives to do so?
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 7. Short ans: INFLATION. In tokenomics, inflation is always portrayed as something negative in nature; for $CRV, it is necessary and not evil, without which game theory is hard to work well.

Before digging into it, let me explain what's my perception of inflation in economics.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 8. Inflation is a gradual process of wealth redistribution in society. Imagine if there is deflation, every dollar note is worth more than it was 1 year ago. Sounds decent right? Every one is making $$ by doing nothing!

That means people are disincentivised to work hard!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 9. Inflation drives consumption, for otherwise you won't be able to afford what you can now, and people work hard to earn more $$.
In this process, wealth is always channeled to more productive people or businesses which manage to meet/create the increase in aggregate demand.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 10. If you want me to write a separate 🧵on inflation, LIKE this tweet + let me know!

Come back to crypto: what does it mean for inflation in $CRV tokenomics?
It is a a gradual process of governance power redistribution, favouring those more loyal and committed to the community!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 11. Loyalty & commitment are exemplified by (i) CONSISTENT ACCUMULATION of $CRV + (ii) locking $CRV for a longer period.

With inflation, #CurveWars players cannot simply be idle and do nothing and meanwhile still keep their governance power and influence in the community.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 12. Moreover, bribery cited below is just those for $vlCVX: bribes for 289M out of 567M $veCRV, leaving bribes of 49% $veCRV NOT counted yet.
In sum, most fails to take into account (a) ALL bribes + (b) $$ for buying $CRV + (c) time value for locking $CRV
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 13. To me, whether a project is ponzi depends on whether the business underneath is sustainable and actually creates value to the industry. @CurveFinance definitely creates value with its 'liquidity-as-a-service' functionalities as said!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 14. Up to now I haven't mentioned how $crvUSD can improve @CurveFinance revenue stream. I have explained it in my previous 🧵. Essentially $crvUSD increases a lot revenue, and creates another flywheel to make it sustainable. Check out below:
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 15. $CRV emission formula is against any monopoly! How?
Let's revisit the formula: boost mechanism calculates one's earning weight by taking the smaller amount of two values. People often neglect the 'min' which prevents any $veCRV holder is too dominant to get most $CRV emitted
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 16. Put simply, a party's earning weight is capped by liquidity it provides. After $CRV emission is directed by voting gauge weight, how much one can get out of the portion of $CRV emitted to a particular pool is based on one's earning weight/total earning weight in that pool.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 17. Example
Support there is a pool of $50k with $10k from X, $10k from Y, and $30k from Z, while X has 40% $veCRV, Y has 1% $veCRV, and Z has 1 $veCRV.
If $100 $CRV is emitted to it, we calculate each party can get how much $CRV by first calculating the
total earning weight:
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 18.
X = min(10k*0.4+50k*0.4*0.6, 10k) = 10k
Y = min(10k*0.4+50k*0.01*0.6, 10k) = 4.3k
Z = min(30k*0.4, 30k) = 12k
total earning weight = 26.3k

Thus, out of $100 $CRV emitted:
X can get $100 * 10/26.3 = $38
Y can get $100 * 4.3/26.3 = $16.3
Z can get $100 * 12/26.3 = $45.6
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 19. X, though with 40% $veCRV holdings, cannot get most $CRV emission: in eg without cap 40% $veCRV allows X to get $57.4 instead!

This shows how the formula prevents monopoly. @CurveFinance endeavours to strike a balance between rewarding loyal & decentralising $CRV holdings.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 20. Regarding the relationship between Curve's TVL & emission, correlation does not mean causation, and Curve's TVL drop can hardly be resorted solely to emission.

I rather argue that the dominant cause is the TVL drop in the whole industry instead.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 21. @WinterSoldierxz logic flow is that as $CRV emission is cut every Aug, TVL will become lower and can't go back to ATH.

