Russian forces continued ground attacks around #Bakhmut, in the Donetsk City-#Avdiivka area, and in the western part of Donetsk Oblast.🧵(1/9) isw.pub/UkrWar021723
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on #Bakhmut itself and near Fedorivka (20km north of Bakhmut), Rozdolivka (19km NE of Bakhmut), Paraskoviivka (9km north of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut).
3/ Geolocated footage published on February 17 of a Ukrainian armored fighting vehicle firing at Russian positions in northeastern #Bakhmut shows Russian forces have made minor advances toward Bakhmut’s city center.
4/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner assault detachments advanced into Paraskoviivka from three sides on the night of February 16 and are engaging in heavy fighting around the settlement.
5/ Russian milbloggers offered conflicting claims on Wagner Group positions near #Ivanivske: one milblogger claimed that Wagner forces advanced to the outskirts of Ivanivske, while another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Wagner forces away from the highway.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults along the outskirts of #Donetsk City near Sieverne and Vodyane (on the northwest outskirts) and Marinka and Novomykhailivka (on the southwestern outskirts).
7/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks on Vodyane, Novomykhailivka, and Pervomaiske (on the northwestern outskirts of #Donetsk city). Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces expanded their control within Marinka.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near #Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).
9/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Novosilka (65km southwest of #Donetsk City) and Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City) and attempted to advance south and east of #Vuhledar. isw.pub/UkrWar021723
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NEW: The PLA maintained a high number of incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone in October, consistent with the new normal it established since ROC President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration. (🧵1/4)
2/ Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ 370 times in October. The PRC increased ADIZ incursions significantly after Lai’s inauguration in May, with over 300 incursions every month since.
3/ A large portion of the total in October came from the 111 incursions on October 14 as part of the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan.
The high frequency of ADIZ incursions drains Taiwan’s resources, exhausts military personnel, and degrades Taiwan’s threat awareness. Taiwan does not scramble aircraft in response to all PRC ADIZ incursions, but it does put military personnel on standby to respond quickly if needed
Key takeaways from the latest Iran Update w/ @criticalthreats:
Post-War Control in the Gaza Strip: Fatah is attempting to extend its control over the Gaza Strip after the October 7 War, but Fatah’s lack of pro-Fatah Palestinian Authority (PA)-affiliated military forces in the Gaza Strip will make this extremely difficult. Fatah likely views the death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ weakened military position as an opportunity to confront Hamas over Hamas efforts to maintain control in the Gaza Strip.
2/ Israeli Military Operations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are conducting a major clearing operation across the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt militia reconstitution efforts. Palestinian militia elements could continue attacks in Jabalia after the IDF withdrew there in May 2024, though it was unclear how effective the Hamas military organization in Jabalia would continue to function. Hamas’ military wing has probably attempted to rebuild itself where possible in Jabalia since May 2024. It is unclear how successful these efforts would have been, however, given Hamas’ inability to resupply its fighters and attrition during Israeli operations in May.
3/ Iraqi Militias and Ballistic Missiles: The commander of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada boasted about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia ballistic missile capabilities on November 5, likely to deter potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi groups probably also seek to message their strength to gain more influence within the Axis of Resistance amid the severe weakening of the Axis’ previous crown jewel, Hezbollah. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have deepened collaboration with the Houthis since October 7, 2023, which could give Iraqi militias access to the knowledge necessary to do rudimentary ballistic missile production.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Kreminna, in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, northeast of Kurakhove, near Vuhledar, and north of Robotyne.
Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of Chasiv Yar.
2/ Kharkiv/Luhansk: Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 4 and 5. Geolocated footage published on November 4 and 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Novoselivske (southeast of Kupyansk) and to a windbreak in northern Terny (northwest of Kreminna).
3/ Chasiv Yar: Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on November 5. Geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of Chasiv Yar. Additional geolocated footage published on November 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar). Russian forces continued attacking near Chasiv Yar, Stupochky, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) on November 4 and 5.
In essence, Moscow was asking Ukraine to willingly give up its military, its offensive and defensive capabilities, its land, a significant portion of its population and economic capacity, and cease protecting its language, history, and culture. 🧵(1/6)
2/ The Kremlin has been incessant in its claims that it set out to negotiate in March 2022 (after illegally invading Ukraine) but that it was Ukraine and the collective West that destroyed the prospect of negotiations.
3/ The RFE/RL investigation supports ISW's long-standing assessment that this was never the case, however, and that Russia never intended to negotiate in good faith with Ukraine.
West Bank: The Israeli Defense Minister emphasized that Iran is “pouring everything [it] can” into the West Bank, indicating that Iran will very likely attempt to pursue a different strategy when rebuilding Hamas to fight Israel again.
2/ Syria: The IDF captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria. This Iranian-led intelligence effort is likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to undertake small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.
3/ Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The Israeli prime minister stated that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” to achieve Israel's stated war aims, which is to return residents of northern Israel to their homes under safe conditions. Current Israeli operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to achieve these war aims, though it does not follow that future Israeli operations will fail to achieve the Israeli objectives.
The implications of a long-term alignment between Russia and North Korea extend far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine and may have long-term impacts on the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Asia-Pacific region.
2/ The war in Ukraine will change the character of all future wars, and Pyongyang has evidently identified this fact as a vital learning opportunity for its forces.
North Korea's military has not experienced large-scale conventional combat since 1953 and understands that its doctrine is unprepared to fight in a modern war, especially against a sophisticated adversary such as South Korea.
3/ North Korea likely hopes that its forces will have the opportunity to refine offensive doctrine, test their weapons systems against a Western-provisioned adversary, gain command and control experience, and learn how to operate drones and electronic warfare systems on the modern battlefield.
Pyongyang likely hopes that any skills its troops learn in the Ukraine war will give it an offensive edge in future conflicts, including on the Korean Peninsula.