1/ Only 10% of Russians are firm ideological supporters of the war in Ukraine, according to a new political analysis. While more than half of Russians support Putin, their support is conditional and likely to fall as Russia's economy weakens amidst the continuing fighting. ⬇️ 
2/ The independent Russian media outlet 'We can explain' (MO) has published an analysis by the political scientist Abbas Gallyamov, a former Putin speechwriter who has been labelled a 'foreign agent' by the Russian government for his criticism of the regime.
3/ Gallyamov has analysed data from several dozen surveys conducted by the Levada Center and ZIRCON, which are well-regarded pollsters in Russia (despite the difficulties that pollsters experience in the current climate). MO summarises his analysis:
4/ "He divides Russian society into six groups with respect to the regime. About a third of citizens are in varying degrees of opposition to Putin:
5/ 👎 consistent opponents of the regime and the war (about 8%);
👎 "opposition periphery": democratically minded citizens who are unhappy with the war but afraid to speak out openly against it (about 15%);
👎 "opposition periphery": democratically minded citizens who are unhappy with the war but afraid to speak out openly against it (about 15%);
6/ 👎 "semi-opposition": they are not ideological enemies of the regime, but are dissatisfied with the quality of governance and life (about 10%).
7/ Loyal to Putin and generally support his actions (around 40%):
👍 aggressive anti-liberals, a steady core of support for Putin and the military operation (about 10%);
👍 aggressive anti-liberals, a steady core of support for Putin and the military operation (about 10%);
8/ 👍 "power periphery" - people who generally agree with Kremlin rhetoric but are unhappy with repression (around 20%): they have a mature demand for change;
9/ 👍 "semi-loyalists" - they support those with power and could swing towards the opposition (10%) if certain developments occur.
10/ 🤷 Another quarter of the population is apolitical and unstable in their sympathies – under the influence of aggressive propaganda they supported the invasion of Ukraine. But their interest in the war is fading fast and their quality of life is less and less pleasing."
11/ Gallyamov suggests that at the outbreak of the war, supporters and opponents of the regime were in rough equilibrium, with neither having a clear advantage. The war and repression have given the regime a greater advantage, but public opinion is still ambivalent overall.
12/ He writes that normally apolitical Russians initially formed a key pro-war constituency, becoming "sharply politicised and swayed towards the authorities - often in a radical way, supporting the shelling of towns, approving of what was happening in Bucha, etc.
13/ It was this process that provided the sense of momentum - the feeling that literally the whole of Russia was rallying in a single anti-Ukrainian impulse."
But this phenomenon has been relatively short-lived and has receded as the war has dragged on.
But this phenomenon has been relatively short-lived and has receded as the war has dragged on.
14/ The lack of Russian success in the war and Russia's economic deterioration mean that currently "they are losing interest in what is going on and are gradually becoming depoliticised.
15/ Members of this group are mostly poor and, faced with falling living standards, are forced to literally survive." As a result, these factors have "contributed to a gradual erosion of the regime's support base." /end
Also worth reading this reply for additional context:
https://twitter.com/Rail_splitter1/status/1624936877945135104
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