This can't be true! And I am sure in the next bull run @CurveFinance's TVL must be higher than its previous ATH. Let time prove it.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 22. Next, UniV3 supporters always argue stacks built on it make it more composable and better user exp.
But they don't consider this mean a worse cost structure: those stacks aren't doing it for free, and each of them charges a fee for providing services
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance 23. Unlike Curve V2 LPs who enjoy seamless all-in-one service, UniV3 LPs need to pay @ArrakisFinance & @xtokenterminal for what's free for Curve V2 LPs. It is against the trend of VERTICAL INTEGRATION.

What does vertical integration mean to cost structure? Take CEXes as an eg
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance @ArrakisFinance @xtokenterminal 24. Crypto exchanges like @binance are vertically integrated platforms, combining both brokerage and exchange functions, and hence have more superior business models compared to traditional exchanges and brokerages.

Why?
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance @ArrakisFinance @xtokenterminal @binance 25. Traditional exchanges have to split fees with other parties responsible for brokerage, margins, risks, clearing, custody, GUIs, APIs, etc. Thus, it results in a much lower take-rate on trades due to more loss on fees to other middlemen.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance @ArrakisFinance @xtokenterminal @binance 26. Crypto exchanges by owning the front-end brokerage can improve the margin via the vertical integration, has direct access to customers as the sales channel, and has users’ data that can inform product rollouts and monetisation strategies.

All these drive a higher take-rate.
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance @ArrakisFinance @xtokenterminal @binance 27. Back to DEXes, all-in-one service to LPs means no loss to other middlemen and LPs can be more incentivised. This explains why @CurveFinance's TVL is much higher despite 50% of tx fees are taken away by the platform.

Thus, @Uniswap fee switch is more difficult to implement
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance @ArrakisFinance @xtokenterminal @binance 28. Moreover, UniV3 design favours whales to do LPs, and drawbacks of LP professionalisation are exhaustively explored in my thread at [30-34]

Do check it out!
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @WinterSoldierxz @ConvexFinance @StakeDAOHQ @fraxfinance @ArrakisFinance @xtokenterminal @binance 29. That's it! Really appreciate @WinterSoldierxz for the informed discussion! Hope this arouses more discussion as to how DeFi can develop in the future!

Tagging gigabrains: @rektdiomedes @0xCha0s @crypto_condom @TheDeFISaint @llamaintern @DAdvisoor @adamscochran @0xShitTrader
To further clarify, $CRV 28% inflation in [3] may not be accurate enough as it includes vests: just as you count $UNI pre-allocation as inflation.

If this is excluded, then inflation is only 13.8% (details: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…)

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More from @DeFi_Cheetah

Jan 26
[Curve vs Uniswap part 2]
Why is @CurveFinance better positioned itself to be the core DeFi infra than @Uniswap?

TLDR:
1. $CRV tokenomics protects Curve against competition [1-13]
2. Curve’s liquidity-as-a-service: functionalities that solve on-chain liquidity issue [14-19]
...
@CurveFinance @Uniswap ...
3. UniV3 loses pricing power by
(i) malfunctioning at extreme market as liquidity dries up outside of LPs' various price ranges [20-22],
(ii) lifting threshold of liquidity management for new projects to set up pools of long tail assets permissionlessly [23-26] & ...
@CurveFinance @Uniswap ...
3(iii) stirring up competition among LPs which
(a) poses extra difficulty for new projects to bootstrap liquidity [27-32] &
(b) puts v3 itself at risk of being outcompeted [32-34]
4. CurveV2 Summer [36-40]

