Army Commander 1st Class Timoshenko's offensive tasked the Soviet 100th Rifle Division with taking Summa while 123rd Division was tasked with seized the 'Millionaire' & 'Poppius' bunkers of the Mannerheim Line.
The Soviet suffered heavy losses, but eventually managed to break through forcing the Finns to abandon the Mannerheim Line. Good 🧵👇
I wrote on the preparations for this Soviet offensive and how the Red Army strategically, organizationally, and tactically adapted during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939 & 1940 for @WarOnTheRocks earlier this week.👇
One note on current Russian efforts to tactically & operationally adapt in Ukraine: Tactical & operational adaptation by Russian forces does not imply increased offensive potential. Historical analogies only get you so far and are certainly not deterministic.
*seizing
I think one under-appreciated factor contributing to the Finnish defeat was the inability of the Finnish Armed Forces to conduct large-scale combined arms counteroffensives. Finns were superb on the defense & localized counterattacks, but fared poorly on the offense.
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„Ukrainian officials say they require coordinates provided or confirmed by the United States and its allies for the vast majority of strikes using its advanced U.S.-provided rocket systems.“ washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/…
„One senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian forces almost never launch the advanced weapons without specific coordinates provided by U.S. military personnel from a base elsewhere in Europe.“
According to our maps and software, a point will have one set of coordinates,”Malinovsky said. “But when we give this target to partners for analysis, the coordinates are different. Why? Because the Americans and NATO countries have access to military satellites.”
Within 25 days in January 1940, the Red Army not only was able to reconstitute and reorganize its forces and revise its campaign strategy but also develop rudimentary skills to execute complex combined arms operations with which the Mannerheim Line could finally be breached.
Looking for potential lessons from the Winter War for Ukraine today, a major takeaway is that a relatively untrained, tactically badly led, and ill-equipped conscript force can indeed strategically, organizationally, and tactically adapt under the right leadership.
“The assault was not led in by a reconnaissance force. It is uncertain whether there was any reconnaissance at all. As previously described, there was no artillery support after the fire plan lifted.”
“The lack of artillery forward observers; the described inadequacies of tactical communications; and ‘old-fashioned’ fire control practices mean an infantry company cannot conduct dynamic or ‘on call’ offensive support.”
Ukraine should receive Western main battle tanks including the Leopard II MBT. However, we need to be realistic about the impact of these platforms on the battlefield. Military success will not depend on a single platform or weapon system.
Rather, it will partially depend on the ability a.) to conduct large-scale combined arms operations & b.) keep a sufficient # of MBTs + other elements of the combined arms force (APC, AIFVs, self-propelled howitzers, air defense/EW systems etc.) in the field & armed.
To maximize the effectiveness of Western MBTs would also require adaptations to Ukraine tank warfare doctrine & a general changes in how MBTs are used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Wrote about this a few years back. Of the 16,000-strong column only one British officer, Assistant Surgeon William Brydon, would arrive in Jalalabad on January 13, 1842.
The rest of the 🇬🇧/imperial army had been killed, captured or wounded—the worst military defeat of the British Empire until the fall of Singapore a hundred years later in February 1942. thediplomat.com/2020/01/great-…@Diplomat_APAC
I followed a small section of the British/imperial route of retreat back in 2015.
I find it difficult to see how Ukraine could form more than 1 or 2 understrength armored brigades composed of Western-made main battle tanks over the next 12-24 months.
(excluding 🇩🇪 Leopard 1s)
We need to be realistic about the military impact of these tank deliveries should they take place on a larger scale (e.g., ~90-150+/- platforms).
Average 🇺🇦 mechanized brigade (~20-30 operational main battle tanks)
Average 🇺🇦 tank brigade (~60-100 main battle tanks)*