Thread by @HeleneBismarck

My @faznet analysis of the British perception of Germany’s foreign&security policy since Russia invaded 🇺🇦 is based on conversations with security experts, academics& government officials. There is considerable interest in London in the way 🇩🇪 is changing.
faz.net/aktuell/politi…

London was surprised by @Bundeskanzler ‘s Zeitenwende speech in February 2022, but the initial reaction was overwhelmingly positive. The speech seemed to announce a real change which could result in Germany stopping to be a weak link in the chain of the European security order./2

The #Zeitenwende has not given rise to UK concern that a domineering or revanchist Germany might eventually be re-emerging. That fear which still existed in Thatcher’s head at the time of German reunification no longer matters among 🇬🇧’s foreign&security policy making elite./3

It’s another negative stereotype, less prevalent in 🇬🇧than it was before 2022, that🇩🇪should worry about: That of a cynical, mercantilist county, which lectures allies from a position of moral superiority, while business interests dictate policy&security is outsourced to others./4

The #Sondervermögen went a long way to dispel this negative cliché. There is awareness&genuine respect in London for the fact that the German government is now making decisions on a daily basis that, due to our history and political culture, were unthinkable before the war.
/5

Everyone I spoke to in 🇬🇧to agrees that the biggest and most consequential German achievement for Europe’s security of the last year was to wean 🇩🇪 off Russian gas. /6

But there is also confusion in London about the strategic side of the Zeitenwende. The communication style of the chancellor is perceived as a problem. The relationship between chancellor &foreign minister @ABaerbock causes bewilderment about 🇩🇪’s position./7

The #Leopard controversy around the Ramstein-meeting was astonishing for 🇬🇧: Why talk about 'not going alone' for weeks when what you really mean is not going without the US? Why not at least make a clear statement on export licenses for other countries at Ramstein?/8

Most U.K. experts I spoke to found it ironic that Germany, *of all people*, who always seems to prefer talking about Europe to discussing its own interests, would now turn out to be the real Atlanticists, & thereby 'publicly discredit' the idea of European Strategic Autonomy. /9

As for the idea that sending US Abrams tanks along with Leopards helps to share the risk of a Russian reaction with the US: U.K. experts are unconvinced by that argument, because the US contribution to Ukraine’s defence far exceeds Europe’s, &Germany has Article 5 protection./10

After one year of #Zeitenwende , the general impression in London is that Germany’s Ukraine- and Russia-policy is risk-averse. Many U.K. experts warn that delaying decisions in times of war out of fear of escalation can entail creating new risks. There is no risk- free way. /11

From a 🇬🇧point of view, #Zeitenwende is not just about spending money, but about changing 🇩🇪‘s strategic culture in a way that enables it to move with the necessary speed. Everyone understands that such a change takes time, but they also emphasise that in 🇺🇦, every day counts./12

Finally, it is worth point out that the British perception of the German #Zeitenwende is not devoid of self-criticism. Many argue that Britain‘s armed forces are also in real need of reform and funding, and that the world of 23 February 2022 will not come back. /13 .ends

Perhaps of interest @camille_grand @AnnwieAnna @MSCheusgen @RikeFranke @FrankeBenedikt @APHClarkson @KeepChannelOpen @CarloMasala1 @EdArnold_RUSI @edwardstrngr @general_ben