1/ If Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine had succeeded in 2022, Ukraine's industries would have been seized and taken over by Russian oligarchs. A leaked document shows that oligarch Konstantin Malofeev intended to create a 'DMZ Concern' from Ukraine's largest plants. ⬇️
2/ Malofeev is a billionaire who is a close supporter of Vladimir Putin and an aggressive promotor of religious conservatism. He's an overt monarchist who reportedly sees Putin as a new Tsar, and has links with far-right parties and individuals in Europe and the US.
3/ The EU, US and Canada have sanctioned Malofeev for trying to destabilise Ukraine and finance separatism. He's closely linked to pro-Russian separatists and was the former employer of Igor Girkin. He's been accused of funding radical nationalist movements across Europe.
4/ The DMZ Concern document, a presentation possibly dated 30 May 2022, was published recently by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel. It sets out a business plan for the "expansion of production assets based on the results of the Special Military Operation".
5/ The first slide shows what appears to be the intended territorial division of a defeated Ukraine, with the whole of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts – up to the Moldovan and Romanian borders – under Russian control.
6/ This would have stripped Ukraine of its entire coastline, all its ports and much of its heavy industry, hydroelectric and mineral resources. It would have become an economically devastated and landlocked rump state, likely under the control of a pro-Russian puppet government.
7/ Slide 2 describes the 'DMZ concern' as a vastly expanded version of the existing Donetsk Metallurgical Plant (DMZ) company, which operates mines and other industrial enterprises in the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. It states a goal of achieving:
8/ "consolidation of existing financial, economic, technical and market opportunities of enterprises of key industries in the liberated territories of the DPR, LPR and Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions, which form the [economic] basis of the south-east region of the former Ukraine."
9/ After listing DMZ's existing holdings on slide 4 (#3 is missing), slide 5 of the plan lists "enterprises located in the liberated territories [that] are possible [candidates] for integration" with DMZ. They include some of Europe's largest mining and mineral processing plants.
10/ These include the Marganets Mining and Processing plant and the Nikopol Ferroalloy plant (both in Dnipropetrovsk oblast), the Zaporizhstal steel plant in Zaporizhzhia oblast and others. Slide 7 discusses a number of additional Ukrainian factories being considered for seizure.
11/ Slides 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that this was not just a theoretical exercise – the plan was already well advanced. Legal work had been done and management agreements had been signed as part of a three-stage plan to be carried out through 2022–2027.
12/ Interestingly, slide 5.3 lists among various business and growth goals for the 2023–2027 period an objective of achieving "Entry into the markets of friendly and sub-allied countries of Eurasian Economic Union, Middle East (Iran, Syria), South-East Asia, Turkey and Africa."
13/ The plan sets out a goal of aligning the DMZ Concern with a "strategic partner" (presumably Russian) and inclusion of its enterprises in "the state programmes of the Russian Federation." It also raises the possible takeover of Odesa port to serve DMZ.
14/ The end result, anticipated on slide 8, is the "reactivation of cooperation and activities of enterprises in the key sectors of the liberated territories of the DPR, LPR and south-eastern Ukraine…
15/ …in the form of a cumulative increase in annual financial indicators from RUR 70 billion [$990 million] (data for 2021) to RUR 220 billion [$3.1 billion] by 2024." This would achieve the "creation of a major enterprise in the interests of the Russian Federation."
16/ The slide indirectly acknowledges the impact of the DNR's large-scale mobilisation of fighting-age men, most of whom are now likely dead, by describing a goal of the "preservation of 8,616 jobs (excluding those mobilized)". It anticipates having over 16,000 workers by 2024.
17/ The plan doesn't specify where the extra workers would come from, but it's likely that – as has happened in Crimea – large numbers of people would be relocated from Russia to repopulate Ukraine's south-east, replacing the Ukrainians who have fled or been deported from there.
