🧵Remember how, because of “globalization,” communist China was to become more open, more democratic, more like us-to quote a former U.S. official: “a responsible stakeholder in the international system”? This was nonsense, showing how little we understood culture and history.1/
Here is a small example of how off-base we were: EY China staff is being encouraged to wear Communist party badges on.ft.com/3Y4843K Rather than democratizing, the PRC has reasserted its commitment to the very ideology that, in CCP’s view, made China’s rise possible. 2/
Had we paused for a minute in 1991 and thought of what happens each time a country rapidly modernizes, three things hold: 1. The country becomes more geostrategically assertive and expansionist; 2. The leadership and political class become more self-confident; and finally, 3/
Rapid modernization strengthens the extant ideological and axiological underpinnings of the state and society. Simply put: It reaffirms and consolidates the institutions of the state and society that are being credited with the country’s modernization and economic success. 4/
Did we really believe that, once modernized, #PRC would follow a different path and not reaffirm the culture, ideology and its state model? The assumption that trade with and investment in China would democratize it was folly. Instead, it strengthened the PRC—our adversary. End/
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🧵As I watch delays in weapons and munitions deliveries to #Ukraine amidst incessant talk about “redlines” and “risk of escalation, let me offer a few thoughts. First,why are we second-guessing ourself as to what Russian reaction might be when #Europe’s security is at stake? 1/
The reality is that we are self-imposing those redlines. We keep communicating our anxiety at every turn, while we should actually keep Russia guessing as to what we will do when it comes to both policy and weapons deliveries to #Ukraine. In effect, we are “self-deterring.” 2/
On my 2nd point, i.e., the risk of escalation let’s remember that in the final analysis we have limited capacity to control what Putin does next. I say this not to dismiss the threat but to focus on what we need to do to help #Ukraine win because it is fighting for us as well.3/
🧵I have read reports of leaks that Germany and France are talking about offering #Ukraine a security guarantee if it agrees to peace talks with Russia/
Assuming these reports are accurate, let me point out a few basic facts: 1. Russia has shown no interest in peace talks. 1/
Any peace deal now would amount to a Russian victory. Pushing for negotiations now would amount to another case of appeasement towards Russia. 2. No country in Europe has military power sufficient to guarantee #Ukraine's security without the United States at the table. 2/
If you doubt me, ask yourself which country other than the US has logistical capacity to execute the supply operation that has kept #Ukraine in the fight for a year. 3. A guarantee against Russia must include a credible nuclear deterrent. Which EUR country could provide it?3/
🧵It's fair to ask why the US has not had many foreign policy successes during the three post-Cold War decades. This in contrast to the Cold War era, when the overall strategy of containment proved effective in leading democracies to victory-notwithstanding occasional detours.1/
Let me suggest a possible explanation. The end of the Cold War was marked by triumphalism that was matched only by our conviction that institutions would always trump culture, that the key to democratization worldwide was effective institution-building. 2/
The argument that "anyone can become like us" eliminated Area Studies as a pathway to tenure in US academia, with cohort after cohort of institutionalists and model-builders graduated from our colleges and universities entering our government, think tanks and our corporations. 3/
🧵We need a larger conversation with our European @NATO allies on how they interact with Russia and especially China going forward when it comes to trade and technology. We need to take a page from the Cold War playbook when it comes to transfers of sensitive technology. 1/
Russia is a neo-imperial revisionist state. Secretary Austin described as China as America’s “pacing threat." We need to work closely with our allies and partners to ensure they do not feed technology and money to our adversary in Asia. 2/
I've advocated that @NATO restore COCOM restrictions from the Cold War era. COCOM (The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) was established after WWII to control what technology was allowed to be sold to the Soviet bloc. 3/
🧵Moving between speeches, panels and round tables here at @MunSecConf I suddenly had this eerie feeling that perhaps this is what 1938 in Europe must have felt like. We all know that there is a storm brewing outside, but here inside the Bayerischer Hoff all seems normal. 1/
Shaking hands with European and American friends I have worked with over the past three decades, making new acquaintances—it all seems so routine. And yet it all changes suddenly when a Ukrainian parliamentarian pointedly tells the audience we are failing to act fast enough. 2/
Or when a Moldovan speaks of her country hanging by the fingernails, not knowing what comes tomorrow. Or when a Finn, a Balt, or a Pole doesn’t mince words to tell us all the truth about what’s riding on this war. But then the conversation seems to revert back to platitudes.3/
🧵Many insightful discussions yesterday and today at @MunSecConf, with a lot of brain power in the room and good analysis of where European security is today.But it makes me wonder why almost a year into the #UkraineWar democracies still appear to be in denial about the threat.1/
I am waiting for our leaders to speak directly to the people about what is at stake in this war. Putin has framed the war as a civilizational struggle against the U.S., NATO and the collective West. If he were to win, the consequences would reverberate both in Europe & Asia 2/
If #Ukraine were to lose the lesson Beijing would learn would be that the West has no staying power. That we talk the talk but don’t walk the walk. It would raise the risk of a wider war in Europe & the Indo-Pacific, for notwithstanding our wealth, we would be seen as weak . 3/