If you get confused by the logic flow, come back to TLDR!
Here we go!
Read 49 tweets
Jan 10
感謝提出觀點,在下反駁觀點如下:
1. 有定價能力的去中心化交易所,MEV volume不會佔大多數的。為什麼?試想像一下套利者為什麼是套利?因為有主要定價的交易所,跟UniV3形成價差,這樣才會產生套利,數據已指出,有43%-60%以上來自於UniV3的成交量都是套利單,這是為什麼?不難理解(Curve只有20%)
2. 這位的觀點忽略了UniV3產生的嚴重問題:LP關係在v3由於能按不同策略提供流動性,這意味著同等的交易費用,聰明有資源的專業LP會把大部分被動和散戶的LP交易費用吃掉,因為前者更聰明
UniV3能提供full-range又如何?這種情況下passive LPs無可觀收益,最終會剩下專業LP,跟orderbook下的MM沒兩樣
3. 再推論下去,為什麼UniV3因而失去了定價權?很簡單,你提高了流動性管理的門檻,變相是增加長尾資產管理流動性的難度,新項目大多都不會到v3開池子,這事實能在v3 dashboard查看交易對時查證
Uniswap如能定位自己成為沒在CEX上幣的長尾資產主要交易所,這樣才有其不可或缺的DeFi地位,現時明顯不是
Read 9 tweets
Jan 7
This 🧵 is about my analysis framework of DEXes: why I think @CurveFinance prevails over @Uniswap, and why Uni v3 is a wrong move!

In short, 2 reasons: (i) pricing power & (ii) profitability
@CurveFinance @Uniswap 1. Background
@DeFi_Made_Here made a thread about @CurveFinance, and a comparison of Curve vs Uniswap.

This prompts me to write a 🧵to provide perspectives that not many people will take into account when comparing among DEXes
@CurveFinance @Uniswap @DeFi_Made_Here 2. Firstly, after the launch of Uni v3, Uniswap gives up its pricing power. What does that mean? For any asset traded among several exchanges, only 1 exchange can have pricing power.

Analogy:
ADR of a stock VS a stock in an exchange where it is mostly traded
Read 31 tweets
Dec 30, 2022
This 🧵is about the most fundamental and important question of DeFi: when does it make economic sense to be an LP for AMM (i.e. benefit > cost)?

@a16z Head of Research @Tim_Roughgarden propose a solution by introducing a new concept called Loss versus Rebalancing (LVR)

👇👇
@a16z @Tim_Roughgarden 1. Background
As shown from a dashboard on @DuneAnalytics by @thiccythot_
(), Uni v3 LPs lose money consistently with respect to toxic order flow, and thus it is suggested that it is not worth providing liquidity on Uni v3 most of the time
@a16z @Tim_Roughgarden @DuneAnalytics @thiccythot_ 2. What is toxic flow? Toxic flow is when the price marked to the future is worse than the execution price after accounting for fees and price impact. Toxicity is the result of adverse selection of passive market makers on Uniswap by market takers.
Read 33 tweets
Dec 26, 2022
Do you know in liquid staking, there is such a thing called First Mover Disadvantage? Those who start later is more likely to generate a higher yield!

$sfrxETH on @fraxfinance -> 8.8% APR
$stETH on @Lido -> 4.8% APR
$rETH on @Rocket_Pool -> 4.14% APR

Why? 🧵👇👇
@fraxfinance @Lido @Rocket_Pool 1. @fraxfinance's $frxETH has its own reason for a higher APR for liquid staking. To understand more its flywheel effect, check out here:


I am not gonna talk about this, but First Mover Disadvantage that results from the status quo before Shanghai Update
@fraxfinance @Lido @Rocket_Pool 2. All things start from the fact that, for every $ETH as staking reward gained by stakers, they cannot be auto-compounded. That is, staking rewards will not be restaked and make it reward-bearing.
Read 12 tweets
Dec 25, 2022
A short 🧵 to explain the flywheel of liquid staking services provided by @fraxfinance - why it generates more yields than other liquid staking providers:
1. Background info:

$frxETH = stablecoin as each pegged to 1 $ETH
$sfrxETH = staked $frxETH, rebasing as POS reward is accrued in the form of $frxETH, so that each $sfrxETH is worth more $frxETH over time
2. $frxETH itself generates no yield, but it can allow users to gain yields in 2 ways:
i. It can be staked as $sfrxETH to earn staking reward in $frxETH
ii. It used to provide liquidity on Curve pool of $ETH - $frxETH pair to earn reward from Curve emission
Read 16 tweets

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