Russian forces continued ground attacks around #Bakhmut and made tactical gains in the area on 23 FEB. Russian forces also continued ground attacks in the #Avdiivka-Donetsk City area in western Donetsk Oblast. 🧵(1/8) isw.pub/UkrWar022323
Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have made incremental advances in the eastern, southern, and southwestern sectors of Bakhmut.
3/ Footage posted by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin on February 23 and later geolocated shows him visiting #Wagner troops in eastern #Bakhmut within 500m of the current frontline, although Prigozhin claimed he was within 400m of the frontline.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka area north of Donetsk City on February 23. Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Avdiivka in the Novobakhmutivka area.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 23.
Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have also advanced to #Pobieda, indicating that Russian troops have likely made additional gains south of #Marinka.
6/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops continue attacks along the northwestern outskirts of #Donetsk City and that DNR fighters are making territorial gains within #Marinka itself.
Russian forces continued ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City in the #Vuhledar area on February 23 with Ukrainian sources noting that Russian forces have recently increased their activity in the sector.
8/ @DefenceHQ warned that Russian forces in this area may be preparing for yet another offensive on #Vuhledar.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are fighting southeast of Vuhledar between Pavlivka and Mykilske. isw.pub/UkrWar022323
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The United States currently prohibits Ukrainian forces from using ATACMS missiles to strike military targets in Russia and only allows strikes using US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS — at maximum permitting Ukraine to strike only 20 out of the 250 objects it could strike with ATACMS.
Only 17 of these 250 objects are airfields, and it is unlikely that the Russian military has redeployed assets away from all the other 233 objects to the same degree as it has reportedly done with aviation assets. 🧵(1/6)
2/ US officials’ comments centered on Russia’s redeployment of air assets have so far largely ignored the majority of targets in range of ATACMS that Ukrainian forces could strike if US prohibitions were lifted.
3/ Many of the 233 military and paramilitary objects in range of ATACMS are large military bases, communications stations, logistics centers, repair facilities, fuel depots, ammunition warehouses, and permanent headquarters that would be extremely difficult or impossible to quickly redeploy assets from or rapidly harden.
NEW: Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater, and the lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons would allow Ukrainian forces to strike a wide range of significant targets undergirding Russia’s war effort. 🧵(1/8)
An unnamed senior Biden administration national security official reportedly stated that Ukrainian strikes with Western-provided weapons against targets within Russia would not be effective because the Russian military has redeployed military aircraft from Russian airbases near Ukraine — but this assessment ignores how Russian forces are leveraging sanctuary space in deep rear areas within Russia for a wide array of infrastructure besides airfields to support military operations against Ukraine.
2/ Politico reported on August 23 that an unnamed senior Biden administration national security official stated that Russian officials have moved some targets out of range of Western-provided Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles and that Ukrainian forces only have a limited supply of these missiles.
An unnamed administration official also reportedly stated that Russian forces have moved 90 percent of the aircraft that conduct glide bomb strikes from Russian airspace away from airfields within range of Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles.
3/ ISW has observed confirmation of redeployments of Russian aircraft to airfields out of range of Western-provided long-range weapons; and the reported decreased Russian aviation activity throughout the theater is consistent with reports that Russian forces have been redeploying aviation assets.
NEW: Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance near Sudzha amid continued Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast on August 23.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
More Key Takeaways ⬇️🧵(1/7)
2/ Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukrainian forces can leverage tactical and technological advantages to offset Russian materiel advantages.
3/ US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 23.
NEW: Ukrainian forces marginally advanced throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast on August 22.
The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts. 🧵(1/5)
2/ The scale of the redeployment of the 56th VDV Regiment is unclear from available information in the open source but is consistent w/ ISW’s observation that Russia has been pulling forces from less critical sectors of the frontline such as Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.
3/ ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military will likely continue prioritizing Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine – namely in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions.
NEW: Iranian interest in the progress of Gaza Strip ceasefire-hostage negotiations suggests that elements of the Iranian regime are likely delaying a retaliatory strike on Israel until ceasefire talks conclude. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The Iranian security establishment may calculate that a continued delay will generate operational surprise while forgoing strategic surprise, though the continued Iranian delay has also enabled the United States to move more assets into the theater to defend against an attack.
3/ Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on August 21. Hezbollah launched two separate one-way attack drone attacks targeting IDF surveillance infrastructure Jal al Alam and Israeli forces at Kiryat Shmona. Hezbollah also launched Katyusha rockets targeting Israeli forces in Ramot Naftali, northern Israel.
Exploiting Russian Vulnerabilities: A Strategy of Persistence and Momentum
The Kremlin is cognizant of its vulnerabilities and Western opportunities to exploit them. US persistence and momentum are key to denying Russia the ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Western strategy should focus not only on imposing multiple dilemmas on the Kremlin but also on imposing the most painful ones.
First, Russia’s military failures are a lynchpin that makes other actions to degrade Russia’s military capability more effective.
3/ Helping Ukraine restore maneuver to the battlefield, building on momentum afforded by Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, and reinforcing the already successful efforts to demilitarize Crimea are therefore strategic, not only operational, priorities.