58,290- 58,305 WIA on all fronts (including sick leave).
~1,380 casualties/day.
3/8
๐ท๐บ RU overall losses until 1/31/23:
133,100- 137,731 losses (~394/day).
~30% are MIA.
291,295- 304,964 WIA (~869/day)
~40% are lightly wounded, most return to duty.
Not all are wounded at same time.
Total casualties: 424.4k- 442.7k in 343 days
(~1264 a day)
4/8
๐บ๐ฆUA overall losses until 1/31/23:
62,233- 65,823 losses (~143/day)
~20% are MIA
148,782- 154,643 WIA ( ~442/day)
~50% are lightly wounded, most return to duty.
Total casualties: 211k- 220.5k (~628/day)
UA counts UAF, NGU, TDF, Police, Intl Legion in these figures.
5/8
Regarding the casualty counts, which fluctuate, and do not follow the traditionally quoted standards of (1:3 or 1:5):
RU Battlefield medicine is extraordinarily poor. Lots of survivable wounds become deadly.
Lightly wounded UA soldiers often refuse to leave the front.
6/8
Regarding Missing In Action:
~20% of UA Losses are MIA, and ~30% of RU losses.
Generally MIA means they are dead. Sometimes they are captured, or deserters.
There are more UA POW's then RU POW's, and vastly more RU deserters then UA.
Wagner has poor KIA accounting.
7/8
Regarding sources and methods:
@Volya_media
Has been tracking RU/UA casualties via numerous sources since the early days of the war, and have had their data echoed by other estimates.
They are RU-language media, but very much anti-Putin.
"Our infantry is fighting flawlessly - otherwise Bakhmut would have fallen long ago"
The NGU soldier with the call sign "Krafter" is performing tasks as part of the 3rd Battalion of the Rapid Reaction Brigade "Svoboda".
๐งต1/8
Like many of his colleagues, Krafter is a volunteer who joined the ranks of the National Guard, and later the 4th RRB after February 24, when he found the full-scale Russian invasion in his hometown as he woke up to rocket attacks early in the morning down the road.
2/8
" It was no longer possible to wait, to sit. I went from my hometown to Kyiv - I just got into the car with volunteers, not knowing where exactly fate would throw me. Later I got to the "Svoboda" battalion, where I am currently serving."
To the NW of Kherson city, the 1st ๐ท๐บline of defense, from Pravdyne-Snihurivka, is completely abandoned to the W of the Inhulets river.
The 2nd ๐ท๐บ line (Tomyna Balka- Chornobaika area) is reportedly in process of withdrawal.
๐บ๐ฆis advancing here, slowly and methodically. 2/9
๐ท๐บ Soldiers in and around Kherson city proper are preparing for an urban defense, with heavy mining of the city, suburbs, and civilian infrastructure such as homes and fields.
A regiment of ๐ท๐บ combat engineers are being deployed to aid in this effect. They came from Donetsk.
3/9
The report covers 4 topics : personnel, equipment, Western security assistance, and the current Ukrainian military performance and outlook. A brief summary of each section is found below:
Personnel:
Part of UA's impressive performance is due to the experience in combat and motivation of its personnel since 2014. They integrated quickly in 2022.
However, a high level of combat casualties and small recruitment base (as compared to Russia) are limiting factors.
A thread on RU withdrawal and UA offensives in Kherson region. Sources from @Volya_media, UA OPCOM South, + others.
As of 10 PM on 11/9/22. East of the Inhulets river, UA is advancing towards Beryslav and the Kahkovka dam. RU is pulling some troops in to cover this area.
๐งต1/10
RU soldiers and equipment are being withdrawn across the Dnieper River near Beryslav and over the dam. The crossing and the dam are not currently shelled.
RU brigades and 3 of the 4 RU units who were just deployed here with fresh mobikis are apparently withdrawing already.
2/10
West of the Inhulets River the situation is different. The bridgehead around Kherson and inside the city itself is held by 13k to 16k RU soldiers
RU is abandoning certain areas of the first line of defense, which runs from Pravdyne in the west to Snihurivka in the east.