1/ If Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had succeeded in 2022, Ukraine's industries would have been seized and taken over by Russian oligarchs. A leaked document shows that oligarch Konstantin Malofeev intended to create a 'DMZ Concern' from Ukraine's largest plants. ⬇️
2/ Malofeev is a billionaire who is a close supporter of Vladimir Putin and an aggressive promotor of religious conservatism. He's an overt monarchist who reportedly sees Putin as a new Tsar, and has links with far-right parties and individuals in Europe and the US.
3/ The EU, US and Canada have sanctioned Malofeev for trying to destabilise Ukraine and finance separatism. He's closely linked to pro-Russian separatists and was the former employer of Igor Girkin. He's been accused of funding radical nationalist movements across Europe.
4/ The DMZ Concern document, a presentation possibly dated 30 May 2022, was published recently by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel. It sets out a business plan for the "expansion of production assets based on the results of the Special Military Operation".
5/ The first slide shows what appears to be the intended territorial division of a defeated Ukraine, with the whole of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts – up to the Moldovan and Romanian borders – under Russian control.
6/ This would have stripped Ukraine of its entire coastline, all its ports and much of its heavy industry, hydroelectric and mineral resources. It would have become an economically devastated and landlocked rump state, likely under the control of a pro-Russian puppet government.
7/ Slide 2 describes the 'DMZ concern' as a vastly expanded version of the existing Donetsk Metallurgical Plant (DMZ) company, which operates mines and other industrial enterprises in the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. It states a goal of achieving:
8/ "consolidation of existing financial, economic, technical and market opportunities of enterprises of key industries in the liberated territories of the DPR, LPR and Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions, which form the [economic] basis of the south-east region of the former Ukraine."
9/ After listing DMZ's existing holdings on slide 4 (#3 is missing), slide 5 of the plan lists "enterprises located in the liberated territories [that] are possible [candidates] for integration" with DMZ. They include some of Europe's largest mining and mineral processing plants.
10/ These include the Marganets Mining and Processing plant and the Nikopol Ferroalloy plant (both in Dnipropetrovsk oblast), the Zaporizhstal steel plant in Zaporizhzhia oblast and others. Slide 7 discusses a number of additional Ukrainian factories being considered for seizure.
11/ Slides 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that this was not just a theoretical exercise – the plan was already well advanced. Legal work had been done and management agreements had been signed as part of a three-stage plan to be carried out through 2022–2027.
12/ Interestingly, slide 5.3 lists among various business and growth goals for the 2023–2027 period an objective of achieving "Entry into the markets of friendly and sub-allied countries of Eurasian Economic Union, Middle East (Iran, Syria), South-East Asia, Turkey and Africa."
13/ The plan sets out a goal of aligning the DMZ Concern with a "strategic partner" (presumably Russian) and inclusion of its enterprises in "the state programmes of the Russian Federation." It also raises the possible takeover of Odesa port to serve DMZ.
14/ The end result, anticipated on slide 8, is the "reactivation of cooperation and activities of enterprises in the key sectors of the liberated territories of the DPR, LPR and south-eastern Ukraine…
15/ …in the form of a cumulative increase in annual financial indicators from RUR 70 billion [$990 million] (data for 2021) to RUR 220 billion [$3.1 billion] by 2024." This would achieve the "creation of a major enterprise in the interests of the Russian Federation."
16/ The slide indirectly acknowledges the impact of the DNR's large-scale mobilisation of fighting-age men, most of whom are now likely dead, by describing a goal of the "preservation of 8,616 jobs (excluding those mobilized)". It anticipates having over 16,000 workers by 2024.
17/ The plan doesn't specify where the extra workers would come from, but it's likely that – as has happened in Crimea – large numbers of people would be relocated from Russia to repopulate Ukraine's south-east, replacing the Ukrainians who have fled or been deported from there.
18/ Needless to say, the Ukrainian owners of the seized enterprises would not have received a kopek in compensation. With their collective value of billions of dollars, Malofeev was planning arguably the biggest heist in history – though it's now hopefully been thwarted. /end
1/ A Ukrainian attack on a Russian fuel convoy heading to Crimea across the Sea of Azov has likely crippled effects to supply the fuel-starved peninsula by water. Russian warbloggers are dismayed and scornful about the Russian government's tactics. ⬇️
1/ Crimea is approaching an economic collapse amidst chronic fuel and electricity shortages, according to a Russian report from the region. Even water is a problem, due to a lack of energy to power pumps and the need to use generators to extract it. ⬇️
2/ The Russian Telegram blogger 'Lawyer in the South' reports on the current situation in Crimea and the Russian south-west:
3/ "Last week, I took a trip to Crimea by car.
This article isn't about assigning blame or sowing panic. It's an attempt to soberly assess the situation and consider ways to solve problems, not just react to them.
1/ Ukraine's drone campaign is leading not only to fuel shortages but also political recriminations in Russia. The attack on the Omsk oil refinery yesterday is prompting increasingly harsh condemnations of Russia's government by Russian warbloggers. ⬇️
2/ 'Older than Edda' is outraged at the attack's success:
"Drone debris has reached Omsk, and hostile channels are distributing a defamatory video claiming it landed and caused a fire at a plant."
3/ "I don't want to be outraged yet again by the fact that several drones fly across the country for many hours and manage to hit something with drone debris."
Like many others, Sergey Kolayashnikov complains that it demonstrates Russian weakness:
1/ Why is Russia's air defence system so patchy that it regularly lets Ukrainian drones cross thousands of kilometres of Russian territory? A prominent Russian drone developer highlights a range of deficiencies in Russia's air defences. ⬇️
2/ As noted by other warbloggers, yesterday's attack on the Omsk oil refinery required Ukrainian drones to fly at least 2,400 km. Russian drone developer Alexey Chadayev points out that air defence teams often don't bother shooting down drones that pass through their areas:
3/ "The situation with the Omsk Oil Refinery raises the awkward question of "transit" regions—regions where local anti-drone enforcement agents operate based on the objective-based defence principle: if it's not aimed at us, let it fly on,…
1/ Today's Ukrainian strikes against a Russian oil refinery in distant Omsk are being greeted with gloom by Russian warbloggers. They say that their predictions of increasingly wide-ranging Ukrainian raids were ignored, but are now coming true. ⬇️
"What happened is what was predicted last year: Ukrainian formations were able to reach Omsk, which is more than 2,500 km from the front line, with modernised FP-1 drones.
3/ "We believe that against this backdrop, discussions and debates about the involvement of Kazakhstani territory and various saboteurs will start again, but this is just a search for excuses, not a solution.
1/ Ukrainian drone manufacturer Fire Point's announcement that it has extended its FP-1 drone's range to 3,400 km (2,100 miles) is prompting alarm among Russian warbloggers. One notes that this puts many strategically vital sites in Siberia in range. ⬇️
"The head of Fire Point company, Denis Stiler, claims that the upgraded FP-1 drones can fly 3,400 km. Of course, he's just hype and lying! But if it's true, the following targets will be hit:
3/ "Tyumen Refinery (2,100 km) - already attacked in June, the fuel base of the country's main oil-producing region: gasoline and diesel are primarily used for domestic consumption in Western Siberia, including oil production itself.