18/ Needless to say, the Ukrainian owners of the seized enterprises would not have received a kopek in compensation. With their collective value of billions of dollars, Malofeev was planning arguably the biggest heist in history – though it's now hopefully been thwarted. /end
1/ Iran is using a unique type of loitering, self-targeting surface to air missile to shoot down US MQ-9 Reaper drones. 11 Reapers costing over $330 million have so far been reported destroyed in the war with Iran. ⬇️
2/ The "358" missile, also known by NATO as the SA-67 and in Yemen as the Saqr-1, is a unique type of surface-to-air missile that is launched with a rocket booster and then loiters in a target area using a turbojet engine, scanning with an infrared sensor for airborne targets.
3/ It appears to be capable of several modes, including the ability to attack ground targets as well. The missile is reported to be 2.75 meters long and is armed with a 10 kg proximity warhead, with a total weight of up to 50 kg when fully fueled, and a reported 100 km range.
1/ Fundraising for the Russian army has been declining steeply for some time, leaving soldiers without essential equipment and supplies. A Russian warblogger explains that it's because soldiers are now seen as being recruited from the ranks of Russia's unwanted underclasses. ⬇️
2/ Russia's professional army was decimated in the first months of the war in Ukraine. Losses were replaced by mobilising 300,000 men from September-October 2022 onwards. They were recruited from across society and were widely supported by the Russian public.
3/ The political costs of mobilisation were high, however, so the government turned instead to recruiting the marginalised and disadvantaged. This has included convicts, drug addicts, alcoholics, debtors, and poverty-stricken ethnic minorities from remote regions of Russia.
1/ Vladimir Putin's popularity ratings, as measured by a state-aligned pollster, are at their lowest point for years. Russian commentators blame the 'bad boyars' around Putin and say that "there's complete degradation all around" in Russia. ⬇️⬇️
2/ The pollster VTsIOM has recorded Putin's popularity at 32.1%, the lowest seen during the war so far (though still some way off his pre-war nadir of 24%, recorded in 2021). Russian bloggers are not surprised, though few blame Putin himself and instead blame his advisors:
3/ 'SHAKESPEARE' writes: "They say Putin's popularity rating has plummeted to a two-year low. It's not surprising after yesterday. It's just some shady crooks who want to take Telegram away from the people at any cost and are trying to push it through with his authority.
1/ Messages hacked from a Russian general's phone illustrate the sweeping scale of corruption at all levels of the Russian army. They highlight a top-to-bottom pyramid of extortion and bribery to obtain promotions and influence, plus scams and theft of military resources. ⬇️
2/ Last month, it emerged that gigabytes of messages spanning 2022-2024 had been obtained by Ukrainian sources from the phone of Major General Roman Demurchiev, most likely as the result of a successful hack.
3/ They have shed an unprecedentedly detailed look at the inner workings of the senior Russian officer corps, including Demurchiev's personal involvement in the torture, mutilation, and murder of Ukrainian POWs, as well as constant feuds between generals.
1/ Russia military policemen are engaged in another crackdown on privately owned vehicles operated by soldiers. Unfortunately for the soldiers, this is reported to be effectively lining them up for Ukrainian drone strikes. ⬇️
2/ The Military Automobile Inspectorate (VAI) and Military Police (VP) have made themselves hugely unpopular among Russian soldiers for their attempts to stop Russian soldiers using privately owned vehicles.
3/ According to Russian warbloggers, between 70-90% of vehicles used by the army in frontline areas are privately owned by soldiers, either purchased with their own money or provided as 'humanitarian aid' through donations from civilians and fundraisers.
1/ Iran's Kharg Island is reportedly under consideration as a target for capture by the Trump Administration. However, declassified US government documents show that the same thing was considered in 1979 but was rejected because it was too difficult and risky. ⬇️
2/ President Jimmy Carter and his National Security Council met in the afternoon of November 6, 1979 to discuss the ongoing Iranian hostage crisis. The discussion involved options for putting pressure on the Khomenei regime, including targeting Kharg Island.
3/ Kharg Island lies 25 km (16 miles) off the coast of Iran at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. It was built up as a deep water oil terminal in the 1960s, providing an ideal oil loading point for supertankers. 90% of Iran's oil exports pass through the island.